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Abstract  
 
Why does externally driven democratization lead to different outcomes? The mainstream view in 
the literature reveals that the countries that enjoy closer political, geographic, economic, and 
cultural ties have better chances to democratize. The regimes that lack these connections or 
consume authoritarian assistance, however, risk becoming an autocracy. The recently developed 
theories shift the blame to domestic actors. These arguments are compelling, although they 
represent the pieces of a bigger puzzle called “competitive regime promotion.” This study takes 
an integrative approach and develops the theory of a coordinated competition.  
     
This theory argues that competing pressures are effective in curbing the unwillingness of domestic 
actors to democratize. The primary mechanism through which it achieves this goal is the 
competitive pressures pluralizing the local political sphere. This diversification creates 
opportunities for lengthy negotiations. It imposes mutual constraints on the different sets of 
external and internal actors. The inclusion of contending forces in political decision-making 
creates a peaceful environment for democratization.  
     
This theory has a reservation. The competition between autocracy and democracy promoters might 
be subversive in polarized and divided societies that are unable to coordinate with one another. 
This study tests these assumptions using a process-tracing methodology and the qualitative data 
on the cases of Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Ukraine. They are typical cases 
falling under competing pressures and lacking coordination with varied intensity. I suggest a 
methodological framework with which to measure the external political competition and the 
competitive edge of external competitors. 
     
The empirical analysis indicates three main findings. First, the external political competition leads 
to democracy in coordinated societies. The competitive pressures may distribute the political 
power in a way that may cause political pluralism to emerge. However, in coordinated societies, 
fractionalized societies democratize faster than homogeneous ones. Second, the external political 
competition generates hybrid regimes in uncoordinated societies. In this case, polarized societies 
or polarized and fractionalized societies could be conflict driven. Third, the absence of external 
political competition makes coordinated and uncoordinated societies stable autocracies.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
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1. Setting the scene  
 
My childhood memories stirred up my curiosity for the process of democratization and democracy 
promotion. In 1992, war erupted in the region of Abkhazia in Georgia, where I was born. After 
months of hostilities, the Russian Air Force carried out air strikes against ethnically populated 
Georgian villages and cities. At that point, my parents decided to relocate to the other side in 
Georgia. When we arrived in the southwestern coastal town, we encountered foreigners greeting 
us in Georgian with a heavy American accent and providing humanitarian aid. This different 
behavior awakened my childish curiosity, and the very first question I asked my parents was why 
the Russians bombed Georgia, but the Americans aided the country. They did not answer, just 
smiled. At that time, I did not know that Europe existed.  
 
The major players of the international system have competing views on how and what kind of 
politics others should pursue. These differences constrain the actors of democratization and 
determine the outcomes of political regimes around the world. The puzzling results of this external 
competition motivate democracy scholars to render causal primacy to different factors and actors 
for pinning down why some countries successfully democratize while others fail to profit from 
democratic assistance. This dissertation follows the same thinking and uncovers the mechanism of 
external democratization. The theory that I develop explains how externally imposed competing 
power structures influence the domestic elites in democratization and how these structurally 
constrained interactions lead to specific political regimes. 
1.1. The study of competitive promotion: theoretical relevance and political 
implications    
 
The central questions that guides the scholarship of the external democratization are why we must 
be cautious about exporting democracy and what political implications emerge from its diffusion. 
The underlying argument is that democratization contains the dangers of conflict depending on the 
domestic conditions of a specific country (Mansfield, Snyder 1995), and the conditions that lead 
to successful democratization are not equivalent to those of a successful promotion (Burnell 
2000:5). These conditions are germane to the localization of the diffused norms because they might 
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delegitimize the potential adopters or threaten their status (Acharya 2004:248). The challenges 
could be structural, as the regime path dependency selects from among critical alternatives 
(Mahoney 2001:113), and the institutional inheritance puts extra constraints on the political 
conducts of actors in democratization (Przeworski, Gandhi 2007; Wright, Escribà-Folch 2012).  
        
Democracy promotion spreads fear not only among the incumbent elites within a particular country 
but among the political elites of regional powers (Risse, Babayan 2015). The installment of 
democracy as a governing regime restricts these powerful groups that perceive external intrusions 
as the attempt to alter the status quo, thus inviting them to engage in confrontation. It leads to an 
authoritarian counter-promotion, which undermines the efforts of external democratizers with 
similar instruments that are used for building democracies worldwide. As a result, handling or 
mishandling domestic affairs becomes the subject of international controversies (Werner 2000). 
That is why outsiders seek to cultivate “reliable insiders” and fight for creating “affine groups” 
(Acharya 2004; Werner 2000). These political implications make studying competing promotion 
theoretically relevant. 
        
The external actors use diverse strategies; for instance, recent scholarship has found that the 
European Union had better and positive effects on good governance than on democracy in the 
countries to which it promised membership (Schimmelfennig, Börzel 2017:291). The same study 
shows that it stops producing such effects after membership. There are two interpretations of these 
findings. First, by offering a membership, the external democratizers increase their competitive 
edge in the domestic political sphere vis-à-vis external autocratizers. Second, the transformative 
forces are different at the stages of democratization and democratic consolidation. The foreign 
competition decreases at the consolidation phase because the candidate countries become 
members, and the membership eliminates the conditional dependency. The recent developments 
in Hungary and Poland are good examples of this explanation. 
       
The post-soviet countries are a theoretically and politically useful domain by which to study 
competing promotion. Specifically, these countries had a common antecedent condition: Soviet 
rule and its subsequent collapse. Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Ukraine were the 
targets of competing influences to a varying degree, and the rate of this competition fluctuated 
across the time and space. Their citizens had divergent views on the accomplishment of political 
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tasks. These cleavages of perceptions on the political role and place in the international 
environment affected the likelihood of cooperation among societal and political groups and 
structures to attain a desirable democratic outcome. Also, the state-building, liberalization, 
transition, and democratization processes were simultaneous in these countries. The 
disaggregation of the hypothesized mechanism of competing foreign pressures in the baseline case 
of Georgia at distinct periods and under different conditions details regime transformation stages 
and sequences (O’Donnell, Schmitter 1986; Rustow 1970). The examination of the explanatory 
variable of external competition across the cases of Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and 
Ukraine informs how these competitive pressures influence a political transformation. 
     
The insights that I draw from this study have theoretical and political relevance and potential to 
extend its application on transitional regimes, which are overarched by contending influences of 
major international players. For more empirical evidence, I will describe a few examples. The 
post-World War II democratization of Turkey is a stark example of how competing foreign 
influences and the domestic demand for a democratic transition affected the flow of 
democratization. The early phase of the Cold War reshaped Turkish foreign policy toward the 
Soviet Union. The Potsdam conference made the Turkish–Soviet divides visible. This controversy 
encouraged Americans to include Turkey under the Truman Doctrine and granted Western aid and 
NATO membership (Zürcher 2004:208-208,235). The external actors continued to play its role at 
the next tides of Turkish democratization (Huntington 1991).  
 
Serbia is another example where the competing influences do not meet the required criteria of the 
country’s structure and dynamics. The international community was careful in its rapprochement 
with Serbia and other former Yugoslavian states. In the course of the Balkan conflicts, the UN 
Security Council adopted Resolution 713 on the arms embargo,1 which was believed to contribute 
to the disproportional armament of conflicting parties (Kozljak 2013). In 1992, the sanctions 
against Serbia and Montenegro2 remained inconsequential for those under threat until the 
involvement of NATO. A competitive edge of autocracy promoters increased in the region. 
      
                                                          
1 http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/713  
2 https://www.nato.int/ifor/un/u920530a.htm  
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The EU democratizing pressures have been regarded as less exasperating and more permissive of 
careful planning for enduring democratic resistance against the authoritarian subjugations in Serbia 
and Bosnia. The societal disorientation of these states made the outcome of the unsupported 
pressures highly uncertain. It is essential to coordinate societal factors when the countries fall 
under the umbrella of competition. Finlandization is a revealing process of how Finland managed 
to materialize democracy through EU membership alongside the competitive Russian influence. 
Economically motivated societal groups partially incited Sweden’s decision to join the EU 
(Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2002). Sweden, as an example, shows the relevance of societal 
coordination and domestic pressures for the consolidated and democratizing regimes. The 
theoretical and empirical puzzles in post-soviet countries and beyond provoke central questions in 
this research. 
1.2. The central questions  
 
The guiding questions of this dissertation follow: How and under which circumstances does the 
external political competition lead to democracy? What are the domestic conditions needed to 
coordinate external political competition? How do these domestic and external factors affect the 
political liberalization, the rule of law, elections, and the gatekeeping of actors? Teasing out the 
answers to these questions requires explaining domestic politics and understanding the causal 
power of the international system (McFaul 2010b). This global environment’s structure defines 
the bargaining power of diverse actors. Knowing the cost of democratization is crucial to managing 
the democracy promotion process (Mansfield, Snyder 1995) and to minimizing possibilities of 
either democratic backsliding or conflict-prone outcomes. 
 
These central questions necessitate zooming in the domestic political sphere. I examine the menu 
of choices of the actors (McFaul 2010b:4) and their coordinative capacities. The combinations of 
the external political competition and a domestic coordination differently influence the political 
opening of authoritarian elites. They explain how the vertical and horizontal accountabilities 
develop in democratizing countries and how they aid or disrupt the gatekeeping potential of 
political elites.  
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1.3. The central arguments  
 
In this study, I developed the theory of coordinated competition. I argue that the competition 
between democracy and autocracy promoters can be beneficial for a democratic transformation. 
The general logic of the central argument is that the integration of authoritarian and democratic 
actors into the process of democratization reduces the chances of violent overthrow. This inclusion 
contains authoritarian actors, while their elimination increases the possibilities of violence. The 
implication of this containment is twofold. First, it forms a stable environment for building 
democracy. Second, the competition among the proxies of authoritarian and democratic outsiders 
decomposes the power (Knight 1992) and does not allow its centralization because a diverse set 
of actors is empowered within the political and societal layers.  
  
The external political competition could be dangerous when the intra-societal and political 
cleavages (Caramani 2004) over the nationalization of foreign policy are high. The target countries 
could not coordinate because the masses and political elites are either polarized or polarized and 
fractionalized. In this setup, the external political competition increases polarization and produces 
conflict-driven hybrid regimes. For instance, the case of Ukraine is a non-accommodating example 
of external political competition because it is polarized between the Ukrainians and the Russians 
on a mass level. The division between the political elites follows the same logic, although a vast 
number of oligarchs also make it fractionalized.  
 
The civil war in El Salvador is another example. The country’s society was homogenous but 
polarized. The militaries and oligarchs were against the peasants. The Liberation Front, FMLN, 
was established to challenge the government. The communists of Cuba and the Soviet Union 
supported the FMLN, while Carter’s and Reagan’s administrations aided the government (Joes 
2000:260-261). In this situation, civil war was inevitable, but ultimately, a peace agreement was 
signed amidst the Soviet breakdown (Green 2018:72). The external political competition 
aggravated this situation by increasing the transaction costs of elites, on which democratic 
transformation depends (O’Donnell, Schmitter 1986; Przeworski, Gandhi 2007; Wright, Escribà-
Folch 2012). As polarization or polarization and fractionalization decomposes power by default, 
it permits the hybridity of a regime. Such societies have no incentive to coordinate and develop 
into war-prone hybrid regimes.  
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In homogeneous and fractionalized societies, coordination is possible. External political 
competition pluralizes these societies and checks their powers. The external support helps the 
contending groups participate in political decision-making. These institutional leverages guarantee 
that they will not be permanent losers. With this sense of confidence, they make a peaceful 
environment for building democracy and constructively struggle. Without the external political 
competition, coordinated and uncoordinated societies transform into stable autocracies. In 
polarized or polarized and fractionalized societies, the absence of the external political competition 
reduces the chances of conflict, although this societal and political structure does not permit them 
to moderate their preferred policies. This rigidity makes political regimes autocratic. Homogenous 
and fractionalized societies follow a similar course of action. As long as they have no external 
sources that breed the repressive mechanisms, the conflicts can be avoided. 
1.4. Filling the gap: key contributions   
 
This dissertation contributes to expanding the literature about this filed in various ways. First, it 
develops a novel theory of a coordinated competition, which explains the different outcomes of 
democratization. This alternative explanation synthesizes the structural and agency-based 
approaches and uncovers the causal pathway leading toward democracy. Second, one of the 
substantial gaps in the literature of international dimension is how to measure the bargaining power 
of actors involved in democratization. We acknowledge that complete information and perfect 
knowledge regarding the distribution of power allow us to estimate outcomes and effectively 
resolve conflicts (McFaul 2010b:14), but no such measure was created. To address this issue, I 
develop a methodological framework. It can calculate the intensity of external political 
competition between autocracy and democracy promoters. This comparative analysis will give a 
detailed picture of external democratization. Third, this research builds on original qualitative data, 
which includes primary and secondary sources. The direct participants, top decision makers, 
journalists, and experts explain to what extent external incentives and disincentives, as well as 
institutional structures, account for regime outcomes. Fourth, this research provides an in-depth 
analysis of externally driven democratizing processes in Georgia, considering the national, 
regional, and international factors. No research has yet thoroughly tackled these issues. 
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1.5. The structure of this dissertation     
 
This dissertation is composed of nine chapters. First is the theory chapter, which details the central 
theoretical arguments. The second chapter puts forward methodological approaches, defines 
independent and dependent variables, and describes the main concepts. The third chapter tests the 
overarching hypothesis about the competing interests of democratic and autocratic external 
players. The other five chapters thoroughly examine different regime periods across twenty-four 
years and test hypotheses. The final chapter tests the theoretical assumptions in Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Ukraine. The conclusion summarizes main findings and states the 
limitations of this study. 
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CHAPTER 2 A THEORY OF COORDINATED 
COMPETITION  
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2. Who promotes, why, and how?   
 
Why is democracy promoted abroad? Diffusing liberal ideas aided democratizing countries in 
producing democratic peace (Owen 1994). The proponents of democratic peace theory provide 
supporting arguments for this thesis. Notably, liberal norms do not allow a monopoly over the 
political power, and if conflicts emerge, democracies prefer a peaceful resolution (Russett 1993:4). 
The underlying logic is that democratic institutions prevent actors from engaging in violence. They 
also require popular consent for making such decisions, which awakens rationalist reasoning in 
public deliberations (Chan 1997:77-81). According to normative thinking, democracies ally 
themselves to cooperate and to check their powers through organizational memberships (Chan 
1997:83; Russett, Oneal 1999:20). The robustness of democratic peace theory is also tested against 
cultural factors. The results support that cultural differences might obstruct but cannot prevent the 
preservation of democratic peace (Henderson 1998:481). A critical aspect is a kind of democracy. 
For instance, partial democracies tend to rage wars with a limited intensity (Chan 1997:83; 
Rummel 1983:67, 1995:457). This finding calls for identifying the peace-building and war-
triggering attributes of democracy (Chan 1997:65).  
 
The great power leaders justified their political decisions based on these points (Owen 2010:1). 
However, spreading liberalism and pressuring undemocratic leaders proves a complicated task 
considering the opportunity structures and the willingness of domestic actors to design democratic 
institutions (Gleditsch 2002; Most, Starr 1980; Starr 1978). Geographic proximity or the “neighbor 
effect” are structural opportunities that create contingency to establish transitional connections 
with democratic states. In this way, structures make domestic actors interdependent on the 
international, regional, and national levels and explain their willingness to democratize (Gleditsch 
2002; Kopstein, Reilly 2000; Whitehead 2001). The global context might deprive democracy of 
its peacebuilding capacity (Gleditsch 1992:374). These variables are regarded as being causally 
powerful in explaining the logic of a democratic diffusion. The fact that authoritarian rivals were 
unable to provide countervailing resources made vulnerable transitional regimes move toward 
democratizing pressures and encouraged the success stories of the post-communist 
democratization in Europe. Democracy scholars share a prevailing view that only domestic factors 
cannot explain the different trajectories of regime change as external governments, and institutions 
have their strategic interests at stake. Their cost–benefit calculation affects the democratization in 
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a particular country (Ambrosio 2009; Huntington 1991; Levitsky, Way 2006; McFaul 2010; 
Pridham 1997; Schimmelfennig, Engert, Knobel 2003; Tolstrup 2014; Vachudova 2005; 
Whitehead, Schmitter 2001).  
  
From this outlook, scholars agree regarding who democratizes and why. The question about how 
to democratize remains contested. Finding a receipt of successful democratization is difficult. 
Something that is optimal for one institution or actor might have a different impact for other 
domestic and external counterparts. The post-soviet states are telling examples. The Baltic States 
consolidated democracies, while others stumbled on their way or remained immediate forerunners. 
The varieties in the underlying conditions of democratization were assigned a challenging task of 
theorizing the typologies of democracy promotion mechanisms.  
  
In this chapter, I review the theories of external democratization. Then, I argue why we need a 
different account to synthesize the concomitant effects of the international system, geopolitical, 
and domestic contexts. Doing this requires case-specific scholarship, which narrows the research 
focus, meticulously tests existing theories of external democratization (Teorell 2010:7; Weyland 
2010: 1170), and identifies a new explanatory variable.  
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2.1. The state of the art: varieties of external democracy and autocracy 
promotion 
   
There are different logics to build the new democratic orders across the regions. The most 
widespread conception is a diffusion process, in which a democratic innovation is communicated 
over time and across actors (Rogers 1962:5). Also, it is called “neighbor emulation,” which leads 
to the induction that the countries reproduce the policies of others (Whitehead 2001:5-6). In this 
process, the political regimes in sending and receiving countries account for either facilitated or 
disrupted “mimetic processes” (Brinks, Coppedge 2006:465; DiMaggio, Powell 1991:69). These 
political, economic, and cultural stocks (Kopstein, Reilly 2000:13) give rise to authoritarian 
preemptive reforms and the termination or blockage of a democratic diffusion (Weyland, 
2010:1148). We see that geographic dependences are not the sole determinants of strategic 
relationships among the states. Space is a more encompassing concept (Beck, Gleditsch, Beardsley 
2006:32). Democratic and autocratic norms are diffused and fused in that space. The stories of 
successful democratization in Western and Post-Communist Eastern Europe, as well as some Latin 
American countries, are related to zeitgeist, which widens a time horizon (Linz, Stepan 1996:76).  
 
Other theories explain democratization outcomes based on constructivist and rationalist premises. 
The former emphasizes the importance of socialization, lesson-drawing, and learning mechanisms. 
Socialization is a process of building networks and alliances through shared values and identities 
(Checkel 2005; Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2004). For instance, East Germany and 
Czechoslovakia were normative democratizers, despite their path-dependence on authoritarian 
regimes (Welzel, Inglehart 2008:133). The dissatisfaction and willingness “to fix what is broken” 
are lesson-drawing impetuses for voluntary democratization (Rose 1991:10-11). Learning is the 
process of transferring knowledge that requires information and expertise connections (Elkins, 
Simmons 2005).  
 
Opposite this, the rational reasoning explains the regime transformation through coercive pressures 
that increase interdependence (DiMaggio, Powell 1991; Gilardi 2013). One such strategy is 
conditionality, which garners a series of coercive levers (Schmitter 2001:30). Conditionality is “a 
bargaining instrument with which the actors involved are assumed to be strategic players and for 
which the outcome depends on their bargaining powers” (Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2004:671). 
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These normative, persuasive, and rational mechanisms can function concomitantly. Autocratic and 
democratic outsiders might use them. These logics cannot always be linear and constant within the 
set of domestic actors because their normative, persuasive, or rational preferences change over 
time and across context. Thus, the influencers are cautious about the regional constellations and 
the popular or political moods while designing and applying specific models of democracy or 
autocracy promotion. There are leverage, linkage, and governance models (Lavenex, 
Schimmelfennig 2011; Lavenex 2013; Levitsky, Way 2006). These models target different 
domestic actors and use diverse channels to diffuse democratic norms. 
 
The root model is leverage. Levitsky and Way define it as “an authoritarian government’s 
suseptability to democratizing efforts, when international actors influence it through different 
coercive tools” (Levitsky, Way 2005:21, 2010:40-41). The three main conditions should be in 
place to let the leverage produce democracy. First, the strength and size of the state measures a 
target country’s capability (Levitsky, Way 2007). These measures encompass geographic, 
political, and economic advantages over the influencers. For instance, Russia is territorially vast 
and resource-rich. It is the third trading partner of the EU (Ambrosio 2009:17) and the second 
supplier of energy. Russia represents a nuclear power and has a veto right in the UN Security 
Council (Risse, Babayan 2015:382). The same is true of China. These external actors cannot be 
leveraged and are autocracy promoters with different intents (Vanderhill 2013). The second factor 
is the divided foreign policy objectives of Western democratizers. Presumably, autocracy 
promoters successfully exploit these divisions. The third requirement is the presence of “Black 
Knights” (Levitsky, Way 2007:51; Tolstrup 2015), which control the cross-border spread of 
democracy (Whitehead 2001:9) by subversion, bolstering and insulation (Ambrosio 2007, 
2009:19). 
 
The competition of the “White Knights” and “Black Knights” is treated as the curtailer of 
democratization. This cross-conditionality should be either absent or minimized so as not to disrupt 
the flow of democratic norms (Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2004:674). The inference is that the 
dirty others (Börzel 2015) become a democracy blocker (Babayan 2015). The type of leverage 
puts strains on their authoritarian conduct. For instance, active leverage is a contextually different 
process in which international organizations and target governments formalize the process of 
accession and determine membership requirements. It is called acquis conditionality. The veto 
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players do not define adoption costs because at the accession stage, the states are consolidated 
democracies (Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2004:680; Vachudova 2005). The passive leverage and 
democratic conditionality set pre-determined conditions for a membership perspective. The 
potential accession is contingent on the democratic performance of a country. The benefits that are 
the stick to this carrot are economic and political (Vachudova 2005:65). Strategically motivated 
blockers are capable of determining “adoption costs by affecting the credibility of threats and 
promises” (Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2004:672). 
 
The leverage model targets polity and aims to democratize political institutions by 
intergovernmental channels (Lavenex 2013:144). Its label is also a political approach in which the 
democracy promoters target core political processes and institutions to have fair elections and 
value for political and civil rights to make political processes democratically meaningful 
(Carothers 2009:5). Why are institutions essential to understanding the actions of domestic actors? 
Institutions formulate rules, procedures, strategies, and beliefs and assign roles that create rule-
bound political behavior. They identify the normative and anticipated activities of the actors and 
their political consequences (March, Olsen 1989:17-24). 
 
The linkage model signifies social, intergovernmental, economic, informational, and civil society 
networks in the context of geographic proximity (Levitsky, Way 2006, 2007). It targets societies 
and roots democratic culture through transnational channels and the socialization mechanism 
(Lavenex 2013:144). This model is considered to be influential to raise costs for authoritarian 
leaders by voicing their wrongdoings and leveraging them through decentralized international 
networks that are difficult to control (Levitsky, Way 2006:384-385). However, the linkage without 
high leverage does not positively affect democratization (Levitsky, Way 2006:379-380), and they 
may promote democracy and autocracy depending on which actor uses them (Tolstrup 2013:721). 
Scholars shift their focus on domestic constellations to unfold structurally non-explained patterns 
of democratization. To accomplish this, they suggest multiple categories, such as consent from 
local groups, “gatekeeper elites,” and “inner-directed linkages” (Pridham 1997; Tolstrup 2014; 
Whitehead 2001). The inference derived from these arguments is that without pro-democracy state 
elites, democracy promotion is ineffective (Schimmelfennig, Engert, Knobel 2003:514; Tolstrup 
2013). 
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Having recognized the importance of domestic actors, the EU designed the European 
Neighborhood Policy to employ external governance model to transfer its rule beyond EU borders 
and to develop relationships with its Eastern and Southern neighbors. External governance 
corresponds to a medium range model, which is neither biased toward political elites nor merely 
focused on deepening ties with target societies. This model is oriented toward sectoral cooperation 
and builds horizontal networks with the administrative entities to democratize their structures and 
affect their policy-making via trans-governmental channels (Lavenex, Schimmelfennig 2009, 
2011; Lavenex 2013).  
 
Alternatively, few scholars focus on the models of authoritarian promotion and call for measuring 
authoritarian engagement in external democratization. They are concerned with the complexities 
of interdependent counter-promotions that do not allow accurate assessments of international links 
to domestic conditions and their subsequent effects on regime outcomes (Ambrosio 2009, 2010; 
Burnell 2011; Vanderhill 2013, 2014). Ambrosio developed the most comprehensive theoretical 
framework, which captures the logic of authoritarian persistence against democratizing efforts. He 
suggests the five mechanisms of authoritarian promotion: “insulation, redefinition, bolstering, 
subversion, and coordination” (Ambrosio 2009:6). Insulation and redefinition are the strategies of 
domestic autocrats. The insulation strategy bans citizens from traveling abroad, developing 
economic connection outside the country, or being exposed to foreign media. The redefinition 
strategy relates to the interpretation of the democracy promotion agenda by domestic authoritarian 
regimes (Ambrosio 2007, 2009). These adjustments give rise to “democracy with adjectives” 
(Collier, Levitsky 1997). In contrast, bolstering is a policy of sustaining politically, economically, 
and militarily authoritarian regimes overseas. Subversion is an extreme form of external 
authoritarian involvement, which aims at toppling or removing unwanted governments through 
military interventions or revolutions. Coordination is the process of building authoritarian alliances 
and institutionalizing cooperation with authoritarian international organizations (Ambrosio 
2009:22-24). 
 
From this vast array of models and explanatory factors, we still do not have a general theory that 
links the tenets of these above-described theories to democratization. There are extensive studies 
on how democratic and autocratic actors influence domestic political processes, but their effects 
are detached and separately analyzed. We have limited knowledge about the mechanisms that 
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describe how these different influences interact and shape political regimes. Given that the polity 
and society consist of diverse actors, they decide what kind of control to succumb to. The same 
actors exchange and transmit these influences. This struggle for advancing their own agendas 
defines the directions of political regime.  
2.2. What do we miss?  
 
This study seeks to show what makes external democratization possible (Rustow 1970:337; Sartori 
1987:156). As political regimes are surrounded by contending forces, it would be theoretically 
wise to find out how this competition influences regime formation. This point is pertinent because 
the power balance between autocracy and democracy promoters is rapidly shifting (Ambrosio 
2010:389). By creating (dis-)incentives and instituting a set of rules, external actors structure 
political interactions, constrain governmental entities in specific ways (Knight 1992), form the 
internal dynamic among the domestic actors, and empower them with bargaining capabilities. 
Under these institutional settings, the domestic actors function, determine the policies of states 
(Bueno de Mesquita, Downs 2006:629), find their roles, and acquire new “patterns of orientation” 
(Parsons 1962:12), which create certain behavioral expectations for external interveners.  
 
All actors are engaged and compete in the utterly bewildering path of regime crafting. The 
competition variable was taken seriously in several instances. For instance, the party competition 
was the restrainer of state discretionary powers in the democratization of post-communist Europe 
(Grzymala-Busse 2007). The study of international economic liberalization treats the competition 
with the same seriousness because it is capable of updating the actors’ knowledge and restructuring 
their preference (Simmons, Zachary 2004). The prominent democracy scholars regard competition 
as a defining attribute of democracy, as it leads to meaningful participation and improves the 
quality of electoral processes (Dahl 1971; Karl, Schmitter 1991; Munck, Verkuilen 2002). Without 
such competition, the political playground favors ruling elites (Levitsky, Way 2010; Linz, Stepan 
1996).  
 
The competition is a missing variable in the literature of international dimension. The theorized 
mechanisms of leverage, conditionality, linkage or gatekeeping, bolstering, subversion, and 
coordination are instruments for this competition. The literature has already thoroughly elaborated 
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on those tools of competition, but we still have no robust framework of competition theory itself 
that will show us the causal pathways toward democracy. Our objective is to provide a fine-grained 
causal mechanism of external competition and identify the domestic conditions under which it 
produces democracy. Whether the society of a country is homogenized, fragmented, polarized, or 
polarized and fragmented affects how target countries coordinate foreign influences. These 
external and domestic factors shape the liberalization and democratization process and explain the 
actors’ strategies. The democratization includes the two fundamental areas of rule of law and 
elections. 
 
Building on these insights, I suggest the following research questions: How and under which 
circumstances does the external political competition lead to democracy? What are the domestic 
conditions needed to coordinate external political competition? How do these domestic and 
external factors affect the political liberalization, the rule of law, elections, and the gatekeeping of 
actors? The prime targets of external competitors are the actors and institutions in a country. They 
are either autocratic or democratic gatekeepers. Institutions ensure their survival and breakdown. 
The actors and institutions are the units of analysis that indicate how the external political 
competition transforms a political regime.  
 
Domestic groupings refer to the incumbent governments and private media outlets. The role of 
political elites is acknowledged as the leading force during transition and democratization. They 
make pacts or lead their nations to the path of revolution (O’Donnell, Schmitter 1986). The way 
political elites act and interact tells us about the political regime’s quality (Linz, Stepan 1996). The 
other influential actors are the media. Why include the media in the analysis? Whitehead and 
Schmitter call for analyzing its role in enhancing or diminishing democratizing pressures as they 
transmit information, which encourages either anti-democratic or pro-democratic sentiments and 
represents a formidable force with which to crumble undemocratic regimes by mass mobilization 
and permitting external penetration (Whitehead, Schmitter 2001). Because of the media’s power 
in shaping public opinions, its role might be different in non-democracies and transitional or 
consolidated democracies. Communication studies demonstrated that the media successfully 
undermined the authoritarian and post-totalitarian regimes in Chile, Spain, Hungary, and Poland 
through government-initiated liberalization (Mughan, Gunther 2000) and by setting agendas 
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(Sükösd 2000; McCombs, Shaw 1972). The media allows the circulation of competing claims, 
removes communication hurdles among competitors, and has different effects on coordinated and 
uncoordinated societies. 
2.3. Guiding hypotheses: building autocracies or democracies? 
 
Democratization is a domestic affair but is also dependent on the international system and on 
geopolitics, which represents an arena for posturing diverse political interests. This diversity leads 
to competition among structurally and typologically different political actors. Structurally distinct 
external actors are superpowers and international organizations. They are either political 
autocracies or democracies. Sometimes, democratizing pressures lead to unintended 
consequences, and illiberal forces motivate democratizing countries to be immediate forerunners 
in a democratic race. The mechanisms of competing regime promotion and the coordinative 
capacities of domestic groups are worth studying to explain these empirical paradoxes. These 
internal and external variables define the trajectories of a political regime. In this section, I suggest 
guiding hypotheses and the theory of a coordinated competition.  
  
Hypothesis 1: The external political competition in democracy and autocracy promotion 
generates a democratic outcome. 
 
The international system is anarchic, and leading international players agree on the norms of 
political conduct and demarcate the consensus-based domains of their penetration. This spatial 
division cannot be permanent because the political processes are dynamic. This theoretical logic 
stands on two interactive methods. First, external actors penetrate through their proxies as 
participants of a target polity. Second, there are either receptive or aversive reactive modes, 
depending on the coordinative capacities of domestic actors (Rosenau 1980:381-382). External 
penetration is multilateral that creates competition.  
 
When the democracy promoters invoke the mechanism of democratic leveraging, the regime’s 
dissimilarities become the primary source of incompatibility (Ambrosio 2007) and motivate 
external autocracy promoters to pursue the policies of counter-promotion. Hence, the competition 
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is about who owns the influence in a polity and who commands coercive instruments of 
conditionality for foreign institutional imposition (Owen 2002). This competition involves the 
pursuit of confronting policies of compromise by external democratizers and of “managed 
stability” or “managed instability” by external autocracy promoters (Tolstrup 2009:929). Managed 
autocratic (in-)stability is achieved through election meddling, transferring knowledge about 
restricting political and civil rights, and building coercive state capacities (Tolstrup 2009:930).  
 
There are fourteen mechanisms of authoritarian encroachment that encompass diplomatic and 
political pressures to influence a target country’s foreign policy agenda. Illiberal values are 
propagated by media outlets and foreign media ownership. Illiberal powers engage in 
disinformation campaigns against the pro-Western political parties and politicians. Military 
rhetoric and actions are used, followed by the deployment of the peacekeepers, to control the level 
of violence. Threats to abolish investment agreements or imposing embargos are economic levers. 
Political influences entail the revitalization of old networks among the Soviet “nomenklatura” 
consisting of rebranded politicians, journalists, and academics. Last but not least, illiberal powers 
embrace isolationism through backing and funding rightist and populist forces, penetrating the 
domestic institutions to create their spots of influence and make a political impact (Bugajski 
2004:29-49). These are antipodes of what democracy promotion agenda encompasses.  
 
Such countervailing measures are believed to entail the risk of either losing democratic credit or 
weakening democratizing pressures. The argument rests on the assumption that competing 
influences attenuate “the mechanism of rewards and punishment for compliance and non-
compliance” (Schimmelfennig, Scholtz 2008:191). It is compelling that the credible promises are 
essential to avoid the frustrations of domestic actors and make them vulnerable toward external 
pressures. The credibility of the promiser is relevant for both kinds of actors. The autocratic players 
may also suffer from the crisis of credibility (Tolstrup 2009:923). This puzzling condition is why 
different outcomes follow democratizing pressures and determine whether we should dichotomize 
the interactive cross-conditionality as “the noble us and the dirty rest” (Börzel 2015:519), “the 
Black and White Knights” (Ambrosio 2014:331; Levitsky, Way 2010:41) or “the spoiler and the 
facilitator” (Delcour, Wolczuk 2015:459). Unbiased conceptualization of the type of external actor 
requires discerning its effects on the liberal performance of a country (Tolstrup 2009:927). 
Following this logic, the external actors might confuse their functions or shift between being 
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negative or positive. It is one part of the puzzle that does not probe for causality between the 
competing external actors and democratization and why autocratic promoters assume a positive 
role so suddenly, if at all.  
 
The argument that I suggest is that the competing political agendas of external players are “the 
necessary evil” (Schmitter, Karl 1991:78). How does external political competition cause 
democracy? There are two supportive arguments for this hypothesis. First, the theory of veto 
players suggests that the approval of actors is required to change a status quo. A high number of 
such veto -players make policies stable and destabilize governments (Tsebelis 2002). It is counter-
intuitive for the competition argument because a vast majority of democratizing countries are 
subject to such external veto players, and if policies are rigid, then competition cannot be 
conducive to democratic transformation. However, careful reading of this logic shows that 
institutional veto players in this case, superpowers and international organizations locally produce 
what Tsebelis calls partisan veto players. Subsequently, the actors of the polity are pluralized, and 
the political system creates multiple power-checkers with the ability to impose institutional 
constraints, decrease the bias toward specific actors in the redistribution of resources, and limit the 
role of agenda-setters (Tsebelis 1990, 2002). Following this argument, the transatlantic divide in 
democracy promotion is desired to avoid absorption (Tsebelis 2002:44) and to channel 
simultaneous processes of top-down and bottom-up democratization. The presence of autocracy 
promoters incentivizes the emergence of compromising policies among domestic actors, external 
democratizers, and illiberal powers (Börzel 2015), which prolongs contestation (McFaul 2010:7; 
Przeworski 1991; Rustow 1970:353) and prevents the domestic political elites from free-riding. 
 
Second, the competitive pressures provide the sizeable efficiency of its sanctioning mechanism, 
which is rather self-enforcing. Conversely, the decline of a democratic influence makes illiberal 
powers subvert democratic processes and invoke unchecked autocracy promotion measures 
through coercive political, economic, and military levers, bolstering authoritarian groups and 
undermining the territorial integrity of target countries (Delcour, Wolczuk 2015; Tolstrup 2009). 
Given the fact that the actors involved in the regime transformation hold asymmetric bargaining 
powers and resources, the competition undermines this power disparity and lowers transaction 
costs (Knight 1992:43). Knight argues that competition creates alternatives and introduces the 
mechanisms of their selection during the institutional change (1992:121). The same logic operates 
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when democracy and autocracy promoters attempt to alter political institutions. If this is so, 
horizontal inequalities are reduced among the domestic actors, and they become interdependent 
(Rosenau 1981; Stewart 2008). The competition-driven heterogeneity of the actors allows polity 
to perform democratically. The supportive argument for this claim can be found in the conflict 
literature, in which scholars convincingly argue that plurality and diversity do not lead to conflict. 
Instead, the exclusion of specific groups from political power is the source of conflict (Fearon, 
Laitin, 2003:75; Wimmer, Cederman, Min 2009:317).  
 
Empirical evidence indicates that the cross-conditionality positively affected the democratization 
in Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. The Baltic States were exposed to incentive- based models of 
democracy promotion (Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2004). Simultaneously, they experienced 
Russian counter-pressures through nationalist parties. These parties were Our Home in Estonia, 
the Russia Party in Estonia, Harmony for Latvia Party, and the Pro-Russian Equal Right 
Movement(Schimmelfennig, Engert, Knobel 2006:157-179). They represented the minority of 
ethnic Russians who were 86.4% and 84.5% in Latvia and Estonia, respectively (Hedenskog, 
Larsson 2007:31). Lithuania slightly differed from Latvia, Estonia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, 
Bulgaria, and Romania because the pro-Russian ethnic parties could not overcome the 2% 
threshold during the parliamentary elections of 1992, although the Democratic Labor Party (the 
former Communist Party; CPSU) won (43%), and its leader Algirdas Brazauskas was well-
received by Russia (Clark 1995:52-58).   
 
In Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan is an excellent example of competing influences, primarily under the 
initial presidency of Askar Akayev (Kopstein, Reilly 2000). However, a competitive edge has 
shifted in favor of Russia and China. Other Central Asian countries followed the uncompetitive 
pattern and embraced the policy of this great power balance. For instance, Kazakhstan’s foreign 
policy is multifaceted. It has stable relations with the West while being a leading member of the 
Eurasian Union (Brzezinski, Sullivan 1996a) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(Ambrosio 2008; Tolstrup 2009). Uzbekistan, under Karimov, slowly moved to the orbit of 
authoritarian states by joining the SCO (Ambrosio 2008:1327) and through the “One Belt, One 
Road” program (Weitz 2018:40-43). Turkmenistan is also a hard case for competition because 
Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are leading external actors. Thus, there is no competition 
between democracy and autocracy promoters. The civil war and the border dispute with China 
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made Tajikistan almost unilaterally dependent on authoritarian superpowers. Its immediate border 
with Afghanistan makes Tajikistan geopolitically attractive for multiple superpowers, including 
Russia, China, the US, Iran, and India (Jonson 2006:6)  
 
Despite the geographic proximity with the West, Belarus is a failed case of competing pressures. 
Lukashenka pretended to implement “multi-vector foreign policy” (Ambrosio 2013:193), but 
remained a loyal consumer of the Russian-diffused authoritarianism through economic, military, 
political, and human-based relations (Hedenskog, Larsson 2007), and centralized its power 
through homogenizing the political and media landscapes (Bunce, Wolchik 2011). Azerbaijan 
resembles the case of Belarus, although the political and civil societies and media are more diverse. 
In 2001, the developments of international politics made Azerbaijan an attractive partner for the 
US. Azerbaijan contains this creeping competition because of its foreign policy stance toward 
Russia and Turkey. The West was also unwilling to irritate Azerbaijan and supported 
“evolutionary changes” instead of the color revolution (Bunce, Wolchik 2011:188).  
 
Armenia and Moldova are comparable cases because they secured relations with the West and 
Russia in specific issue areas (Risse, Babayan 2015). Both countries excluded NATO membership 
and decided to pursue a neutral foreign policy. Georgia is a vivid case of competition, apart from 
1991-1995, when Russia was a predominant external actor. Likewise, Ukraine has recently become 
the case of competition between the external democratizers and Russia. This empirical overview 
demonstrates that the competition variable deserves scientific scrutiny. It has an explanatory 
power, even beyond the post-soviet cases. For instance, the democratization of Italy was marked 
with disagreement among the North and South. The communist and socialist parties opposed 
NATO membership in the North, while the Christian Democratic Party supported it (Owen 
2002:401-402). 
 
For theoretical robustness, I need to descend the ladder of abstraction to the national variable that 
I designate domestic coordination. It is important to understand under which conditions 
competition permits peaceful democratization instead of war-prone dynamics. The wars in Georgia 
and Ukraine are telling instances of subversive effects of competition, while the ethnic divisions, 
state incoherence, and loss of a foreign patron (Fearon, Laitin 2003:76; Wimmer, Cederman, Min 
2009:335), as well as a non-competitive environment, in which Russia politicized ethnic 
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differences (Wimmer 1997:633) and was a predominant veto player, explain the conflicts in early 
independent Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Tajikistan. External democratizers 
limited their involvement to embassy politics and humanitarian aid. 
 
2.4. Why does domestic coordination matter? 
 
Domestic coordination is a necessary condition by which to internalize democratic processes and 
minimize the uncertainties that even well-defined democracy promotion strategies embroil. The 
coordination buttresses the competing influences and discriminates among their alternatives from 
which different regime outcomes derive. Coordination helps political entities be adaptive of 
changing circumstances and maintain “balance between internal needs and external demands” 
(Rosenau 1981:29). I define the coordination variable as a national agreement to collaborate on 
common political aspirations (Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, McDermott 2006; O’Neil 2010:50). 
Coordinated citizens do not contest the meaning of their collective identity (Abdelal, Herrera, 
Johnston, McDermott 2006:696). Coordination is an interest-based arrangement among national 
groups.  
 
These groups can be homogeneous and heterogeneous along ethnic, linguistic, religious, or racial 
lines. Heterogeneous societies may be either fractionalized or polarized, while homogenous 
societies can be polarized. The main difference between them is that fractionalized societies have 
multiple groups that struggle for power, whereas polarized societies have two groups of almost 
identical capabilities (Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, Wacziarg 2003).  
 
Ethnic studies scholars argue that both have different effects on societal conflicts and democratic 
governance. Ethno-linguistically divided societies are seemingly the most conflict prone because 
their political groups and voters are inclined to ethicize politics (Alesina, Devleeschauwer, 
Easterly, Kurlat, Wacziarg 2003; Horowitz 2014:5). The comparative analysis of European 
countries demonstrated that cultural fragmentation also determined the intensity of the 
nationalization of politics and the degree of cleavages (Caramani 2004:251-252). 
Consociationalism and centripetalism were designed to avoid the pitfalls of fractionalization. 
Consociationalism satisfies the claims of different groups, exposes them to incompatible opinions, 
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and approximates the competitor elites. It prevents multiple groups from radicalization and 
preserves peace (Lijphart 1969:216). Centripetalism provides multi-ethnic societies electoral 
impetuses to establish coalitions and accommodate their opposing demands (Horowitz 2014:5). 
 
Compared to fractionalized societies, polarized societies are more dangerous. A number of reasons 
supports this conviction. First, when the polarization enhances, the likelihood of conflicts is twice 
as large as usual. Second, among the polarizing parameters, ethnic polarization is the strongest 
trigger of war, coupled with other fractionalizing and polarizing factors. Finally, polarization 
obstructs economic development because the deep-rooted resistance between the major groups 
does not allow adequate policy-making and consensus-building (Montalvo, Reynal-Querol 
2005:787-805). Polarization happens in homogeneous and fractionalized societies as division goes 
beyond ethnic, linguistic, religious, and racial lines and may develop if its members hold 
incompatible views. Somalia is an example of ethno-culturally similar clans experiencing struggles 
over economic resources instead of ethnic representation (Fearon 2003:200). Similarly, multiple 
groups may unite against a common enemy in fractionalized societies and oppose the majority by 
pooling resources (Posner 2004:8).  
 
What are the implications of either fractionalized or polarized societies for domestic coordination? 
I argue that fractionalized societies can coordinate better and adopt mutually beneficial policies. 
Conversely, polarization rarely allows cooperation because conflicting groups view any such 
situation as a zero-sum game (Alesina, Arnaud, Easterly, Kurlat, Wacziarg 2003; Lijphart 1969). 
The group think theory supports these claims in many ways. Group thinkers standardize things. 
They do not question the decisions of the majority or reflect on external criticism and often punish 
freethinkers. This bias limits their choices; thus, they hardly stick to their goals and merits. They 
remain unprepared for policy failures and are rigid toward changes. These habits help them 
maintain “group solidarity and cohesiveness” (Janis 1982:3-7). 
 
Given that polarized societies are mostly bipolar with the opposing groups of similar potential, this 
structure allows them to develop group-think disease. They build the image of an enemy based on 
the rival group and rarely compromise or moderate, which makes it impossible to coordinate. By 
contrast, the external dangers incentivize fragmented societies to coordinate and strive for equal 
representation (Lijphart 1969:2017). Thus, national coordination can be present in fractionalized 
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and non-polarized homogenous societies, while polarized or polarized and fragmented societies 
could not coordinate.  
 
Before suggesting other hypotheses, I discuss the issue of necessity and the sufficiency of the 
external political competition and coordination variables. They are jointly necessary, independent 
variables that produce democracy. Separately, the external political competition and a domestic 
coordination lead to a variety of hybrid and autocratic regimes. However, I do not claim that they 
are the only group of necessary conditions (Mackie 1965:245) to define a political regime. Such a 
claim is methodologically unsound because a number of factors are involved in the generation of 
the desired outcome (Little 1990:27).  
 
Hypothesis 2: The external political competition causes a democratic outcome if there is 
domestic coordination.  
 
How and when does external political competition lead to democracy? I hypothesize that the 
external political competition produces democracy when the domestic actors coordinate, which is 
possible under either fractionalized or homogenous societies. Democratization in fragmented 
societies is regarded as being risky without building democratic institutions or legitimately 
demarcating national boundaries (Mansfield, Snyder 2005). This danger doubles when the 
societies of transitional regimes are heterogeneous because undemocratic institutions cannot 
accommodate cleavages between the outgoing and incoming political elites (Lijphart 1977b; 
Snyder 2008). The absence of “cross-pressures” negatively affects the consolidation of conflicting 
interests and the nation- and democracy-building processes (Lijphart 1977:10-24). 
Consociationalism is a solution for this contestation (Lijphart 1977b), although the concern of 
undemocratic institutions remains relevant because of the credibility issue of political agreements.  
 
What can put institutional constraints on fragmented actors when democratic institutions are 
absent? I argue that external political competitors play this role through reinforcing their support 
groups. External political competition can be an interim substitute to weak institutions during the 
phases of democratic transition through which it motivates fragmented societies to search for 
consensus instead of marginalizing rival groups (Snyder 2008). As a result, the domestic groups 
are in strategic opposition (Dubiel 1998:213).  
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The situation is straightforward in homogenous societies. National unity is regarded as a necessary 
background condition, in which civil and political liberties, democratic party systems, and viable 
civil society organizations sow the seeds for diversity (Rustow 1970). This unity is the prerequisite 
for a democratic transition (Linz, Stepan 1996). When the nation aggregates its interests 
(Mansfield, Snyder 2005:16) and “the national ideals are not frustrated” (Horowitz 2006:94-96), 
the cooperation of political elites defines the trajectories of democracy (Lijphart 1977a:106). The 
political elites of a homogenous society have fewer incentives to collaborate, as they easily ignore 
the demands of their populations, resulting in better concentrating political power, especially 
without democratic institutions or when such institutions are weakly shaped. In such cases, 
external political competition breaks the consolidated power by pluralizing domestic political 
spheres and empowering the disadvantaged insiders of the regime. 
 
Unlike fractionalized nations, homogenous societies need more time to open for foreign 
competitors. For instance, Armenia is the most homogenous post-soviet state (Snyder 2000:34). 
The low-intensity competition of foreign actors in Armenia resulted in a regime change only after 
twenty-five years. Despite its well-established diaspora networks in the West, a homogenous 
Armenia made a slow political opening toward external political competition and stopped making 
democratic progress.  
 
Hypothesis 3: The external political competition leads to war-prone hybrid regimes if there 
is no domestic coordination.  
 
People and political elites are usually polarized because of political opinions or social, ethnic, or 
psychological factors. Polarized societies view their opponents as enemies, and this negative 
disposition rarely allows them to compromise. The following is an important question: Which 
segments are polarized and why? The levels of societal and political polarization frequently 
converge because the political identity of voters defines their positions on politically and socially 
relevant issues and makes them loyal toward a preferred political group. This situation leads to 
political impasse, in which governing the state and adopting new policies are complicated 
(Abramowitz 2010:161; Campbell 2016:223, 228-240; Garner, Palmer 2011:243).  
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Scholars argue that there is a potential of conflict in polarized societies. This happens due to the 
cleavages between equally sized and unequally equipped groups. Their social antipathy roots 
conflicts (Hegre 2008:261-262). Gurr calls this disparity “relative deprivation,” which is “defined 
as actors’ perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities” 
(Gurr 1970:24). The deprivation of social, political, and economic benefits causes horizontal 
inequalities, among which social horizontal inequalities are significantly linked to conflicts (Østby 
2008:156).  
 
Studies reveal that the outbreak of conflicts is more possible in fractionalized societies, but these 
conflicts are fiercer in polarized societies. The political regimes might serve as the accelerator in 
such situations. For instance, the dictatorial and majoritarian regimes compared to proportional 
systems are more conflict prone (Esteban, Ray 2008:165-178). In polarized and fractionalized 
societies, the likelihood of war is greater than in merely polarized societies. The logic is that the 
domination of a major group over fractionalized entities increases tensions and that the deprived 
groups confront the majority (Esteban, Ray 2008:177). The external political competition is risky 
in polarized or polarized and fragmented societies, which are unable to coordinate. In such cases, 
the external competitors increase the level of fractionalization and polarization, which brings about 
war-prone hybrid regimes. 
 
Hypothesis 4: If external political competition is absent, coordinated and uncoordinated 
societies develop into autocracies.  
 
Given the success of external democratization in post-Cold War Europe, it has become obvious 
that building democracy cannot be only domestically driven. The authoritarian encroachment of 
Russia and other global powers enhanced the validity of this argument. Democracy and autocracy 
promoters aim at displacing each other through developing local networks. Democracy promoters 
prescribe to develop democratic institutions, such as independent judiciary, freedom of expression, 
viable nongovernmental organizations, and professional media, until the domestic actors engage 
in electoral competition. Such sequences are believed to avoid the unintended consequences of 
democratization (Carothers 2009; Mansfield, Snyder 2005:17). This perception is hardly followed, 
as such institutions cannot be established overnight. Thus, external political competition for 
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cultivating reliable insiders can be an informal substitute of institutional constrains, as it prevents 
domestic actors from being reckless. 
 
Without the external political competition, coordinated societies are unable to decompose political 
power. The democratization of homogenous societies is more difficult than fractionalized 
societies. Without external support, homogenous nations take a longer time for social and political 
pluralization and democratization. Azerbaijan and Belarus are examples of this proposition. I 
assume that the pluralizing mechanisms are self-contained in fractionalized societies. The absence 
of external political competition demotivates fractionalized societies to share power or consent, as 
they do not sense external threats. Like coordinated societies, the polarized and polarized and 
fractionalized societies transform into autocracies. However, they are less likely to fight wars 
without external political competition because the latter increases the level of polarization and 
fractionalization. When the level of polarization and fractionalization increases, the states are more 
likely to be conflict-driven (Esteban, Schneider 2008:138). In such cases, the absence of external 
political competition pushes a regime toward stable authoritarianism. 
 
When discussing the consequences of coordinated or uncoordinated competition, I differentiate 
cases on the timing of state formation, nation-building, liberalization, and democratization to 
provide analytical rigor and explain divergent political trajectories (Caramani 2004:251-252). 
Other scholars also acknowledge the sequencing argument regarding the preparatory, decision, 
and habituation phases (Carothers 2002; O’Donnell, Schmitter 1986; Rustow 1970). 
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Figure 1: The causal mechanism of a coordinated competition. The competitive regime promotion 
coupled with a national coordination leads to a democratic outcome. 
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Figure 2: The causal mechanism of coordinated or uncoordinated no-competition. When external 
political competition is missed, either the absence or presence of national coordination produces an 
autocratic outcome. 
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Figure 3: The causal mechanism of uncoordinated competition. When competition is present and 
coordination is absent, the political regime becomes a hybrid regime with the possibility of engaging in 
conflict.
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3. Empirical approach to the study of external political competition  
 
In this chapter, I explain my methodological choices. First, I introduce my research design on 
the study of external influences and discuss why theory-testing process tracing is a compatible 
methodology for my theoretical assumptions (Goertz, Mahoney 2012). Second, I define and 
operationalize the concepts of external political competition and a national coordination. I 
develop measurement criteria for external political competition. Third, I spell out the case 
selection strategy and address the generalizability of my theory across similar cases. Finally, I 
review the data collection techniques used.  
 
3.1. Research design  
 
This dissertation aims to deduce how competing foreign pressures lead to electoral democracy. 
I developed a causal mechanism to depict this relation. Theory-testing process tracing is a useful 
methodology to explain the transformative steps (Hedström, Swedberg 1998:22) because it 
generates multiple and independent observations. It uses deductive logic to determine whether 
the hypothesized mechanism or its building blocks are entirely or partially present in the 
selected case (Beach, Pedersen 2013:14). For testing the mechanisms and hypotheses in 
question, I disaggregate the case of Georgia into sub-cases, which gives contrasting cases in the 
selected time set (Munck 2004) and lets me measure variations in the independent and 
dependent variables (Gerring 2007). I study how the independent variables affected 
liberalization and democratization and defined the choices of actors.  
 
In-depth empirical analysis provides diagnostic evidence for the theory, which is the source of 
valid inferences (Bennet 2010; Collier, Brady, Seawright 2004). The theory-testing process 
tracing helps to solve the issue of inferential fallacy by identifying another variable that might 
have caused independent and dependent variables (Bennet 2010:209). It does this in two ways. 
First, theory-testing process tracing explains outcomes that are generated by multiple concepts 
(George, Bennett 2005; Hall 2003). Second, these multiple causalities require contextualization 
and periodization of the mechanism. Contextual factors can obstruct or facilitate the operation 
of the mechanism (Falleti, Lynch 2009; Goertz 1994). Periodization is essential for the 
modularity and development of the causal theory given herein (Beach, Pedersen 2016; Falleti, 
Lynch 2009) because the kind of constitutive components of the mechanism and context in 
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which it unfolded differed from 1992 to 2016. The relative advantages of external actors were 
contingent on their domestic developments. For example, Yeltsin’s Russia and Putin’s Russia 
involved different complexities. Superpowers and international organizations had no identical 
views on foreign policy issues. They participated in domestic political processes to a varied 
degree. 
 
Through expert interviewing and studying secondary materials, I test my theory in other post-
soviet countries of Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. The periodization of 
mechanism and context as well as the extrapolation of theoretical arguments beyond Georgia 
transforms the theory-process tracing in what Sartori calls “intra-area comparisons among 
relatively homogenous context” (Sartori 1970:1044). In doing this, I generate the middle-range 
theory and establish the difference in kind (Sartori 1970) between the competing external forces 
and a democratic outcome. 
3.2. Conceptualizing and scoring the independent variable: external 
political competition  
 
Studies on external democratization have extensively researched the causality between foreign 
influences and democratization. However, scholars identified certain drawbacks in the 
conceptualization and measurement framework of external influences. The first shortcoming 
relates to the lack of distinction between positive and negative actors and contains the potential 
of inferential bias. Second, the international dimension literature overestimates the effects of 
positive actors and underestimates the role of negative players that threaten the credibility of 
democracy promoters by their counter-promotion measures (Schimmelfennig, Scholtz 2008; 
Tolstrup 2014). The third methodological flaw is the actor-specific conceptualization and 
operationalization of foreign influences, which does not tell us a full story of democratization 
(Tolstrup 2009:923). Few studies have integrated the positive and negative actors in their 
conceptual framework, an approach designated “parallel conditionality” (Schimmelfennig, 
Scholtz 2008:198). Fourth, insufficient attention is dedicated to how the competing pressures 
transform institutions and shape the behaviors of polity members (Burnell 2011:288). 
 
To address these methodological points, Pridham’s perception of external actors and the forms 
of foreign influences are appealing. In particular, he distinguishes between the international 
organizations and superpowers that engage either in bilateral or multilateral relations with target 
 34 
 
countries (Pridham 1997:10-11). Pridham argues that the motivations of this classification of 
external actors are essential because autocracy and democracy promoters perceive the process 
of democratization through their own lenses. Competing external actors use deliberate coercion 
toward a target country to adopt the rules and practices of a change agent by exerting different 
levers (Bugajski 2004; Levitsky, Way 2010; Schimmelfennig, Scholtz 2008a; Schmitter 2001) 
and by setting relations in a strategic framework (Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2004). 
 
Drawing on these existing concepts, I define external political competition and take several 
methodological steps. External political competition takes place when international 
organizations, superpowers and their “reference groups” (Ambrosio 2010:384) engage in the 
competitive diffusion of democracy and autocracy, aiming at what it is called, “institutional 
isomorphism” (DiMaggio, Powell 1991:67). Institutional isomorphism is a deliberate act to 
promote competing strategies (Burnell 2011:227; Tolstrup 2009) and target domestic actors 
simultaneously. Political competition has three dimensions. First is for what actors compete  
(Tsygankov 2010:201). Authoritarian outsiders compete to promote autocracy, and external 
democratizers push for democracy. Second, the external actors do not have equal capabilities 
or strategic interests toward target countries. Thus, one should expect that the intensity of 
competition varies across time and countries. Third is the nature of the instruments used, which 
tells us how competing external actors exercise their leverage. 
 
To capture the dynamic of competition, I introduce strategic partnership and strategic rivalry as 
attributes of the superpower competition. Similarly, there are incentivized and imposed 
memberships in cases of organizational competition. In these conceptualizations, the guiding 
points are the intentions of external democratizers and autocratizers. This approach is 
methodologically sound because I do not label external actors based on the perceptions of 
domestic actors. For instance, Russia has a partnership with Belarus and helps Lukashenka to 
preserve his authoritarian power. It is the partnership with a particular autocrat but rivalry 
toward democracy. Before classifying external actors as autocratizers or democratizers, I ask 
the following question: Does the external actor aim at democratic performance? (Tolstrup 
2009:923).  
 
The answers are evident. The Western democratizers have a declared objective to democratize 
polities worldwide, and they avoid coercion until the conditions are formalized 
(Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2004:672). Studies on external democratization provide evidence 
that this indeed happens (Finkel, Perez-Linan, Seligson 2007; Schimmelfennig, Scholtz 2008b; 
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Vachudova 2005). Conversely, authoritarian superpowers and organizations spread 
authoritarian rule and institutions (Burnell 2011:254). Following these assumptions, strategic 
partnerships and incentivizations relate to external democratic actors, and rivalry and 
imposition to authoritarian actors, which aggressively restrict democratic transformations.  
 
The four components of rivalry, partnership, incentivization, and imposition are reflective of 
external deliberations and their interactive modes with domestic actors. These distinctions serve 
two methodological purposes. First, they help to build a general mechanism of external 
democratization (Finkel, Perez-Linan, Seligson 2007:406). Second, the inter-component 
similarities (Sandri 2012:86) and dissimilarities are visible and allow the comparative analysis 
of autocracy and democracy promotion. 
 
External Autocratizers External Democratizers 
Superpowers Organizations Superpowers Organizations 
Russia 
(Bilateral 
relations) 
CIS, 
CSTO/ODKB, 
EUAU 
(Multilateral 
relations) 
USA 
(Bilateral relations) 
EU, NATO 
(Multilateral 
relations) 
Objective Objective 
Rivalry towards democracy 
+ 
Imposition to maintain 
authoritarianism 
= 
Authoritarian performance 
 
Partnership to build a democratic 
regime 
+ 
Incentivization to democratize 
= 
Democratic performance 
 
Table 1: The set of external actors 
 
This list is not exhaustive because China also stands among the influential authoritarian global 
powers (Ambrosio 2010; Burnell 2011; Vanderhill 2013). However, China is not included in 
this analysis because the Western powers and Russia were the most vocal players with 
conflicting views in the South Caucasus, Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine.  
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The puzzle emerging from these interactions is the different regime outcomes that deviate from 
the intentions of external actors. The analysis leaves space for speculation and questions 
democracy promotion efforts. It is acknowledged that unilateral democratic pressure generates 
a positive outcome, and the unilateral influence of authoritarian actors leads to autocracy. These 
are two extreme poles of the continuum. The majority of transitional regimes in the “gray zone” 
(Carothers 2002:9) fall under competing external pressures. The competition should not a priori 
be understood as negative because there are hard cases for the conventional theories. Turkey is 
one example. The EU granted the status of candidate country to Turkey in 1999 and placed it 
under similar conditions as other membership seekers. (Schimmelfennig, Engert, Knobel 
2003:506). However, the Turkish political elites did not succumb to this uniform democratic 
pressure. Iraq is another clear case. The Western intervention in Iraq and its unsuccessful 
democratization spurred worldwide skepticism of external democracy promotion (Cederman, 
Hug, Wenger 2008:510). To determine the effects of foreign political competition, I 
qualitatively study the case of Georgia and develop a methodological framework to measure 
the intensity of competition.  
 
I select concept and context relevant indicators to qualitatively measure external competition 
(Munck, Verkuilen 2002:25). These five indicators are “political, human-based, energy, 
economic/trade, and military levers” (Hedenskog, Larsson 2007:19-109; Tolstrup 2009:928). 
Political levers encompass political pressures and support (Tolstrup 2009:928). Human-based 
levers are the network of elites that receive education in and develop connections with either 
the West or with its authoritarian counterparts. These elite groups include politicians, 
academics, journalists and nongovernmental activists (Bugajski 2004; Hedenskog, Larsson 
2007). They serve as the opinion-makers and transmitters of those influences to the different 
layers of the regime. Energy levers include the “pipeline politics” in which state-owned 
companies or external actor-affiliated corporations have a vested commercial interest. Pricing 
and supply interruptions are invoked as punitive measures under energy levers (Hedenskog, 
Larsson 2007:45). Economic and trade levers entail sanctions, embargos, and boycotts, or the 
establishment of preferential trade regimes including tariff reductions or eliminations and 
giving access to markets. Military levers involve defense cooperation agreements, educational 
training of military and civilian defense personnel, military exercises and presence or 
peacekeeping, supplying military aid and equipment, assignment of military attachés 
(Hedenskog, Larsson 2007:78), and transferring the knowledge of institutional governance by 
teaching the techniques of institutional dialogue for better civilian control of the military.  
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These five indicators help us to see the distribution of bargaining power among external actors, 
and where is their relative stances. This research is qualitative, but it is forward-looking. Thus, 
I suggest coding rules and a measure to quantify the power structure of competing external 
actors.3 These will be used for quantitative data collection as an extension to this research.  
 
Operationalization of Independent Variables  
 
     Concept                                            External Political Competition   
 
 
 
     Attributes                  
 
 
  Components  
  Of Attributes  
 
  Dimensions of Leverage  
  Indicators  
 
 
Scale of Measurement  
  
 
 
Table 2: Concept tree of external political competition 
 
 
 
Note 1: The logical structure of the independent variable and its operationalization heavily rely on the logical tree 
of concepts developed by Gerardo Munck with Jay Verkuilen in Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: An 
Evaluation of Alternative Indices, p. 21. The indicators are taken from the Defense Analysis conducted by 
Hedenskog, Jakob, Larsson, Robert, (2007:19-109), Swedish Defense Research Agency, FOI. 
                                                          
3 See the coding rules in Appendix I.  
Superpower 
 Competition   
Organizational 
Competition 
Incentivized 
Membership 
Strategic 
Rivalry 
Strategic 
Partnership 
    Imposed 
Membership 
Political 
Levers 
Human 
Based Levers 
Energy  
Levers  
Economic 
and Trade  
Levers  
Military   
Levers  
High 
1 
Low 
0 
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Note 2: Indicators take any value between 0 and 1. In qualitative terms, the scale of measurement ranges from low 
to high with an equal weight because the continuous measure conveys more descriptive information and is more 
“projectable” (Sandri, 2012:103; Sneath, Sokal, 1973).  
 
𝐸𝑃𝐶 = 𝐷𝑒𝑚 ( ∑ 𝐸
𝐿
𝐷=𝑁
𝑑𝑐)  −  𝐴𝑢𝑡 (∑ 𝐸
𝐿
𝐴=𝑁
𝑎𝑐) 
 
Equation 1: Calculating external political competition. EPC stands for the external political 
competition, in which democracy and autocracy promoters compete for influence. L are the five levers 
used by democracy and autocracy promoters. D is the democracy promoter, which is N number (1…. 
N). ‘E dc’ is the competitive edge of democracy promoters in a country. A is the autocracy promoter, 
which is N number (1…. N). ‘E ac’ is a competitive edge of autocracy promoters in a country.  
 
This measure is additive. The aggregate powers of external democratizers and autocratizers are 
calculated separately (Bossert, D’Ambrosio, La Ferrara 2011:724). Calculation takes several 
steps. First, the five levers of democratic superpowers and international organizations are added 
and averaged by count. Second, a similar procedure is used to calculate the competitive edge 
of authoritarian superpowers and international organizations. Third, the difference between the 
aggregate powers of democracy and autocracy promoters defines the level of competition. 
 
The separation of the measure is useful because it depicts which external competitor holds a 
competitive edge. Let’s assume that the democratizers and autocratizers score 0.38 and 0.43 
respectively. The difference will be - 0.05. This negative value is closer to zero; thus, the 
competition will be balanced, with a smaller advantage for autocratizers. If these values are 0.3 
for autocratizers and 0.7 for democratizers, the difference is 0.4. The competition is increased, 
but democratizers have an advantage.  
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Figure 4: Example values of external political competition. The difference in external political 
competition (EPC) between the democracy (DP) and autocracy (AP) promoters is closer to zero. The 
competition is balanced, with a smaller advantage for autocratizers. 
            
Figure 5: Example values of external political competition. The difference in external political 
competition (EPC) between the democracy (DP) and autocracy (AP) promoters is 0.4. The competition 
increases, although democracy prompters prevail. 
  
The separation is also useful for understanding the exact values behind the uniform estimator. 
If the democratizers hold 0.8 and autocratizers 0.2 (or the inverse), the situation is 
uncompetitive as the values are either -0.6 or 0.6, but actors still compete. These values are not 
fixed because the preferences and capacities of actors change over time and space. Besides, the 
negative and positive values are received from a number of combinations. In this case, 
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separation allows us to trace how the effects of external political competition change when these 
values increase or decrease in both directions.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: A combination of values that produces a positive high competition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: A combination of values that produces a negative high competition. 
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3.3. Defining and operationalizing the independent variable: a domestic 
coordination 
 
There are homogenous, fractionalized, polarized, or polarized and fractionalized societies. 
These four societal structures indicate whether domestic actors can coordinate the external 
political competition. Homogenous societies are cohesive and share a collective identity (Sørli, 
Gleditsch, Strand 2005:145). The sameness of the society makes it more consistent in its actions 
(Selway 2011:113). External political competition has pluralizing effects on such societies; 
however, it requires time to decompose their internal cohesiveness.  
 
By contrast, fractionalized societies are free from such rigidity because their ethnic, linguistic, 
religious or political diversity makes them more susceptible to foreign pressures. The external 
political competition increases diversity in a fractionalized society because it reduces a group’s 
domination and lowers its cohesiveness. Under these conditions, fractionalization does not 
induce conflict (Collier, Hoeffler 2004:581; Esteban, Mayoral, Ray 2012:1312). When the 
fragmented groups increase in number, the information is uncertain and imperfect (Dodd 
1976:78). Then, the actors or groups are motivated to cooperate and impose mutual constraints.  
 
Polarized societies and polarized and fractionalized societies create dangerous domestic 
environments. Scholars find that ethnic polarization instigates conflicts in authoritarian regimes 
(Esteban, Mayoral, Ray 2012:1336; Schneider, Wiesehomeier 2008:194). Given that the 
polarized structure of society creates a deadlock condition, authoritarian institutions are unable 
to moderate it. The search for external supports aggravates situation because the competing 
empowerment increases the level of polarization or polarization and fractionalization. The case 
of Ukraine belongs to the sub-set of polarized societies, in which division goes between the 
Ukrainian-dominated west and the Russian-dominated east. Russia is a rival external player that 
uses the ethnic card as the pretext of Ukraine’s annexation. The Western support is political. 
Such power constellations of domestic and external actors make Ukraine a war-prone hybrid 
regime. Syria is the extreme case. The multiple fractionalized groups generate the two polarized 
entities of the government and the rebel groups which are subsidized by multiple external 
actors. As a result, there are state and regime failures.  
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These societal structures are endogenous and necessary variables to understand the coordinative 
capacities of target states, as well as to establish the causal links between external political 
competition and a political democracy. Below, I suggest the table on the operationalization of 
a domestic coordination. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: The operationalization of a domestic coordination. There are either coordinated or 
uncoordinated societies in a target state. Coordinated societies are cohesive or diverse. Polarized or 
polarized and fractionalized societies cannot coordinate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coordinated 
society 
Homogenous society  
Fractionalized society
Uncoordinated 
society 
Polarized society 
Polarized and  fractionalized society 
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3.4.  Conceptualizing the dependent variable 
 
As I study the promotion of democracy, I could not aim at maximalist concepts such as 
egalitarian or liberal democracies. I chose a minimalist definition of electoral democracy. 
Electoral democracy involves certain dangers of equating democracy with electoral 
authoritarianism, which manipulates elections to gain electoral legitimacy for its power captures 
(Schedler 2002:37). To avoid this methodological misperception, I have to set clear boundaries 
between the electoral democracy and electoral autocracy for which the V-Dem definition of 
electoral democracy is appealing.  
 
There are multiple conceptual and methodological motives for this decision. First, the V-Dem 
definition accentuates the competition dimension, which is an indispensable element for 
meaningful participation and illustrates to what extent political rights are exercised (Alvarez, 
Cheibub, Limongi, Przeworski 1996:19). It includes all the components that are influenced by 
the hypothesized mechanism. The first affected component concerns expanded freedom of 
expression and is intended to measure media and political liberties and the dynamics of media-
government relations. The second component pertains to electoral competition. This component 
and its indicators help to understand governmental posture against the opposition (Levitsky, 
Way 2010). Third and fourth are suffrage and cleanness of elections, which emphasize how 
political actors or incumbents access power (Schedler 2006a:6). Finally, the component of 
elected officials measures the way offices are filled, thus capturing the power-sharing 
mechanism between the legislature and executives.4 
 
Given that Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Ukraine underwent the phases of 
territorial conflicts, I consider it reasonable to incorporate sovereignty and authority as the 
baseline dimensions. Although both dimensions are more pertinent to “stateness”5, they explain 
the regime’s qualities and trajectories. Sovereignty is the measure of independence of a polity 
to define its domestic and external policies without the forceful involvement of outsiders, while 
authority tells whether the central government exercises its powers over the entire territory of 
                                                          
4See V-Dem Methodology, 2017, University of Gothenburg, V-Dem Institute, University of Notre Dame, and 
Kellogg Institute, pp. 435-436.  
5See V-Dem Methodology, 2017, University of Gothenburg, V-Dem Institute, University of Notre Dame, and 
Kellogg Institute, p. 240.    
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the polity (Coppedge, Gerring, Altman, Bernhard, Fish, Hicken, Kroenig, Lindberg, McMann, 
Paxton, Semetko, Skaaning, Staton, Teorell 2011:255).  
 
This conceptualization of the dependent variable necessitates the definition of the main 
concepts that build the supportive institutional framework to formulate and signify strategies, 
beliefs, and interactions of diverse agents (Dahl 1971:2; Teorell 2010). I discuss these 
supportive institutions in the coming section. Until then, I suggest the operationalization of 
electoral democracy based on the preceding analysis. This aids objective classification of 
external actors and their types of influences.  
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Table 4: Operationalization of the dependent variable: the baseline and major dimensions are categorized (1) to distinguish electoral democracies and electoral autocracies, and (2) 
to identify the kinds of external influences on these categories. Dimensions and categories are reproduced based on “the conceptualization and operationalization of electoral 
democracy from the V-Dem Codebook,” 2017, p. 240 and pp. 435-436. See Dahl’s Polyarchy, Participation and Opposition (1971:3), and the conceptualization of electoral 
democracy in Lührmann, Tannenberg, Lindberg, 2018:3-4 and Collier, Levitsky, 1997:436-439
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3.5. Defining key concepts 
 
Political and civil rights are prerequisites for democratic elections (Merkel 2004). These 
fundamental rights determine the extent to which diverse political opinions are expressed by 
political parties, nongovernmental organizations and media without intimidation or coercion 
(Coppedge, Gerring, Altman, Bernhard, Fish, Hicken, Kroenig, Lindberg, McMann, Paxton, 
Semetko, Skaaning, Staton, Teorell 2011:256). According to Merkel’s definition, the institutional 
force of such rights enables citizens’ organization and political communication (2004:38). 
Although the dependent variable for this study is an electoral democracy, I assume that these 
fundamental rights are existent to a certain degree. Otherwise, the elections cannot be free, fair or 
competitive.  
 
 Liberties should grant political, civil and media organizations independence, privacy, capacity, 
opportunity, and power (Sartori 1987:303). Sartori understands these traits as the procedural 
relations between conditions and consequences (1987:303). The degree of independence and 
autonomy is dependent on the capacities, opportunities, and power that could be secured by the 
rule of law. This mechanism of “horizontal accountability” (Linz, Stepan 1996; Merkel 2004) is 
problematic because how it functions in transitional regimes frequently deviates from normative 
conjectures. I include the rule-of-law actors as institutions in the analysis. Their alignment to a 
particular group of actors may define the chances of their survival.  
 
These two concepts are essential for electing rulers in a competitive way. Political and civil rights 
and judicial independence guarantee a fair political competition and representation. Electoral rules 
may also account for the competitive flow of electoral processes. They aid in what Norris calls 
“manufacturing majority.” The regulatory rules restrict the behaviors of actors and institutions 
concerning how and on what issues citizens can vote (Linberg 2006:7). Malfeasant electoral 
consequences come from manipulations of the electoral laws; the laws form electoral systems, 
determine how votes translate into mandates and which political actors are included or excluded 
(Norris 1997; Norris 2015:163).  
 47 
 
Competing external actors instrumentalize these interdependent mechanisms to diffuse their 
influences, and to ensure that their proxy actors benefit from these institutional arrangements.  
3.6. Georgia as the arena of multiple influences and a typical case of 
democratization  
 
The theoretical and methodological choices of this study set the criteria for case selection. These 
criteria are quite straightforward. First, this research takes on the theory-centered approach. 
Second, it tests causal hypotheses with distribution-based case selection strategy (Rohlfing 
2012:62). The case selection is driven by its empirical relevance, which rests on its typicality, 
meaning that Georgia is representative of all the theoretical concepts (Gerring 2007:91; Rohlfing 
2012:90). Put differently, Georgia is an empirically relevant research setting (Collier, Seawright, 
Munck 2010) because the scope of conditions, independent and dependent variables varied across 
the selected time frame. The presence of “difference in kind” about the competing foreign 
influences, main concepts, and regime types permits me to control for selection and confirmation 
biases. 
 
By subdividing the case of Georgia into five different categories through periodization, I meet 
three crucial expectations. First, periodization updates my degree of confidence regarding the 
hypothesized mechanism. Second, it improves my assumptions about the causal complexities and 
scope conditions of the mechanism. Third, it exhibits the causality between the competing foreign 
influences and electoral democracy (Beach, Pedersen 2013:153). Georgia is also a data-rich 
environment (Evera 1997:79), which allows me to verify the process-tracing accounts (Gerring 
2007:185) and provide mechanistic evidence for each causal part. Doing so, I achieve three main 
research goals. First, I capture the discrete stages of regime transformation. Second, I expand the 
generalizability and validity of my theoretical propositions. Third, I evaluate my theoretical 
arguments (Rohlfing 2012:11).  
 
I scrutinize the background information about the case in question to check whether these 
methodological arguments are at work empirically. The case of Georgia has the antecedent 
conditions of communist rule and its legacies, similar to other post-soviet and post-communist 
states. These post-authoritarian regimes opened to external pressures. Some of them democratized 
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and consolidated their democracies, whereas others were lost in transition. Additionally, these 
countries endured counter-democratizing measures from illiberal regional powers. Georgia 
experienced countervailing pressures shortly after the Soviet collapse. These competing pressures 
of external actors (Tolstrup 2014; Whitehead 1999) make Georgia a solid case to study and 
research what the implications of these divergent influences on the evolution of liberalization 
policies, rule of law and electoral arenas were. 
 
In 1992, the USA and NATO were the first Western comers to Georgia.6 US-Georgian relations 
were humanitarian.7 Georgia also entered the NACC to facilitate its communication with NATO.8 
Then, Georgia signed the PCA.9 The democracy promotion tools were modified based on the 
merits and needs of a target country and the changing dynamics of domestic politics of the external 
actors. Georgia can ensure the energy stability and security of Europe by linking the Caspian Sea 
and Azerbaijan to the West (Cornell 2007:15). Given its good neighboring relations with 
Azerbaijan and Turkey and its balanced diplomatic ties with Iran, it has a strategic potential. As a 
parallel negative conditionality, the autocracy promotion mechanisms were also at hand. Georgia 
entered the CIS (Brzezinski, Sullivan 1996b:237), and the CSTO (Saat 2005:3). The diplomatic 
tensions and conflict with Russia made Georgia leave these organizations. Russia’s illiberal 
methods were the impetus for Georgia to intensify its transnational links with democratic 
countries. These geopolitical constellations motivated democracy suppliers and democracy 
consumers to remain credible in their promises. Georgia went through multiple transitions with 
democratic backslidings and advances. Despite wars and revolutionary experiences, the regime 
eventually turned into an electoral democracy. The ruling party admitted electoral defeat in the 
parliamentary election of 2012 and peacefully transferred power.  
 
 
                                                          
6 https://archive.org/stream/bub_gb_B2W1YOG3N10C/bub_gb_B2W1YOG3N10C_djvu.txt  
7 https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/sofa/georgia.pdf  
8 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69344.htm  
9 See Article 423, p. 261, available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/association_agreement.pdf   or 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/july/tradoc_116755.pdf 
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The conclusions I draw from this case study also apply to similar contexts such as the post-soviet 
countries. To affirm this statement, I add an extra test to my theory with a cross-case comparison. 
The selected countries are Azerbaijan, Armenia, Moldova, and Ukraine. I collected the data for 
comparison from country expert interviews and secondary materials. The case selection strategy 
for these four countries involves the same logic of typicality. Similar to the baseline case, these 
countries were areas of multiple influences to varied degrees. 
 
Azerbaijan and Armenia are the countries where negative external influences were more prevalent. 
In contrast, Moldova and Ukraine were exposed to the pressures of positive external players, 
although the “Black Knights” maintained strong positions. The difference in the intensity of 
competing foreign pressures is a guiding criterion for the comparative analysis of these cases 
because this difference in degree makes them perform differently in kind. Specifically, Georgia is 
extremely different from Azerbaijan, which is a rejecter of democratic innovation. It also differs 
from Armenia, which is a laggard democratizer, but stands closer to Moldova and Ukraine. 
However, Georgia performs better than these persuaded democratizers. According to the Freedom 
House scores, Armenia is ranked as partly free identical to Moldova and Ukraine, but what makes 
it different from Moldova and Ukraine is that the political elites are reliant on Moscow’s foreign 
policy objectives. The explanation for this difference partly lies in the territorial conflict with 
Azerbaijan over the province of Nagorno-Karabakh. The Russian Federation explicitly supports 
Armenia - albeit with flexible relations with Azerbaijan based on mutual tactical and strategic 
goals. 
 
Georgia and Ukraine chose different foreign policy patterns that contradicted the Russian agenda. 
The attitude of these rebel countries to a large extent explains Russia’s aggressive policies toward 
them, including exploiting ethno-territorial cleavages in Georgia and Ukraine. Moldova is a low 
priority because the US entrusted the role of democratizer to the EU there since 2005. Moldovan 
political leaders retained a strategic relationship with the US, but predominantly on the level of 
“embassy and Washington visits” that was supposed to translate into domestic and international 
legitimization as well as political capital. This makes the Kremlin a bit reluctant to influence 
Moldova except in Transnistria, which is an effective pressure against Moldova.  
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The within-case study of Georgia helps identify whether the mechanism of competing foreign 
pressures has been similar to that of a causally homogenous setting. Cross-case comparison will 
allow me to discern the tenets of the effect of a causal condition and whether this effect derives 
from the hypothesized mechanism (Rohlfing 2012:97). This double decisive test enables me to 
generalize the findings of the within-case analysis to other causally similar cases (Møller, 
Skaaaning 2016:296) and strengthens the inferential validity of my theory.  
3.7. Data collection, analysis, and evidence evaluation  
 
The collection of empirical observations was theory-driven and served to reconstruct the suggested 
causal mechanism of democracy promotion. The qualitative evidence includes primary and 
secondary data. Since qualitative researchers check bias on the empirical level, I searched for 
diverse and independent streams of evidence (Bennett, Checkel 2015:27). Similarly, I selected 
sources of evidence for their potential to test my theory assumptions robustly (Beach, Pedersen 
2013:132). This case study analysis rests on 50 semi-structured interviews with state officials, 
opposition leaders, foreign diplomats, media and nongovernmental representatives and experts. 
This qualitative data is the product of two field studies carried out in Tbilisi, Georgia between the 
years of 2016 and 2017, and online interviews with the country experts from Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Moldova, Ukraine, and Russia.    
 
I selected the decision-making actors of processes from the governments of Shevardnadze, 
Saakashvili, and the Georgian Dream Coalition. Interviewing them was a deliberate 
methodological choice.  The insights of leading actors in democratization might be more useful 
than survey data (Ambrosio 2010:388). I selected the interviewees for their knowledge about major 
political events and the general context relevant to the mechanistic parts. I drafted different streams 
of questions. There were questions relating to the liberalization policies, the rule-of-law reforms, 
elections, scope conditions and democratizing or autocratizing tools of the external actors. Other 
questions pertained to media-government relations.  
 
I recorded and transcribed these interviews. Furthermore, I produced the data analysis reports for 
these causal parts. Interview contents generated the direct measures of theoretical predictions and 
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underlying context of the democratization process. The evidence was evaluated based on the 
following four criteria: the type of evidence (account, pattern, sequence, or trace), the source of 
the evidence, the meaning of the evidence in context, and the inferential value of the evidence 
concerning my hypotheses (Beach, Pedersen 2016).  
  
 52 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 COMPETITIVE REGIME 
PROMOTION 
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4. Democratic and autocratic competition in Georgia: 1992-2016  
 
This chapter presents a comparative empirical analysis of competing foreign influences on the 
domestic politics of Georgia. The layout of this chapter consists of four main parts, in which I 
discuss how democracy and autocracy promoters worked through the strategic partnership, 
strategic rivalry, incentivized membership, and used “political, human-based, energy, economic, 
and military levers” (Hedenskog, Larsson 2007:19-109; Tolstrup 2009:928), and why these were 
relevant for a regime transformation. In the conclusion, I discuss the findings of this study.  
4.1. Power structure of autocracy promoters    
 
Winston Churchill, in his Iron Curtain speech, claimed that the Russians honor military superiority 
(Tsygankov 2010:6). Almost seventy years have passed since the Iron Curtain speech, and much 
remains unchanged in perceptions of the Russian foreign policy architects. Understanding the 
power structure of autocracy promoters was the most challenging part to address in this research. 
The revival of Russia as a negative external player (Tolstrup 2009) in the South Caucasus and 
beyond requires the study of Russian politics at home and toward the region in question. These 
interrelated points help define the mechanisms of autocracy promotion and explain the divergent 
outcomes of democratization.  
 
The Soviet dissolution deprived Russia of its role as “patrimonial power” (Snyder 1992). Russia 
allowed democracy promoters to enter its backyard by default after “the greatest geopolitical 
catastrophe of the century” (Kagan 2008:16; Kanet 2010:210). Then, it continued to invoke 
“political, human-based, energy, economic, and military levers” (Hedenskog, Larsson 2007:19-
109) through strategic rivalry and imposed membership. These mechanisms were reciprocal and 
aided Russia in elevating its influences in the region and harboring autocratic incumbents (Kramer 
2008). Before analyzing the Russian foreign policy concerning Georgia, I scrutinize Russian 
domestic politics in comparative perspective.  
 
The August Coup of 1991 not only triggered the illusionary reconciliation of the communist and 
liberal worlds (Ostrow, Satarov, Khakamada 2013) but divided the Russian political elites 
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regarding many internal issues, including how to implement political reforms. President Yeltsin 
sorted out his political surroundings. He excluded pro-democratic forces under the leadership of 
Yury Afanasyev, who established the Democratic Russia Movement in 1990, and Gavriil Popov, 
who served as the first mayor of Moscow in 1990-1992. Instead, Yeltsin selected technocrats, such 
as Yegor Gaidar and then Viktor Chernomyrdin, who was the first chair of the Gazprom energy 
company. Both served as prime ministers of Russia. With these reshuffles, it was evident that the 
Russian political elite prioritized modernization and economic reforms. The democratization of 
the domestic political arena was a matter of secondary importance.  
 
Boris Yeltsin ended the constitutional crisis of 1993 by dissolving the parliament and approving a 
new constitution (Smith 1996). Throughout the following years, Russia started to acquire the 
properties of the hybrid pluralistic type of political system and moved to a new authoritarian 
pattern. The constitutional amendments of 1993 extinguished all opportunities for political reforms 
and democratization. Symbolic integrations with the West were no remedy for the traditional 
matrix of neo-imperialism. Russia’s awakened society started to learn how to take its demands, 
rights, and freedoms to the street. There were the signs of a bottom-up demand for democracy, but 
a collapsing state delving into economic chaos frustrated people to push the Russian government 
toward democratic reforms.  
 
The positioning of the Western powers was another catalyst for authoritarian takeover in Russia. 
The dissolution of nuclear power was a subtle case. Although the West supported Gorbachev, they 
were not ready to channel financial assistance or make any democratic investments at that point. 
Nor were they in favor of Yeltsin’s coming to power. In 1991, US President George Bush made a 
speech in the parliament of Ukraine.10 He advised Ukrainians to be cautious about secessionist 
policies and avoid reckless decisions. The Soviet Union was impossible to rescue, and the power 
shift was inevitable. Following Yeltsin’s rise to power, the West started supporting him with all 
possible resources and aiding vertical power consolidation, not thinking much of democracy. The 
rationale behind this was the stability of nuclear power, for which Presidents Bush and Clinton did 
                                                          
10 https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-supreme-soviet-the-republic-the-ukraine-kiev-soviet-
union  
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everything possible to encourage economic modernization in Russia without asking about the 
political elements of the regime.  
 
Although Russia never had the experience of a free and open society, Russians quickly learned to 
mobilize on the horizontal level. Hundreds of nongovernmental organizations, societies, and 
groups were established to defend the media and particular segments of society. Yeltsin evaded 
suppressions of the nonincumbent actors because he considered himself the president of a 
democratic breakthrough. He could not crack down on everything around himself, even if he were 
willing. The quickly exalted society rapidly calmed down, as they were not accustomed to 
supporting civil society organizations. The West was also unable to compensate Russian liberals 
and democrats that fell behind the majority. Compared to other newly independent states, Russia 
was too big to correct the ineptitude of the Russian political elites and help them to implement 
multi-dimensional transformation. As a result, the nongovernmental sector lacked societal and 
international support to maintain its positions.  
 
The good beginning had no good continuation. Boris Yeltsin resigned, and Vladimir Putin came 
to power amidst the conflict in Chechnya. His presidency is marked by the super-presidential 
system, loyal political opposition, and a controlled media, which under Yeltsin had criticized the 
brutalities of the Chechen War (Gel’man 2013; Lipman 2013; Politkovskaya 2013). Putin 
consolidated his power to the fullest extent by arresting media magnate Vladimir Gusinsky of 
NTV. Boris Berezovsky, another oligarch and the owner of media outlet ORT, absconded from 
persecution and received political asylum in the UK (Gitelman 2013). Putin became a glutton of 
power and kept punishing the opponents of his rule and the oligarchs, including Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky and Leonid Lebedev, the owners of Yukos Oil Company. He restricted the 
autonomy of regional governors and strengthened power vertically. Similar to other authoritarian 
regimes, the Russian government successfully exercised its hard and soft powers to influence 
nonincumbent actors, political elites, and the Russian population. The combination of outright 
repressions carried out by police, prosecution, and courts are among his ruthless strategies, while 
propaganda and disinformation are soft tools well-practiced and enforced by misappropriated 
media. This smart toolbox of controlling politically different others consists of repression, co-
optation, corruption, bribery, and persuasion. Thanks to this oppressive machinery, the various 
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stakeholders have encountered the problems of personal survival and courage. Transgressions 
from authoritarian prescriptions meant losing the status of the elite (Gel’man 2013:296), and all 
benefits stemming from being the obedient enforcers of such rules.   
 
The situation deteriorated further, and the nongovernmental organizations were demoralized when 
Putin crashed the hammer of the state on the most articulate and viable nongovernmental 
organizations by adopting the Russian “foreign agent” law. According to this law, all 
nongovernmental organizations funded from abroad became labeled as foreign agents. The 
government silenced the civil society organizations and eroded all possibilities of bottom-up 
democratization. The Russian population supported Vladimir Putin. Sadly, they perceived the 
situation as a trade-off between stability and democracy. Democracy was associated with conflicts, 
limited rights, and economic hardship, while the autocratic regime created by Putin brought them 
managed stability and certainty.  
 
Having served two consecutive terms, Article 81 of the Russian Constitution11 banned Vladimir 
Putin from announcing his presidential candidacy. The search for a successor was crucial to remain 
in power and maintain the prospects of becoming a third-time president. The choice must have 
been made between the two camps - the Kremlin hardliners, also known as siloviky (the officials 
with military and security experience) and economic liberals (Pacer 2016:2; White 2006:42). Putin 
selected Dmitry Medvedev, a trusted subordinate and a teammate in the political group of Anatoly 
Sobchak, the first mayor of St. Petersburg and an influential politician in early post-soviet Russia. 
Settling with a candidacy from the camp of economic liberals was indicative of Putin’s mistrust 
toward the hardliners. Scholars of Russian politics designated this as “tandemocracy,” in which 
power-sharing is derived from a personal, instead of constitutional, arrangement (Black 2015:16; 
Ryabov 2008:2). As Ryabov explains, the term tandemocracy better describes the relationship 
between Putin and Medvedev because it eliminates any possibility of uncertainty or bipolarity 
(2008:2).  
 
                                                          
11 http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-05.htm  
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Under Medvedev’s presidency, the political landscape was appeased temporarily. The president 
was relatively open to the opposition media and was also tolerant of political opponents (Black 
2015:72). Shortly after the War in Georgia, Medvedev outlined the priorities of his foreign policy 
in five broad directions.12 First, and perhaps most ironic, was the statement about Russia’s 
adherence to international laws. Second, he rejected the unipolar world order (Oldberg 2010:32). 
Third, he claimed that had no intention of pursuing isolationist policies. In his fourth and fifth 
objectives, he called for protecting the lives of Russian citizens abroad. He also proclaimed 
Russia’s “special historical relation” with the region.13 Medvedev tried to define domestic politics 
according to his rules, but without confronting the prime minister. He attempted to address the 
issues of corruption and protect businesses from the abuse of the state. Addressing these challenges 
promised him a favorable reputation among the politicians and entrepreneurs with a liberal mindset 
(Ryabov 2008:5-6). Without political cronies, he risked mishandling these domestic assignments. 
Eventually, some developments including the Russian-Georgian war and the financial crises 
triggered a power swap with Putin.  
 
Russian presidents Yeltsin, Putin, and Medvedev differed in specific ways, and thus formulated 
political regimes according to their own political agendas. Yeltsin created a pluralistic regime with 
authoritarian elements and expressed a general readiness to work with the West, but stressed 
Russia’s distinctive agenda. Putin’s early presidency was marked with a mild posture toward the 
West, most likely because of the dirty wars in Chechnya involving mutual atrocities (Black 
2015:50; Politkovskaya 2013), the terrorist act in Moscow, and the Beslan massacre. Putin needed 
the West to handle the North Caucasus and counter Islamic fundamentalists. In 2002, the EU 
channeled humanitarian assistance of 28 million euros through European Civil Protection and 
Humanitarian Aid Operations to Chechnya (60%), Ingushetia (35%), and Dagestan (5%).14 The 
former two republics received this funding to cope with the influx of Chechen IDPs, which caused 
                                                          
12 Interview given by Dmitry Medvedev to Television Channel One, Rossia, NTV, 31 August 2008  
13 For the detailed interview see http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/48301 
14 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52003DC0430  
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tensions among the locals of Ingushetia and Dagestan.15 In fact, the EU helped Russia deal with 
the postwar consequences. Putin’s second term was much more aggressive and assertive externally 
and domestically. In contrast, Medvedev was not tough locally and his regime exhibited the 
properties of soft authoritarianism. Externally, he played the role as an interlude, which 
encouraged the Obama administration to launch the policy of Russian reset. In 2012, the return of 
Putin brought stronger authoritarianism manifesting itself in domestic oppressions and developing 
assertiveness toward the outside world.  
 
4.2. Russia in Georgia - from strategic rivalry to imposed membership  
 
The foreign policy of Russia embraced a domineering stance, and post-soviet states were satellites 
in its orbit (Kanet 2012:15). Even the liberals in the Kremlin claimed Russia’s supremacy in its 
near abroad (Berryman 2010:238; Cornell 2001). The two contemporary schools determined what 
kinds of decisions were made in the Russian foreign policy. These were liberal Westernizers and 
statists (Light 2006; Tsygankov 2010).  
 
Liberal Westernizers, notably foreign minister Andrey Kozyrev, supported Russia’s inclusion in 
the European institutions (Tsygankov 2010:5). Statists dominated the Russian foreign policy 
school and pursued great power balancing and pragmatism. Yevgeny Primakov, the former 
Russian prime minister, backed the great power balancing. Another statist Russian prime minister 
and president, Putin, pursued the great power pragmatism. National interests, stability, and state 
authority were predominant reasoning in the political philosophy of statists. These beliefs, and not 
democratic values, were determinants of their foreign policy, used continuously as the excuse for 
domestic failures (Tsygankov 2010:4-9).  
 
On the cognitive level, the inferiority complex of not having a democratic political system similar 
to the West has guided Russian foreign policy designers in their behaviors. It reminded them of 
                                                          
15 According to Report from the Commission (Humanitarian Aid Office: ECHO) - Annual Report 2002 
/COM/2003/0430 final/, 100, 000 and around 5-10, 000 Chechen IDPs were placed respectively in Ingushetia and 
Dagestan 
 59 
 
their post-Cold War demises. Whether the West treats Russia as politically equal is the most 
disturbing and frequently asked question among the Russian foreign policy elites, and substantially 
structures the nature of their decisions.  
 
Georgia was a priority in the agenda of Russian foreign policy. Russia influenced its domestic 
political agenda and shaped Georgia’s political choices. Russia was involved in the change of two 
political generations. The Soviet experience was not a promising starting point. Democratic skills 
for managing the political process were missing, which made the country vulnerable to 
authoritarian pressures. Post-soviet institutions failed to accommodate conflicting parties. This 
situation provoked the civil and separatist conflicts. Russia was a vocal supporter of the anti-
Gamsakhurdia forces and separatist regions that gave rise to the Russian-Georgian rivalry.  
 
Until 2000, Georgia staggered on the path toward the West. Despite Western humanitarian aid and 
democratic investments, there was no official declaration or determination about Georgia’s foreign 
policy orientation. The political elites and population debated with whom to bandwagon in 
international politics. In the discourse of foreign policy choices, there were three dominant elite 
groups: adherents of political neutrality, hesitant supporters of Western influence, and 
Westernizers. Followers of political neutrality explicitly declared pro-Russian sentiments and 
promoted anti-Western narratives, thus excluding any membership in the Western military or 
political alliances. Hesitant supporters were not in opposition to Western aspirations, but were 
handicapped by their Soviet background, which made it impossible to find a common language 
with democratic outsiders. Subconsciously, they were willing to take down the old system, but had 
fewer opportunities to survive under the democratized system. The crudeness of Russian politics 
toward Georgia skewed the sentiments of swing adopters to the West. Westernizers were 
venturesome democratizers enthusiastically calling for orienting to the West. Westernizers were 
predominantly liberal-minded politicians with a Western education, who regarded the US, NATO, 
and EU as counterweights of Russian influences.  
 
The last two groups were in the vanguard of defining domestic and foreign policy objectives. 
Russia levied its authoritarian pressures through the two main streams of influence - a strategic 
rivalry and imposed membership. Both streams employed “the political, human-based, energy, 
economic, and military levers” (Hedenskog, Larsson 2007:19-109; Tolstrup 2009:928). Russia 
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effectively exercised political levers when it exploited ethnic and territorial cleavages in Georgia. 
Under the CIS and CSTO, it deployed military bases in post-soviet states (Tsygankov 2010:116). 
Constant diplomatic pressures aimed to avert Georgia from the Western path. The Bucharest 
Summit of 2008 exemplified this diplomatic pressure by convincing the insider skeptics of the 
NATO enlargement not to grant the Membership Action Plan to Georgia and Ukraine. Following 
the August War, Russia recognized the separatist regions (Nygren 2010:110) and exercised a 
maximum of diplomatic pressures.  
 
The most effective strategy of human-based levers was the appointment of pro-Russian ministers 
in the Georgian government under Shevardnadze. After the fall of Sokhumi, Shevardnadze made 
great concessions, which questioned the sovereignty of Georgia. Notably, the important ministerial 
posts were allocated to Russian allies, including Igor Giorgadze, the security minister who was 
later convicted of the terrorist attack committed against Eduard Shevardnadze. Giorgadze obtained 
political asylum in the Russian Federation. Tengiz Kitovani, the defense minister, rebelled against 
the first new Georgian president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia. His overthrow instigated the Tbilisi Civil 
War. He deployed the Georgian troops in Abkhazia and made abrupt decisions without consulting 
with Shevardnadze. Shota Kviraia, the security minister, Varden Nadibaidze, the defense minister, 
and Security Minister Valeri Khaburdzania were other influential proponents of Russian interests. 
Human-based levers also included journalists and media outlets. Their media content built on the 
hate and xenophobic speech spurring anti-Western sentiments. “Sakartvelos Respublika,” “Alia,” 
“Asaval-Dasavali,” “Media Holding Obieqtivi,” “Sakinformi” and “Kviris Kronika” are 
considered to be such outlets and closely related to the Russian media organizations Russia Today, 
RIA Novosti, Rossia, ORT, and others.16  
 
European Initiative - Liberal Academy Tbilisi researched Russian involvement in funding and 
establishing the anti-Western nongovernmental organizations. According to their findings, since 
2008, Russia started to copy the US’ strategies and created Ros-Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo) 
                                                          
16See the MDF (Media Development Fund) report at: 
http://mdfgeorgia.ge/uploads/Report%20on%20Obiektivi%20&%20others.pdf and the newspaper article of 
Netgazeti: http://netgazeti.ge/life/72502/    
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with a total budget of 330 million USD. “Ros-Cooperation” is the Russian antithesis of USAID. 
Other influential organizations are the Gorchakov Fund, Lev Gumilyov Center (having ties with 
Alexander Dugin, the advocate of Neo-Eurasianism and far-right ideology), the Georgian Eurasian 
Institute, Multinational Georgia’s Anti-Fascist Coalition, and the Society of Erekle the Second.17 
European Initiative - Liberal Academy Tbilisi estimates that the financial assistance for pro-
Russian and anti-Western NGOs in Georgia reached 1 million USD.18  
 
Energy levers succeeded in two main directions. First, by 2006, Russia obtained the energy 
infrastructure and strengthened the operation of its companies in the Georgian energy market. 
However, it failed to appropriate the energy pipelines (Hedenskog, Larsson 2007:55). Second, 
Russia influenced the Georgian economy by supplying energy and electricity (Tsygankov 
2010:150) and through pricing policies. In January 2006, two consecutive explosions occurred. 
The Mozdok-Tbilisi pipeline was blasted in North Ossetia, as was the electricity transmitter in the 
region of Karachay-Cherkessia.19 They provided Georgia with Russian gas and electricity. 
Georgian President Saakashvili accused the Russian government of political blackmail20 and 
portraying Georgia as an unstable energy partner in pipeline politics. At that time, the presence of 
Azerbaijani companies on the Georgian energy market substantially mitigated the situation.  
 
Energy levers are the backbones of the Russian coercive strategies. The competing projects of the 
US-backed Nabucco and the Russian-promoted Nord Stream and South Stream pipelines represent 
the dividing line between the US and Russia. In contrast, the EU was engaged in both of them. 
Nabucco aimed at securing the EU energy resources and making it leniently dependent on the 
Russian Gazprom by transporting gas from Central Asia through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey 
to Europe (Black 2015:115). Black elaborates on these intertwined dynamics of pipeline games, 
particularly that Russians launched the two reciprocal projects of Nord and South Streams. Nord 
Stream was meant to supply gas to Germany from Russia under the Baltic Sea. South Stream 
involved the route from Russia to Bulgaria. It had two branches. The Northern branch would be 
                                                          
17 See the report “Treats of Russian Hard and Soft Power” by European Initiative - Liberal Academy Tbilisi available 
at: http://www.euneighbours.eu/en/east/stay-informed/publications/threats-russian-hard-and-soft-power-georgia 
18 Ibid. p. 31  
19 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4637034.stm  
20 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/jan/23/russia.georgia  
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headed to Serbia, Hungary, and Austria (see also Trenin 2008:116). The Southern branch would 
go through Greece and southern Italy. President Medvedev secured the Russian energy presence 
in Central Asia by negotiating with the leaders of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and 
Kyrgyzstan. Hungary and Bulgaria were among the countries that engaged in a transit agreement 
with Russia, Serbia, Italy, and Greece. At the same time, they permitted the Nabucco project within 
their territories together with Turkey, Austria, and Romania. Bulgaria and Romania were moving 
back and forth on the South Stream and Nabucco Projects. Putin also negotiated an uninterrupted 
implementation of the South Stream project with Turkey (Black 2015:115-117).  
 
Economic and trade levers probably would have been useful in Shevardnadze’s Georgia, because 
the country actually had no economy and heavily relied on international assistance and economic 
self-organization through corruption. Besides, Russia had other influential levers to invoke rather 
than restricting trade relations or remittances that in return could have affected the Russian 
economy, if marginally. The economic and trade levers were explicitly applied when the “2006 
Espionage Scandal” broke out. Four Russian military officers and thirteen Georgian citizens were 
charged with spying for the Russian foreign military intelligence. Georgia’s intolerant response 
provoked diplomatic tensions, embargos on the export of wine and mineral waters, a ban on money 
transfers (Hedenskog, Larsson 2007:60-64), and massive deportations of Georgian nationals from 
the Russian Federation.21 Kakha Bendukidze, a former minister of economy, assessed inflicted 
damage at below 1 % of the GDP.22 Boycotts forced Georgia to diversify its market. As a result, 
Russia fell behind other trade partners such as Azerbaijan, Turkey, China, Bulgaria, Moldova, and 
Armenia in 2014-2015.23  
 
Military levers are the most subversive, but ineffective if exerted offensively. Russia confined its 
military influences in two principal directions. First, Russia increased its military presence in 
                                                          
21 http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Collective_expulsions_ENG.pdf 
22 See “Kakha Bendukidze Analyzes Georgia’s Economic Strategy: How Georgia Handled Its Economy After the War 
and the Economic Crisis” – p.2,  April 7, 2010, the Harriman Institute, Columbia University, available at: 
http://harriman.columbia.edu/files/harriman/Kakha%20Bendukidze.pdf 
23Analyses on the Georgian Foreign Trade in 2015-2017 by Georgian National Statistics Service, available at 
http://www.economy.ge/uploads/files/sagareo_vachroba/FTT-_2015__6_month.pdf 
http://geostat.ge/cms/site_images/_files/georgian/bop/FTrade__01_2017_GEO-with%20cover.pdf   
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Georgia, and second, deployed the so-called “peacekeeping troops.” Until 2006, Russia maintained 
twenty-eight military bases, among which were eighteen combat units, five logistic units, two radar 
units, two military bases, and an autonomous unit (Hedenskog, Larsson 2007:81-98). The majority 
of Russian troops were combative, which raised suspicion about their peacekeeping mission 
(Hedenskog, Larsson 2007:79). Georgian political elites, particularly Shevardnadze, invited 
Russian military forces. His rationale was straightforward. First, Shevardnadze had to maintain his 
power during the political turmoil of the 90s. Second, he desperately needed to contain extreme 
polarization and clean the political landscape of paramilitary groups. Third, Shevardnadze had to 
remove obstinate ministers who plotted the coup d’état against Gamsakhurdia. Although 
Shevardnadze had arrived upon their request, he anticipated power struggles with this radical 
camp. Third, it was necessary to end the war in Abkhazia that was instigated by a rebelling group 
of ministers under the leadership of Tengiz Kitovani, Tengiz Sigua, and Jaba Ioseliani.  
 
Addressing these points promised Shevardnadze would break international isolation (Ekedahl, 
Goodman 2001) and attract international assistance to rebuild the country from scratch and to 
create an imaginary economy, heavily dependent on foreign aid. The realization of these three 
tasks meant softly counterweighing Russian influences. Ekedahl and Goodman point out that 
actually, this decision of Shevardnadze’s was costly for several reasons. First, Russia assumed the 
position of a mediator in the Abkhazian conflict that either would freeze the conflict resolution or 
solve it in support of the de facto government of Abkhazia, thus ending Georgian jurisdiction in 
this breakaway region. Second, Georgia had to welcome Russian military bases, and their 
withdrawal would be a headache for future leaders. Third, Georgia had to accept imposed CIS 
membership (Ekedahl, Goodman 2001:257).  
 
Russian mediation of these conflicts was something unacceptable for the Georgian population 
because of Russia’s broad engagement in these wars. The war in South Ossetia resulted from the 
political negligence of Zviad Gamsakhurdia and his absolute unpreparedness to deal with 
separatism that eventually allowed Russians to exploit ethnic cleavages and advance their foreign 
policy agenda successfully. Eduard Shevardnadze fought his war in Abkhazia. Shevardnadze was 
an outstanding player in international and Soviet politics. This political regalia of Shevardnadze 
failed to deter the Russian support of Abkhaz separatism. As the Human Rights Watch reported, 
Russian military planes and vehicles heavily bombed civilian targets and territories populated by 
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the ethnic Georgians.24 Shevardnadze’s deal with the devil (Ekedahl, Goodman 2001:269) eroded 
his credibility among the Georgian population.  
 
The Northern Caucasus militants fought against Georgians because of three main reasons. First, 
Sunni Islam was the second-largest religion after Orthodox Christianity among Abkhazians. The 
North Caucasus belligerents were radicalized, and this religious affinity motivated them to fight 
in the Abkhazian-Georgian and Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts on the side of their Muslim brothers. 
Second, the war in Abkhazia happened under the presidency of Shevardnadze, and the rise of 
guerilla fighter Shamil Basayev started under the first Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev. This 
Chechen nationalist leader had friendly relations with President Gamsakhurdia. Dzhokhar 
Dudayev sheltered Gamsakhurdia in Chechnya while in exile as a result of his overthrow. Fighting 
against Shevardnadze’s army was another substantial reason. The third (and probably most 
counterintuitive) motivation was to favor Russia. Basayev allegedly cooperated with Russian 
military intelligence. He expected the recognition of Chechnya and Dudayev’s government. 
Instead, Russian troops invaded Chechnya, and Dzhokhar Dudayev entrusted Shamil Basayev with 
warfare against the Russian army.  
 
The Russian military behavior was non-recursive in the post-revolutionary setting when Adjara 
crisis emerged. Aslan Abashidze, the Russian-backed leader of the Autonomous Republic, 
announced a state of emergency in Adjara and strengthened control over the administrative 
borders. Russia rewarded Abashidze and liberalized visa requirements, spurring discontent from 
the Georgian central government. Aslan Abashidze initially communicated with Nino Burjanadze, 
a leader of the revolutionary triumvirate and the acting president. The two revolutionary leaders 
first Nino Burjanadze and then Zurab Zhvania attempted to negotiate with Abashidze to permit the 
presidential election in Adjara. Walter Schwimmer, Secretary General of the CoE, together with 
Georgian counterparts convinced Abashidze to take the election proposal. The Georgian 
population elected Mikheil Saakashvili as the president with an overwhelming majority. President 
Saakashvili decided to visit Adjara, but he was delayed at the Choloki Bridge and denied entry. 
Saakashvili regarded this as an action against the parliamentary election and an attempt to 
overthrow his rule. The Georgian central government responded with economic sanctions. 
                                                          
24 https://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/Georgia2.htm  
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Abashidze immediately scheduled a meeting with the president and agreed to disarm his 
supporters, allow the parliamentary elections, and station the president’s representative in Batumi 
Port.  
 
The Georgian central government removed the sanctions. Abashidze shamefully lost the election. 
He threatened the central government to announce a referendum due to the supposed electoral 
fraud committed against his party. Abashidze started to mobilize military forces, but only General 
Roman Dumbadze remained loyal. Other divisions followed the orders of Defense Minister Gela 
Bezhuashvili. President Saakashvili called for the Russian troops not to interfere. Russia refrained 
from using its military levers, at least explicitly. President Saakashvili demanded disarmament 
from Abashidze, otherwise threatening to exercise constitutional powers and dismiss the self-
governing authorities of Adjara.25 Abashidze was persistent, but the population forced him to 
resign. On 5 May 2004, 15, 000 protestors gathered at Batumi University and peacefully ended 
Abashidze’s rule.26    
 
President Saakashvili was proven right that the population would take care of Aslan Abashidze 
and that Georgia would not repeat its past mistakes of military confrontation. The above-described 
factual circumstances puzzle observers about the Russian stance. Why did Russian Foreign 
Minister Igor Ivanov escort Aslan Abashidze and safely settle him in Moscow? Russia had a 
number of reasons not to use its military levers. First, Turkey guaranteed the status of Adjara as 
an autonomous republic under the Treaty of Kars (1921). In 1992, President Eduard Shevardnadze 
and Prime Minister of Turkey Süleyman Demirel reiterated the same provisions in the so-called 
“Frame Agreement.”27 Second, there was no ethnic cleavage among the Georgian population. One 
dividing line was religion. The crisis in Adjara was destined to fail because Abashidze’s power 
games had no vast majority of supporters, and any insurgency would be undermined by Turkey’s 
takeover. Russia could not confront Turkey-a NATO member and a potential ally in pipeline 
politics directly. Challenging an influential regional actor also threatened Russia’s position in a 
turbulent North Caucasus. These structural factors constrained actors of all sides to engage in 
                                                          
25 https://civil.ge/archives/105810 
26 https://civil.ge/archives/105847  
27 https://www.radiotavisupleba.ge/a/1534244.html  
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conflict. Russia negotiated with Georgia to withdraw its military bases. Salome Zurabishvili, a 
foreign minister of Georgia, recalls:  
 
“Military withdrawal was possible because of a different geopolitical context, because of 
our interests, because of the Russian interests. It happened that Russia was ready at that 
time. Why? That is a different issue and needs clarification from inside, but there was a 
certain readiness. Otherwise, no one is a magician to achieve something that contradicts 
the interests of another country. Every successful negotiation requires mutual readiness 
and concessions. When these concessions are equal, the agreements are possible. 
Negotiators should know and identify that crucial point of equilibrium. Then, the process 
of trust building, relations, etc. starts.”28  
 
This process of trust-building was the most challenging part of Georgian-Russian relations. The 
Russian political elites were inconsistent in their promises, most probably because Putin himself 
experienced specific challenges among the top military officers. Putin considered that a détente 
with the West would increase the visibility of Russia in international politics and positively affect 
the economy, but his generals perceived that Russia should maximally oppose Western 
expansionist policies (Facon 2005:212). As part of his electoral rhetoric, Putin announced military 
reforms and signaled to the highest military echelons that he would strengthen the civilian control 
of militaries. He outlined specific steps to reform the military by addressing the issues of outdated 
weaponry, establishing units of professional contractors fighting abroad, and increasing military 
training (Facon 2005). Simultaneously, Georgia made explicit its NATO ambitions and irritated 
Russia. The mutual attempt of Georgia and the West to create a democratic belt around Russia and 
pursue a containment policy precipitated geopolitical disorientation of Russia, ultimately resulting 
in the Russian-Georgian War in August 2008. Russia rolled tanks beyond the administrative 
borders of the conflict zones and evicted the UN and OSCE monitoring missions but approved the 
EU monitoring mission. The Russian punishment awakened Georgian and Western elites. 
Georgian politicians realized that reversal from the Euro-Atlantic road would be costly. Following 
                                                          
28 Author’s interview, December 2016, Tbilisi, Georgia;  
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this interstate conflict, the Western skeptics could hardly claim Russia as the broker of these 
conflicts.29  
 
Until now, I have discussed the mechanisms of a strategic rivalry. Another streamline to promote 
autocracy abroad is an imposed membership, which holds on the same tools. Georgia entered the 
CIS as part of the deal with Russia to end the Abkhazian war (Brzezinski, Sullivan 1996b:237; 
Cornell 2001:161; Mathew 2012:42; Milanova 2004:130). Georgia opened for the CSTO and its 
peacekeepers, although it later cut close ties with them (Mathew 2012:47).  
 
The Belavezha and Alma-Ata accords established the CIS (Brzezinski, Sullivan 1996a:41; Kanet 
2012:18; Tsygankov 2010:79). At first sight, the fourteen articles of the agreement sounded 
democratic, with aspirations of building democracy. The member states declared that their foreign 
policies would be based on the principles of equality, sovereignty, and non-interference in 
domestic affairs. They denied evoking any methods of pressure including the use of force, 
economic, or any other sanctions. The Commonwealth promised to ensure open borders within the 
organization, provide customs benefits, cooperate in the development of transport and 
communications, reduce military expenditures, and achieve nuclear disarmament under strict 
international control. Some of these promises were kept, some of them were broken. Those issues 
which had the potential to endanger global security or better serve the Russian domination were 
among the fulfilled ones. The deceitfully democratic spirit of the organization attempted to imitate 
the EU in the Eastern hemisphere, focusing on a façade of formalities without democratic 
substance. The Commonwealth iterated the Soviet logic in many areas and devised itself as the 
community of transitional states with lots of uncertainties.  
 
Amid Putin’s authoritarian backlash, the member states drastically changed the structure of the 
organization under the decision of 2 April 1999. Accordingly, the six governing agencies were 
created. The Chief Council of Governance deals with social and economic affairs. The Council of 
Foreign Ministers is a main executive body that enhances cooperation on foreign policy matters. 
The Court of Economic Affairs handles economic disputes. The Council of the Representatives of 
Permanent and Fully-Fledged States regulates interstate relations. The Standing Executive 
                                                          
29 https://eumm.eu/en/about_eumm/facts_and_figures  
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Committee administers and coordinates the member states. The Commonwealth established 68 
base organizations, which develop sectorial cooperation with governmental agencies, train the 
bureaucratic resources and military staff, organize scientific and practical conferences, and support 
personnel in the energy sector. 
 
The Collective Security Treaty Organization was predominantly a military-political alliance, 
although one having economic interests. The organization prohibited membership in any other 
military alliances. The cooperation envisaged military and political empowerment through arms 
and expertise provision.30 It enabled public officials, bureaucrats, and military officers to create 
human-based levers. Economic levers were operating through military levers by engaging member 
states in the arms trade. Member states and organizational peacekeepers underwent military 
exercises and training. The CSTO had no clearly outlined energy levers, but was capable of using 
energy resources as a means of competition (Weitz 2014:2).  
 
President Shevardnadze championed the balance of politics. After the terrorist attack, 
Shevardnadze realized that Russia and its international organizations were not credible in their 
promises. President Shevardnadze slowly stepped back. Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and 
Moldova formed the Western-backed project GUAM Organization (Alexandrova-Arbatova 
2008:300; Oldberg 2010:37). Russia regarded this as a countervailing measure of its power. 
Another step in Georgia’s creeping Europeanization was its membership in the Council of 
Europe.31 Zurab Zhvania, the late chairman of the parliament of Georgia, declared Georgia’s Euro-
Atlantic determination by emphasizing the country’s European identity and the readiness of 
political elites to integrate with Western organizations. The declaration of this willingness was the 
decision to leave the CSTO.  
 
Under the first presidency, Saakashvili repeated Shevardnadze’s balancing strategies, although 
with less efficiency. He attempted to find a common language with Vladimir Putin but 
continuously failed, which frustrated him. Saakashvili realized that the country was losing its 
security umbrella under the given geopolitical conditions. Russia was the source of significant 
                                                          
30 http://odkb-csto.org/documents/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=1896  
31 https://www.coe.int/en/web/tbilisi/field-office/overview  
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troubles, not a remedy. The political leadership of Georgia had no sufficient political, financial, or 
human capital to deal with this domestic mess. The engagement of external democratizers was 
necessary to provide the resources for a democratic transformation. Georgia started a creeping 
rapprochement with the Euro-Atlantic realm. Saakashvili progressively implemented painful 
reforms, which earned him numerous enemies inside and outside the country. The August War of 
2008 unpacked the dynamics of the contrasting foreign policy objectives of Russia and Georgia. 
In response, Georgia withdrew its membership from the CIS (Oldberg 2010:37).  
 
Georgia has never opted for Eurasian Economic Union membership, whereas Armenia, Belarus, 
and Kyrgyzstan joined later. Armenia prioritized EEU membership to the EU Association 
Agreement. The architect of the Eurasian ideology is the extreme rightist political philosopher 
Alexandre Dugin, who considered that conflicts between Eurasians and Atlanticists would 
characterize contemporary international politics.32 The most alarming fact is that the Eurasian 
Economic Union was established with this combative spirit and perverted democratic values. 
Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev pushed the initiative in the 90s, but could not 
succeed (Brzezinski, Sullivan 1996:335). Russia has recently revitalized this project.  
 
The EEU holds strong potential to exercise economic, political, military, human-based, and energy 
levers over its member states, especially if they decide to cooperate with third parties. Regional 
economic integration and free trade are priorities.33 EEU members states believe that these 
objectives would guarantee a complete modernization, sustain economic development, and 
improve standards of living for their citizens. Politically, the Union strives to establish a joint 
legislative framework by unifying and harmonizing the laws of member states. With its executive 
body, the Board of the Commission, the Union creates the structural subdivision of political parties 
to affect the political landscapes of member states. The Union’s supreme political body is the 
Supreme Council, which has extensive political powers to influence the decisions of member 
states.34 As for the human-based levers, the Union establishes a common labor market among 
                                                          
32 See Eurasian Mission: An Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism by Alexandre Dugin, 2014.    
33 http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/70/docs/treaty_on_eeu.pdf  
34 See Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union, Article 12, pp. 13-15.  available at 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/70/docs/treaty_on_eeu.pdf  
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member states with preferential treatment. Besides, it determines the recruitment methodology for 
human resources in the bodies of the Union. For energy industries, the Union aims to develop 
mutually rewarding cooperation for the practical use of energy resources and provide national 
economies with electricity, gas, and oil products, as well as determining market pricing.35 Finally, 
the treaty implicitly outlines military levers. It involves supplying services to military institutions, 
trading with military products, and enhancing military-technical cooperation for the modernization 
of military arsenals.  
 
The autocracy promoters successfully copied and used these five levers to counterweigh the power 
structure of democracy promoters. “Defeating with your means” is a phrase reflective of this 
competitive dynamic. Below, I study the mechanisms of external democracy promotion. 
4.3. Power structure of democracy promoters  
 
“I am Georgian, and therefore, I am European.”36  
Zurab Zhvania, the late chairman of the parliament of Georgia  
 
Democracy promoters have a common idea of what it means to diffuse democracy abroad; 
however, different views on the strategies of democracy promotion divide transatlantic actors 
(Kopstein 2006; Magen, McFaul 2009). Americans export democracy by emphasizing elections 
and empowering political parties, nongovernmental organizations, and media actors. These are 
necessary prerequisites for democracy but are insufficient to secure its longevity (Kopstein 
2006:88-94). Europeans devised the enlargement policy through conditionality, which 
democratized the political elites. Successful completion of the Copenhagen Criteria under the EU 
supervision earned some Eastern European states entry tickets to the European family. The 
combination of these strategies is believed to produce a unified platform for transatlantic 
democracy promotion, which can effectively leverage authoritarian leaders (Kopstein 2006:97).  
 
                                                          
35  See Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union, Section XX – Energy Industry, pp. 86-90. available at 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/70/docs/treaty_on_eeu.pdf  
36 https://www.coe.int/en/web/tbilisi/field-office/overview  
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The attitudinal divergence of the US-EU has been summarized as a Mars and Venus dichotomy in 
which the US takes an intrusive stance that features policies tailored through its lenses, punitive 
measures, and regime change by “a surgical intervention” in extreme cases. However, the EU 
prefers to use the soft-power tools such as cooperation, engagement, capacity-building, and the 
policy of rewards (Börzel, Risse 2009:35). As scholars contend, the conflicts may arise from the 
structural typology of democracy promoters or their different foreign policy goals for specific 
countries or regions. The US represents a unitary actor that is thus less constrained in its decisions. 
The EU struggles to reconcile the foreign policy agendas among its members and is more cautious 
in strategic planning (Risse 2009:247). This country- or region-specific bias of democracy 
promoters provokes what Risse calls “value trade-offs,” which trigger the crisis of credibility.  
 
In structural terms, the US and the EU share a common ground in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization. Usually, the NATO enlargement is complementary to the EU integration process 
and is mutually reinforcing. The Alliance requires that its partners meet democratic standards, 
although it sets a lower threshold compared to the EU (Matlary 2011:65). Doing so, the Alliance 
intends to protect the security architecture of the Euro-Atlantic space.  
 
Some cracks appeared in this common ground regarding the NATO enlargement policy between 
the European skeptics and the US optimists. The Russian foreign policy rhetoric and behavior 
changed during Putin’s authoritarian venture. The crisis of Russian democracy (Sakwa 2011) 
explains the transatlantic anxiety. The CEECs integrated into the Euro-Atlantic structures to avoid 
Russia’s possible domination (Schimmelfennig 2003:37-38). Russia was unable to resist the 
enlargement in this cohort of countries because it was busy with domestic upheavals on its political 
and military frontlines. 
 
Georgian political elites anticipated similarly. The pro-Western elites of Ukraine decided to 
embark on the same path, but Georgia and Ukraine were spatially too close and too dear to Russia. 
Putin’s Russia successfully exploited the political mistakes of Georgian and Ukrainian elites. 
Among others, this factor prevented Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Luxemburg, and Hungary from inviting Georgia and Ukraine.37 The US and the EU could not 
reach a consensus over the membership action plan at the Bucharest Summit of 2008. In contrast, 
                                                          
37 http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/03/world/europe/03nato.html  
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Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Moldovan political elites were reluctant regarding NATO’s 
aspirations. There was no need for Russia to make any efforts.  
 
Despite the skeptical attitude toward the transatlantic unity, there is a concerted route on which the 
Europeans and Americans could stand together. Both international actors grasp the importance of 
distributing power equally among the ruling elites, thus nurturing democratic governance and 
eliminating corrupt practices and the breach of civil and political liberties (Magen, McFaul 
2009:3). These commonalities aid them in going beyond the electoral dimension of democracy 
promotion (Morlino, Magen 2009) and generate “a transatlantic consensus” on the use of 
fundamental logic of influence (Risse 2009:245). Within the framework of a strategic partnership 
and an incentivized membership, democracy promoters target different layers of the regime and 
utilize political, human-based, energy, economic, and military levers to a varying degree.  
 
4.4. Georgia in pursuit of Euro-Atlantic integration: from a strategic 
partnership to incentivized membership  
 
I prefaced this section with Zurab Zhvania’s concluding remark at the Council of Europe. In 1999, 
the late prime minister of Georgia and the then chairman of the parliament of Georgia conveyed 
the central message of the Georgian political elites and population to the European community. 
He signaled that leading political forces were taking a step forward toward the Free World, which 
could create opportunities and prerequisites for sustainable development. Except for this intrinsic 
motivation, Georgia culturally identified with Europe, and the return to its natural place 
necessitated institutional integration as well.  
 
Threats from Russia and the affinity with Europe awoke Georgia’s enthusiasm to base its foreign 
policy vectors on the Euro-Atlantic integration. This noble and naive desire perfectly matched the 
Strategic Agenda of “Europe Whole and Free and at Peace.” Georgia was also attractive because 
of its potential to provide alternative trading and energy routes to Europe. Stability and democracy 
in Georgia were in the strategic interests of Georgian and the Euro-Atlantic elites. Specific 
methods of supporting democracy could achieve these tasks. Democracy promoters streamlined 
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their assistance in two main directions of strategic partnership and incentivized membership. Since 
1992, the US heralded a strategic partnership and became a leading democratizer.38  
 
The US utilized various tools, including, among other things, financial aid, communication with 
nongovernmental and media actors, backing different initiatives, and developing cooperation with 
state agencies. The USAID was a head project.39 Since then, Washington allocated 1.5 billion USD 
for economic growth, developing financial institutions, enhancing energy security, and building 
human capital.40 Furthermore, MCC invested 140 million USD in the Georgian educational sector. 
That was a multifaceted effort to democratize polity, although much was dependent on the 
impulses of the ruling elites because they were identifying problems on the ground. Detecting all 
these challenges from outside was difficult without local actors who could provide visibility to 
specific predicaments.  
 
It is difficult to immediately see the benefits of democratizing efforts. The controversy with Russia 
greatly helped to skew the popular opinions toward pro-democracy forces. The diplomatic 
messages and recommendations as the tactic of “naming and shaming” (Risse 2009:250) also 
worked because the counter-promotion prevented the political elites from warding off 
democratizing pressures. It set clearheaded, mutual expectations. One of the instances of political 
leveraging occurred when the US State Secretary Collin Powell and Ambassador Richard Miles 
persuaded Shevardnadze to conclude negotiations peacefully during the Rose Revolution. In this 
diplomatic exchange, Americans emphasized the fundamental rights of popular mobilization and 
called for not using force against the peaceful demonstrators.41 Three main factors prohibited 
Shevardnadze from being ignorant. First, he was too old for political manipulations. Second, the 
fragility of authoritarian institutions made the outcome highly uncertain and dangerous. Third, the 
                                                          
38 Author’s interview with Irakli Menagharishvili, Deputy Prime Minister of Georgia in 1993-1995, Foreign Minister 
of Georgia in 1995-2003; February 2016, Tbilisi, Georgia. 
39 https://www.usaid.gov/georgia/history  
40 External Aid in Georgia, Report 2015 – obtained by the author from the eAIMS database, the Donor Coordination 
Unit under the Prime Minister of Georgia; 
41 Author’s interview with Giga Bokeria, the former secretary of the National Security Council of Georgia, the former 
deputy foreign minister and the co-founder of Liberty Institute; February 2017, Zurich, Switzerland.   
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US helped him in maintaining power and thus initiating economic, political, and security 
transformations. Shevardnadze’s susceptibility was rationally, politically, and morally plausible.  
 
After the August War between Russia and Georgia (Nygren 2010:109), the US grasped an 
immediate necessity to reframe its strategies. Otherwise, it risked the decline of pro-democracy 
sentiments among the Georgian population. The postwar difficulties complicated many things for 
democracy promoters. Americans and Europeans carefully reacted on what the Georgian 
government was supposed to do in the given time frame. The Georgian government launched an 
information campaign to consolidate public opinion toward the Western institutions. The two 
Georgian Ambassadors proactively engaged in drafting a cooperation framework and leaping 
ahead of diplomatic relations. On 9 January 2009, the United States–Georgian Charter on Strategic 
Partnership was signed. This charter outlined the four major pillars: (1) economic, trade, and 
energy cooperation; (2) security and military cooperation; (3) education and cultural exchange; 
and (4) strengthening capacity of democratic institutions. It went beyond the declaration and 
established state commissions. These commissions were composed of the working groups, which 
were cooperating, checking progress, and analyzing further needs. It made the partnership more 
institutionalized.42    
 
Concerning the human-based levers, the US invested in empowering media entities, 
nongovernmental organizations, and opposition forces. The change was expected to come from 
below. Other rationales included liberalizing the government structures (Simmons, Dobbin, 
Garrett 2006), making polity members responsive, and spurring demands for the rights of self-
expression (Welzel, Inglehart 2008). On the other hand, the change focused on creating 
institutional elites inside the governmental structures that simplified the transmission and 
interpretation of external messages and made cooperation convenient. At a later stage, the US and 
Georgia developed connections between government agencies, universities, research institutes, 
                                                          
42 Authors interview with Batu Kutelia - Former Georgian ambassador to the United States of America in 2008-2011, 
former deputy minister of defense of Georgia in 2006-2007 and former deputy secretary of Georgia’s National 
Security Council in 2011-2013, and Davit Sikharulidze - Former defense minister of Georgia in 2006-2008, former 
Georgian Ambassador to the United States of America in 2008-2009; 
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and private sector companies through scientific and technological collaboration.43 Pro-democracy 
human capital was the multiplier of other democracy promoting factors.  
 
The US-Georgian economic relations were initially humanitarian. This relationship provided 
commodities, supplies, and other properties under assistance programs.44 Since 1994, the parties 
extended their economic cooperation.45 Georgia gradually engaged in world trade. The 
government of Georgia was steadily dependent on US financial assistance throughout these years. 
Economic levers turned critical after the Rose Revolution. The post-revolutionary government 
realized that the state budget was empty. Political leadership encountered problems with salary 
payments, which substantially hindered the implementation of reforms at governmental agencies. 
To address this dilemma, Zurab Zhvania, the State Minister of Georgia, concluded the Grant 
Agreement.46 Another critical point was the aftermath of the 2008 August War. Georgia 
experienced a sharp decline in foreign direct investments, upon which its national budget was 
dependent. The US involvement mitigated these political and economic downturns. 47  
 
                                                          
43 Agreement between the Government of Georgia and the Government of the United States of America on Science 
and Technology Cooperation, 6 August 2009, p.3. Source: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia.  
44 Agreement between the Government of Georgia and the Government of the United States of America regarding 
Cooperation to Facilitate Humanitarian and Technical Economic Assistance, July 1992, p. 2. Source: the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Georgia. 
45 Treaty between the Republic of Georgia and the Government of the United States of America concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, 7 March 1994, pp 1-5, Source: the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Georgia.  
46 Grant Agreement between the United States of America and Georgia, 13 January 2004, Article 1, p.1. Georgia 
received approximately 3, 000, 000 USD for salary payments. The MCC also granted the Compact of 295, 300, 000 
USD on a multi-year basis to the Georgian government for economic growth and poverty reduction in the regions. 
The Compact Grant of the US Millennium Challenge Corporation to the Government of Georgia, 12 September 2005, 
pp. 2-4. Source: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia; 
47. Cash Transfer Grant Agreement (250, 000, 000 USD) between the Government of the United States of America, 
Acting through the United States Agency for International Development, and the Government of Georgia, 22 October 
2008, p.2., and USAID Assistance Agreement No AAG-114-G10-002 (83, 069, 599 USD) between Georgia and the 
United States of America for Improved Infrastructure, Economic Opportunities and support for Internally Displaced 
Persons, 12 August 2010. Source: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia. 
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Energy levers were linked to economic and trade relations but were given particular attention 
because of the Georgian energy dependence on the market of Russia (70%). Shevardnadze 
developed energy cooperation to diversify supply and transit routes and to reinvigorate the regional 
partnership with Turkey and Azerbaijan. The Baku-Supsa (1999) and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (2006) 
oil pipelines and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (2006) natural gas pipelines were the three projects 
that engaged Georgia in the Southern Corridor of Energy Infrastructure.48 Energy vulnerability 
also stemmed from the location of Enguri Hydroelectric Plant, which borders the breakaway region 
of Abkhazia. It is the largest supplier of electricity (45%). The US channeled 126,815,000 USD in 
five directions. The assistance intended to (1) upgrade, reconstruct, and put into operation 
electricity transmission; (2) construct, replace, and rehabilitate gas transit infrastructure; (3) 
promote hydro investment; (4) launch the Georgia Clean Energy Initiative; and (5) support the 
program.49  
 
The Georgian-US defense and security cooperation circumscribed the three main areas of 
operation: military education and training, funding the advisory groups, and material and technical 
support of the Georgian army. The US-Georgian governments agreed to station a Military Liaison 
Team within the Georgian Ministry of Defense. This decision served to support Georgia’s 
membership candidacy to NATO.50 FMF determined the military funding of potential projects. 
The parties cooperated through LOA.51 The Georgian political elites desired to end the Russia First 
Policy. They realized the need to deepen and institutionalize the relations with NATO. The strategy 
of diversified involvement promised to increase competition between the democratizers and 
against the autocracy promoters.   
 
                                                          
48 United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership of 9 January 2009, Section III, Paragraph 3. Source: the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia.  
49 USAID Assistance Agreement No AAG-114-G-10-10001 between Georgia and the United States of America for 
Energy Infrastructure Expansion, 25 February 2010. Source: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia.  
50 Agreement between Georgia, Ministry of Defence/General Staff and the United States European Command 
concerning Support of A military Liaison Team, 28 May 1999. Source: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia. 
51 Information provided by the Ministry of Defence of Georgia under the status of public information on 22 April 
2016. pr@mod.gov.ge. The same source is used for Figure 6.  
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Figure 6: The dynamic of Foreign Military Financing over twenty years. 
 
After the Cold War, NATO remained without an adversary and modified its functions to integrate 
different systems. Georgia initially had neither political nor material resources to make initiatives. 
The political will for peace and democracy became stronger under the umbrella of cooperative 
security. In 1994, Georgia engaged in the format of Partnership for Peace, which was the victory 
of “soft power” for two reasons. First, the Soviet propaganda hijacked alternative concepts and 
created the icon of the enemy from those who belonged to the other camp of the political system. 
These perceptions were reverted, and Georgian militaries treated the former enemies as partners. 
Here, the war memories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia aided. Second, beyond this psychological 
point, the Georgian army had the Soviet military traditions that undermined interoperability. To 
address this issue, Turkey opened the Infantry Training School, and Germany established the 
Sergeants Training School. These two NATO members prepared Georgian peacekeepers for the 
Kosovo mission. Based on the progress, the Alliance considered reviewing the partnership goals 
as the means of political leveraging.  
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On 26 August 1999, the Russian-Chechen War erupted. Georgia opened its northeast corridor to 
the Chechen refugees, which raised questions among the Russian officials and induced allegations 
about the deployment of Chechen fighters in Georgian territory. The Pankisi Gorge crisis 
encompassed military and political elements that might have been detrimental to Georgian 
statehood. Russian pressure culminated. Russian leadership signaled to the Georgian government 
that Russia would solve this matter. The prospect of Russian interference was unattractive for the 
Georgian government, population, and partners. The formula was found, and the Georgian 
Ministry of Defense created anti-terrorist forces under the assistance of the US and NATO. This 
project became the basis of the Train and Equip Program. When the Iraqi problem emerged in the 
scenery of international politics, Georgia decided to participate in this mission, but the agreement 
prohibited the Ministry of Defense from sending these anti-terrorist units. Georgia convinced its 
partners to allow the participation of the commando troops trained by Turkey and the platoon of 
engineers in the Iraqi mission. The latter successfully de-mined the Soviet-made explosives with 
which the US militaries had difficulty.  
 
Cooperation with NATO enabled Georgia to acquaint with the institutional governance. 
Specifically, the country developed the mechanisms of army control according to NATO 
standards, which improved the institutional dialogue among different branches, including the 
Ministry of Finance, the parliament, supervisory bodies, and the courts. Learning institutional 
management of the army had spillover effects on the development of other institutions. Georgia 
gradually moved from “personal checks and balances” to “institutional checks and balances.” The 
Alliance saw success with the More for More Policy. It opened new opportunities, especially for 
the professional elites, who were sent for short- and long-term study visits at NATO schools. The 
Ministry of Defense gradually accrued specific capacities and created like-minded professionals. 
The position of militaries during the Rose Revolution was indicative of their moral and 
professional readiness. The external hold and Shevardnadze’s decision also helped them to be 
passive.  
 
The post-revolutionary defense ministers, Giorgi Baramidze, Irakli Okruashvili, Davit 
Kezerashvili, and Bachana Akhalaia, were disoriented because of their police backgrounds. 
Around 6,000 trained military officers were dismissed. In parallel, the Ministry of Defense 
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increased the contingent of militaries in the Iraqi mission and left only three brigades at home. 
Amid the August War of 2008, Georgia recalled 2,000 troops from Iraq under US assistance.  
 
Although the reform of patrol police was successful, other police units remained closed to external 
pressures, unlike the militaries that were trained according to NATO template solutions. Further 
political processes revealed an observable difference between these two agencies. Mainly, police 
officers were frequently used to disperse peaceful demonstrators and control opposition leaders. 
The heads of such agencies lacked the required practices for military guidance and made external 
partners worry. That was a domestic affair of Georgia, and the Alliance would never interfere. 
Instead, NATO suggested that the Professional Development Programme (2009-PDP) train the 
security staff of all governmental agencies and facilitate intra-agency cooperation and 
coordination. Simultaneously, the Defense Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP) was 
designed to support the education of defense and other security institutions. In 2010, the Alliance 
opened a NATO/PfP training and education center.  
 
In 2012, NATO developed the Smart Defense Initiative to train military pilots, transfer knowledge 
about multinational cyber defense, and create a base of female leaders in the spheres of security 
and defense. The same year, Georgia joined the Building Integrity Initiative and completed a self-
evaluation document to increase transparency and accountability and reduce the risks of corruption 
at defense agencies. In response, NATO drafted the Peer Review Report to assess the progress and 
identify future steps. The NATO core team, project leaders, and advisors from member countries 
helped Georgian counterparts implement priority initiatives. These programs aided in creating an 
institutional memory based on skills and merits. This interaction It minimized the occasions when 
the deputy ministers and department heads were leaving together with the ministers and 
accumulated reliable human capital.  
 
Since 2002, the NATO Support and Procurement Agency and Georgia have collaborated to 
manage the military economy. Georgia I Phase and Georgia II Phase demilitarized surface-to-air 
missile systems, particularly S-75 (NATO reporting SA-2), Krug (NATO reporting SA-4), and 
anti-hail air systems. The budgets of these phases were 486,721 euros and 478,214 euros, 
respectively. Georgia III Phase and Georgia IV Phase focused on the development of medical 
capacities and emptying military storage facilities with a budget of 1,545,910 euros and 1,300,000 
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euros.52 In 2010, the State Military Scientific-Technical Center Delta was established to develop 
military and civil projects and engage with the NATO Energy Security Center of Excellence as 
the first nonmember contributor-partner.53 Delta has a permanent representative at this center.54  
 
In 2008, the NATO Annual National Programme replaced the Individual Partnership Action Plan 
(2004), which consisted of four parts: (1) politics and security; (2) defense and military; (3) social, 
scientific, environmental, and civic-emergency situation planning issues; and (4) resource 
management. The ANP is an overarching framework for the mechanisms of practical cooperation. 
In 2014, as the most interoperable partner, Georgia was invited to the Enhanced Opportunity 
Partners’ Group and received the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package to stimulate an integration 
process. Georgia demonstrated a constant political will to take things forward. It made proactive 
efforts in learning by doing. The membership decision requires convincing arguments for twenty-
eight countries that pursue their independent foreign policies. Here, the biggest challenge is the 
breakaway conflicts. There is no written reservation prohibiting the country of a NATO 
membership because of the conflicts, although Georgia’s commitment to finding the formula of a 
peaceful resolution is essential.  
 
The Georgian political elites developed a parallel track of the European integration. The rationale 
behind a creeping Europeanization was twofold. First, the EU does not permit broader political 
interpretations because it formulates specific milestones and the mechanisms of rewards that 
enhance motivation. Georgian political elites understood that this incentivized path might 
democratize the polity even without an explicit promise of membership, even though the EU has 
recently become inward looking. Second, the federalist and border-relaxed structure of the EU was 
believed to provide the baseline for the political inclusion of the self-exclusionary (Cederman, 
Gleditsch 2013:68) breakaway regions. In most cases, the EU sets the political agenda itself, has 
its budget, and possesses strong expertise, which also includes the lessons from the Balkan wars 
in Croatia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia.  
                                                          
52Information provided by the Ministry of Defence of Georgia under the status of public information on 22 April 2016. 
pr@mod.gov.ge.    
53http://www.delta.gov.ge/en/georgia-became-the-contributor-partner-of-the-nato-energy-security-center-of-
excellence/  
54 http://www.delta.gov.ge/en/stc-detla-nato-ensecoe-meeting/  
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The EU engaged with Georgia through political dialogue and assistance programs, specifically to 
develop democracy and a market-oriented economy, as well as to harmonize the legislative 
framework. To ease this evolving communication, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
provided modalities of delivery through political, economic, energy, human-based, and, to a lesser 
extent, military collaboration. The platform of political dialogue signified regular meetings 
between top officials and among experts. It has incited profit from diplomatic channels through 
bilateral and multilateral formats (Article 7, Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, 1996).  
 
Economic cooperation was based on a most-favored-nation treatment and promoted the 
mechanisms of free trade (Article 9). It focused on the development of human resources within 
specific sectors, road infrastructure, and monetary policy; encouraged regional cooperation; and  
supported privatization and an attractive environment for investment opportunities (Article 45, 
Article 49). The EU programs trained scientists, researchers, professionals, teachers, and 
journalists, thereby empowering the human resources at different levels (Article 53, Article 54). 
The EU-Georgia partnership on energy issues developed in line with the European Energy Charter. 
It helped Georgia to define its energy policy, manage and regulate this sector, improve energy 
supply by modernizing energy infrastructures and technologies, and create favorable conditions to 
increase energy trade and investment (Article 56).  
 
At that point, the EU restricted its military cooperation with Georgia by aiding in the modification 
of the military industry (Article 47). Given the fact that Shevardnadze struggled on different 
political frontlines at home, and that his government was massively corrupt, Georgia could not 
take full advantage of this cooperation. Irakli Menagharishvili, a Georgian foreign minister, recalls 
the following:  
 
“Because of our mistakes and domestic confusion, we lost a lot… The European Union is 
the international format of multilateral cooperation. States formulate domestic policies 
themselves. If there were any obstacles, and of course there were, they came from our 
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unpreparedness. All these concepts about different types of assistance were completely new 
for us. Until then, Georgia only knew how to exist within the Soviet Union.”55  
 
The Rose Revolution was the turning point in these wavering relations because the revolutionary 
government demonstrated its grit in embarking in sectoral and crosscutting reforms. The EU 
rethought its strategies toward Georgia and included it in the European Neighborhood Policy, 
which was designed to stabilize EU’s eastern and southern neighborhood. The ENP based itself 
on the fundamentals of the PCA, although it modified its priorities under newly emerged realities 
and successfully supported reforms through the incentive-based policy of More for More.56  
 
The EU implemented at its core structural reforms of neighborhood economies through the Macro-
Financial Assistance operations and by building the capacity of economic personnel for better 
management of economic resources.57 Owing to the mutual need for energy sovereignty, the EU 
explicated the importance of the Southern Gas Corridor and energy market integration with 
Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia in the Eastern Neighborhood Policy.58 Politically, the EU focused 
on civil society, human rights activists, and electoral processes, which precipitated the 
empowerment of human capital inside the polity. The ENP envisaged reforming the public 
administration to depoliticize civil servants, support academics, and enhance the communication 
of youngsters.59  
 
The EU supported military reform within a Common Security and Defense Policy and better 
articulated it in the Eastern Partnership. The latter is the updated version of the ENP.60 Under this 
framework, Georgia engaged in the EU missions and operations and received funding for the 
                                                          
55 Author’s interview with Irakli Menagharishvili, Deputy Prime Minister of Georgia in 1993-1995, Foreign Minister 
of Georgia in 1995-2003; February 2016, Tbilisi, Georgia.  
56 Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic, and Social Committee and 
the Committee of the Regions Review of the European Neighborhood Policy, by High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2015, p.5;    
57 Ibid, p.7; 
58 Ibid, p.11;  
59 Ibid, p.6, p.21;  
60 https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/eastern-partnership_en   
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educational training of its military officers. The Eastern Partnership increased investments and 
introduced the mechanisms for supporting media projects and electronic communications.61  
Georgia successfully negotiated and concluded the Association (AA), Trade (DCFTA), and Visa 
Facilitation Agreements. The visa liberalization policy served to intensify people-to-people 
connections. The EU spent around 32 million euros for the growth of human capital and was the 
largest donor in that respect.62 The Association Agreement leveled Georgia’s presence in the EU 
policies, programs, and agencies by enhancing dialogue on foreign policy and security matters and 
contributing to the peaceful resolution of conflicts (Association Agreement 2014:7-9).  
 
In economic terms, the parties have accorded on trade remedies, eliminating customs and duties 
(Association Agreement 2014:14-15), and encouraging the free movement of capital (Association 
Agreement 2014:62). This has involved building ties with the Georgian entrepreneurs and making 
transparent economic legislation. Following the DCFTA, Georgia’s trade turnover increased by 
1,433,892.5 USD.63 The EU sets higher quality requirements. The member states have their 
business positions established on that market, and the accommodation of newcomers is 
challenging. Energy cooperation signified Georgia’s inclusion in the Energy Community and 
followed the logic of previous agreements. Militarily, the Association Agreement focuses on arms 
control and the non-proliferation of illegal weapons. It orients on the social protection of military 
officers and promoting gender equality in the army. Other military areas of cooperation have 
included cyber defense and the training of military professionals.64   
 
Georgia’s national ambition to transform itself as a stable and prosperous democracy and to pursue 
the policies of the Russian containment stabilized its instinct to move toward the West. However, 
it is worth mentioning that the pro-Western sentiments of the Georgian population forced the 
                                                          
61 Commission Staff Working Document, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council, Eastern Partnership, pp.8-12, SEC (2008) 2974/3, Brussels;     
62 External Aid in Georgia, Report 2015 – obtained by the author from the eAIMS database, the Donor Coordination 
Unit under the Prime Minister of Georgia; 
63 http://www.economy.ge/uploads/files/sagareo_vachroba/FTT-_2015__6_month.pdf  
64 Information provided by the Ministry of Defense of Georgia under the status of public information on 22 April 
2016. pr@mod.gov.ge. 
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political elites to divert from the path of democratization. This willingness and the structurally 
conditioned factors were a solid ground for external democratizers to work on the project of 
democracy promotion.65 Their opinions were listened to, which created opportunities and built 
better political connections.  
4.5. Summing up: What makes the difference?  
 
In this chapter, I investigated the mechanisms of autocracy and democracy promotion in Georgia. 
Over the twenty-four years, both external actors were presented with different intensities. Russia 
was actively engaged from the outset. The US, NATO, and EU involvement gradually limited its 
authoritarian dominance. Odds have changed, and the external political competition threatened 
authoritarian outsiders. Georgia found itself at war with Russia. The lessons learned from this war 
were twofold: First, the complete displacement of autocracy promoters put the whole process of 
democratization at stake. Second, the feedback mechanism strengthened because the pro-
democracy political elites needed greater support to avoid popular frustration, and the external 
democratizers had to maintain their credibility. These intertwined necessities made the political 
elites more cautious in their future political decisions and increased people’s roles. The political 
elites are inclined to divert from the path of democratization because democracy reduced their 
payoffs. The population curbs their gatekeeping temptations. Without popular support, the political 
elites risk their legitimacy and political survival.  
 
I find that “the geopolitical pluralism” (Brzezinski 1997:119) and the external political competition 
proved positive for a democratic outcome. The democratic outcome emerges if the autocracies and 
democracies simultaneously leverage domestic actors and pursue their political agendas. The 
competing influences could be favorable for democratization. The democratizers risk assuming 
the role of autocracy promoters without competition. The reason is plain: The absence of counter-
resistance limits the effects of sanctioning policies (Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott 2007:7). External 
democratizers might engage in secret deals with the autocratic leaders and by default bolster 
authoritarianism (Ambrosio 2014:342), or, vice versa, the Black Knights might be facilitators 
(Delcour, Wolczuk 2015). The mechanism of competition should be conditioned in the specific 
                                                          
65 See Appendix III for detailed financial aid according to the areas and donors. 
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logic to allow polity to become a democracy. Notably, the target country needs to coordinate to 
avoid subversive effects of the external political competition.  
 
It is acknowledged that all international politics are local (Gleditsch 2002). This finding speaks to 
this postulate definition by identifying that the competing external influences are contingent on the 
domestic constellations. In upcoming chapters, I will investigate the cogs and wheels of competing 
regime promotion from inside. By opening this black box, I relate it to the variable of domestic 
coordination and study different regime types along the five periods in Georgia. Then, I provide a 
regional outlook in the concluding chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 THE PERIOD OF INSTABILITY 
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5.1. Liberalization, transition, and state-building, all at once - 1992-1995   
 
In this period chapter, I test the guiding hypotheses during the first presidency of Eduard 
Shevardnadze. I explain how the external political competition and domestic coordination affected 
the processes of political liberalization and transition. I analyze the political consequences of these 
variables for elections and for the actors of democratization. Namely, I scrutinize the behavior of 
the law groups in political processes and the media–government relations. Other chapters follow 
a similar logic.  
 
5.2. Political liberalization and a murky transition   
 
“If liberty means anything at all, it means the right to tell people what they do not want to hear.”  
 
George Orwell 
 
The competing foreign pressures make authoritarian leaders more receptive toward policies, 
through which individuals and groups build a voluntary connection and engage in a “free behavior” 
(O’Donnell, Schmitter 1986; Schneider, Schmitter 2007). This externally driven liberalization 
could trigger the anti-regime mobilization. It may increase internal demands to make certain rights 
effective at the individual and social levels and protect them from unwarranted inferences during 
the transition (O’Donnell, Schmitter 1986). These connections may be disrupted and become 
conflict prone when the external autocratizers are unilaterally engaged in regime promotion and 
when the domestic actors are polarized. These conditions create a fertile ground for authoritarian 
takeovers.  
 
Georgia went through the process of state-building, during which it failed to maintain congruence 
of “polity and demos” (Linz, Stepan 1996:25). The domestic groups contested at different levels 
and found out that their rights might be endangered during the phases of political liberalization 
and transition. For instance, the first elections in Georgia was followed by the elections in the 
South Ossetia that demanded succession from Georgia. Gamsakhurdia decided to revoke 
autonomy. By contrast, he reached an agreement in the autonomous Abkhazia, where the electoral 
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laws ensured a consociational agreement between ethnically Abkhaz and Georgian legislatures. 
Both groups had equal power to leverage constitutional decisions, although this agreement was 
short-lived, as their political leaders had divergent views on national projects (Nodia 1997:32, 
2016:67). These cleavages excluded the possibility of coordinated action. The overlap of political 
liberalization, transition, and founding elections (Karl, Schmitter 1991; Schneider, Schmitter 
2007) under the low external political competition made the outcomes of democratization 
uncertain.  
 
Except for this ethnic fractionalization, ethnic Georgians themselves were polarized. The civil and 
political liberties were relics in Soviet Georgia. The prime goal of the social groups was to attain 
civil and political freedoms. Their endeavor caused Gorbachev to introduce the two liberalization 
policies, perestroika and glasnost, before the Soviet collapse. The Soviet media started to openly 
address taboo issues, and the dissident organizations assumed the responsibility of 
nongovernmental organizations.66
 Liberalization resulted in a cacophony of in-group and out-
group claims. International actors embraced the domestic effort for fundamental liberties under a 
democracy promotion agenda. However, this support was delimited with political statements 
during the pre-independence period and afterward by humanitarian assistance.  
  
The political liberalization and transition were initial steps toward promoting democratic projects. 
The domestic actors were motivated to align with a free and democratic world and mitigate “a path 
dependency” (Mahoney 2001). Also, the political elites needed legitimization to safeguard their 
regained sovereignty through integration into the international community. But they were also 
required to make certain concessions to other members of the polity. Dissidents became politicians, 
and the post-communist press assumed the role of nongovernmental organizations. Thus, former 
allies became rivals.  
 
                                                          
66 See Freedom in the World – 1989-1990, political rights and civil liberties by Freedom House p.252: “Glasnost 
encouraged greater openness in the Soviet media, which began addressing issues previously off-limits and criticizing 
aspects of the Soviet communist society and its history. It also encouraged citizens to speak out and led indirectly to 
burgeoning national movements in the Baltics, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova.”   
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President Gamsakhurdia signed the Law on the Press and Mass Media. The provisions of this law 
were progressive at first glimpse. It banned censorship (Article 1) and regulated the ownership 
issue to prevent the monopolization of the media market (Article 6). However, the law authorized 
the executive agency and the court to terminate the activities of media outlets (Article 12). The 
solid journalistic rights of access to information, including archives and confidential and special 
funds at any governmental agency, were undermined by libel provisions (Article 25 and Article 
29: Honor Trial). They determined the liability for a deliberate spread of fake news or an affront 
to the dignity and honor of citizens or organizations without clear criteria. Such discrepancies 
restricted the professional freedom of a journalist and disarmed the editors or media owners. 
Consequently, the nonincumbent actors and the government stood on the different sides of 
liberalized policies.  
 
Another line of confrontation was at the polity level. On 14 April 1991, the Supreme Council of 
Georgia introduced the position of a president,67
 
which caused antagonism among the political 
forces. The fatal issue of a prime position resulted in the 1991 Civil War of Tbilisi. The 
paramilitary groups led by Kitovani-Ioseliani violently overthrew the elected president, Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia. Meanwhile, the war of laws between Georgia and the Autonomous Republic of 
South Ossetia continued with a real war, which ended on 24 June 1992 with the Sochi Agreement 
(Dagomys).68 Giorgi Chanturia, the chair of the NDP (Cornell, 2001:147), heavily criticized 
Gamsakhurdia’s policies and asked for his resignation. In response, Gamsakhurdia arrested him 
(Levitsky, Way 2010:222). In fact, the wind of danger was blowing from the other side. It was a 
final and a major division within the forces of “the national movement.” Both of them opposed 
Eduard Shevardnadze.  
 
Following the coup d’état, Tengiz Kitovani and Jaba Ioseliani invited Eduard Shevardnadze to 
legitimize the takeover of state leadership. They shared power with Prime Minister Tengiz Sigua. 
Shevardnadze established what Ekedahl and Goodman call “an unholy alliance of convenience” 
(2001:265) with them. Defense Minister Kitovani deployed troops in the Autonomous Republic 
                                                          
67 The Law on the Institution of the Post of President and concerning the amendments and additions to the Constitution 
of the Republic of Georgia dated as of 14 April 1991; 
68 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/south-ossetia  
 90 
 
of Abkhazia, where the separatist movements had already been observable. The deployment of 
National Guard was part of countermeasures against Gamsakhurdia’s supporters. On 14 August 
1992, the war started in Abkhazia and ended a year later with Russian-backed Abkhazia’s de facto 
succession.  
 
Gamskahurdia’s removal from this political battlefield explicated the confrontation between the 
coup d'état triad of Kitovani, Ioseliani, Sigua, and Shevardnadze. This triad was outdoing 
Shevardnadze. He immediately created a quasi-representative body—the Council of the State— 
with 250 members. It was intended to replace its prototype: the Military Council. At first, 
Shevardnadze was beleaguered to shake militaries. Shevardnadze headed it, and Ioseliani was a 
deputy. Kitovani and others were in the Presidium of the Council. The personal discretions and 
powers of the Head were minimized. Shevardnadze was dissatisfied with this power configuration. 
The remedy was to hold an election. On 11 October 1992, the parliamentary election was held, in 
which 36 parties participated,69 and there was no electoral threshold.70 As a result, Shevardnadze 
had multiparty legislation with parliamentary and non-parliamentary oppositions. Simultaneously, 
his super-coalition government experienced cleavages between the members of Mkhedrioni—the 
former paramilitary grouping—and Shevardnadze’s supporters. Constitution-making was the 
point of dispute. The political actors engaged in power exertion games. On 31 December 1993, 
exiled president Gamsakhurdia allegedly committed suicide (Ekedahl, Goodman 2001:269). The 
chair of the National Democratic Party Giorgi Chanturia was murdered in a terrorist attack. 
Chanturia accused Shevardnadze’s law enforcement ministers of being the Russian protagonists.  
 
After the elections, Shevardnadze adopted the Law on the State Powers, which substituted the 
constitution. The parliament elected its chairperson as the Head of State. The Chairperson of 
Parliament occupied the leading position of the legislative and executive branches at the same time 
and was entitled to appoint or dismiss judges, the prosecutor general, and ministers (Article 17),71
 
and this caused a power fusion. Shevardnadze coauthored the perestroika. This mantra of the 
                                                          
69 Author’s interview with Avtandil Demetrashvili, the president of the Constitutional Court 1996–2001; chairman of 
the State Constitutional Commission 2009; secretary of the State Constitutional Commission 1993–1995; Tbilisi, 
Georgia, December 2016.    
70 See Freedom in the World – 1992–1993, political rights and civil liberties by Freedom House, p.239.    
71 http://constcentre.gov.ge/failebi/2010_clis_reforma_11577.pdf  
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reformer hence forced him to design the Georgina foreign policy to his international image. He 
understood that the political and civil liberties should comply with international standards to avoid 
further conflicts. External democracy promoters also signaled to Shevardnadze that the Law on 
the State Powers (dated 6 November 1992) was undemocratic and failed to check and balance the 
legislatures, executives, and judicial system. Shevardnadze created the Constitutional 
Commission, and Georgia slowly moved from a mega-phonic type of free speech to more 
institutionalized freedom of expression.  
 
The constitution provided legal guarantees for the actual exercise of civil and political liberties. 
First, the Institute of Ombudsmen was introduced, and, second, the Constitutional Court was 
established to examine human rights cases primarily.
72 
Georgia acceded to the ICCPR in 1994.73 
These mechanisms preconditioned and helped Georgia to integrate into the Council of Europe 
(1999).  
 
In 1994–1995, the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association74
 
and Liberty Institute75 were 
established. A famous television station, Rustavi 2, was also founded in 1994. The media and 
nongovernmental organizations became the consumers and advocates of civil and political 
liberties. They granted them institutional leverage.76 The GYLA and the Liberty Institute were 
strongly dependent on international aid. US and European agencies created financial opportunities 
for the existence of these organizations. Domestic funding sources were unavailable, as there were 
no internal habits of supporting unprofitable causes. This made them susceptible to external 
influences. The bottom–up demand for nongovernmental and media organizations increased the 
                                                          
72 Author’s interview with Avtandil Demetrashvili, the president of the Constitutional Court 1996–2001; chairman of 
the State Constitutional Commission 2009; secretary of the State Constitutional Commission 1993–1995; Tbilisi, 
Georgia, December 2016.     
73 https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?chapter=4&clang=_en&mtdsg_no=IV-4&src=IND 
74 https://www.gyla.ge/ge/page/history  
75 Author’s interview with Giga Bokeria, the former secretary of the National Security Council of Georgia, the former 
deputy foreign minister and the co-founder of Liberty Institute.    
76 Author’s interview with Tamar Kintsurashvili, the former director general of the Georgian Public Broadcasting, and 
media expert, February 2016, Tbilisi, Georgia.     
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effectiveness of foreign financial assistance and positioned them as influential social and political 
players. The failures of government policies precipitated this popular crisis. 
 
On 24 August 1995, Georgia had a new constitution that introduced the quasi-presidential system. 
International experts and nongovernmental organizations assisted the constitutional commission. 
Shevardnadze refrained from direct interference during the hearings, whereas his supporters 
bogged down all alternative drafts. Bakur Gulua, the Head of the Union of Reformers, presented 
the final draft, which presumably derived from the political bargaining between Shevardnadze and 
the Republican Party. The National Democratic Party abstained from voting, the Republican Party 
supported, and eight members of the parliament voted against. Shevardnadze had a lust for a 
personalist rule and excluded any possibility of a parliamentary republic. The Constitution of 
Georgia contained the elements of a presidential system similar to the US model. It secured the 
power of Shevardnadze and encouraged him to be firm against its opponent. His first targets were 
“old allies.” He cleaned the political landscape of its military elements and arrested those who 
invited him to undertake political leadership. 
 
Although Shevardnadze neutralized all paramilitaries, clan governance was a prevalent mode of 
his political crafting. Shevardnadze assigned functions and granted extensive rights to the regime’s 
loyalists. This soft-power strategy was a trade-off between stability and violent political 
confrontations. Shevardnadze’s involvement with Aslan Abashidze, the then head of the 
Autonomous Republic of Adjara, exemplified this proxy rule. Shevardnadze had two 
requirements. First, the governors had to transfer taxes to the state budget; second, they had to 
create a particular type of order without challenging the existing regime. Shevardnadze’s 
concession politics were aimed at balancing internal forces and appeasing the economic and social 
discontent, yet this massively increased corruption.  
 
In this period, Russia was the external actor with a competitive edge. The external democratizers 
provided a forum of dialogue. Georgia was undergoing the processes of state-building, and post-
soviet authoritarian institutions were still in place. In this context, political liberalization was a 
strategic decision for Shevardnadze to divide and rule his opponents. In this rocky transition, 
Shevardnadze could not reconcile fractionalized political and social groups. However, he reduced 
polarizing effects by removing militaries and radical groups. 
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5.3. The role of rule of law actors  
 
The competing foreign actors influence, among other groups, the rule of law actors. The rule of 
law is that actors are the least amenable groups toward external pressures. The competing foreign 
forces weaken them and mitigate their amenability. At that time, the rule of law actors were free-
riding, as no political group managed to build tight connections with them. Moreover, the external 
democratizers were less engaged with them, and their cooperation was of a general nature. Russia 
primarily used military and political leverages. It hardly relied on its old networks at early 
independence days because there was a counter-reaction to the Soviet-imposed ideological 
constraints. Anything forbidden by law was unwelcomed. This mentality and attitude prevailed in 
and among all state institutions and officials. Courts, prosecution, and police, which earlier were 
used by the Communist regime as a tool of violence and punishment, were self-fulfilled with the 
expectations that they should serve as arbiters in this new political reality and that laws guide their 
actions instead of ideology.  
 
The military coup d’état extinguished all initial opportunities, and the rule of law actors had no 
role in regulating any relationship under the Military Council. When Shevardnadze started to 
consolidate its power, he encountered resistance from the security and police ministers. These 
ministers had strong affiliations with the Russian intelligence. Giorgi Khachishvili, Shota Kviraia, 
and Igor Giorgadze received professional education at Russian security institutions and 
collaborated with them. All of them were suspected of plotting in the terrorist attack against Eduard 
Shevardnadze. Khachishvili and Giorgadze were convicted of committing a terrorist attack against 
Shevardnadze. Khachishvili was also accused of organizing the assassination of Giorgi Chanturia, 
the leader of the National Democratic Party. Eventually, he was imprisoned and served his 
sentence. Giorgadze fled to Moscow, and later his colleague Kviraia joined him. 
 
Courts and prosecution reasonably sided with Shevardnadze. Prosecutor General Jamlet 
Babilashvili and Chief Justice Mindia Ugrekhelidze came from the team of Shevardnadze. They 
cooperated with the political leadership for several reasons. First, Shevardnadze returned them the 
role that was deprived by paramilitaries. Second, in the aftermath of three wars, Georgia became 
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“the paradise of organized criminal groups” that threatened the security of prosecutors and judges. 
Shevardnadze guaranteed them this security to a certain degree. He encouraged them to open up 
to external democratizers and receive required professional training. In doing so, he thought he 
would liberalize them and avoid further confrontation. Third, Georgia lacked a strongly established 
Soviet-style bureaucracy and had no robust traditions of bureaucratic governance. The absence of 
an organized bureaucratic mainstream lowered the transaction costs of this bargaining. The 
country-wide economic misery caused these actors to participate in massive corruption. As a result, 
they lost credibility and legitimacy, which made prosecutors, judges, and police and security 
officers unenthusiastic in exercising their powers to the fullest extent. They successfully practiced 
“telephone justice” and “selective justice.”  
5.4. The political consequences of elections  
 
The first national elections were regarded as fair and free because the political actors intended to 
build a new type of state for which fair elections were the central prerequisite. All elections, 
including the parliamentary election of 1990 under the collapsing Soviet rule, the National 
Referendum of 31 March 1991, in which 98% of the Georgian population voted for independence, 
and the presidential election of 1991, which had the highest voter turnout of 2,978,47, were held 
in an atmosphere of national euphoria.77  
 
The desire of the people and the leaders to end the communist regime temporarily revived 
democratic ideas. Any undemocratic move during the founding election would act against this 
common goal. Neither the political elites nor the people realized that a set of institutions were 
missing to deal with post-election difficulties.  
 
The pre-election debates revolved around choosing the best electoral system for prolonging 
transition. Using a majoritarian system in the first presidential election of 1991 was instrumental 
to societal polarization. It failed to precisely reflect voters’ preferences and created an unstable 
political environment. The groups that felt threatened about losing privileges or being 
underrepresented were vulnerable to illiberal external pressures and translated their dissatisfaction 
                                                          
77 http://infocenter.gov.ge/elections2017/history_en.pdf  pp.5-7.     
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into local insurgencies. Although the parliamentary election of 1992 used a mixed system, the 
majority of candidates were elected through a proportional system and with a 2% electoral 
threshold. This election ensured the representation of different political groups and slowly 
transformed “the gun politics” into parliamentary politics. The successive parliamentary elections 
applied the same electoral system with an increased electoral threshold of 7%. Shevardnadze 
appeased internal conflicts by allowing almost all political groups to enter parliament, but he 
tailored the constitution and the electoral laws to have strong representation.  
 
Elections force politicians to pursue popular demands, but how a principle–agent problem is solved 
depends on different factors, including the governance system, the composition of the political 
landscape (Fearon 2011), national sentiments, and the presence of liberal and illiberal powers. The 
political leaders and the voters are “expressive” (Brennan, Hamlin 2004) in “founding elections” 
(O’Donnell, Schmitter 1986:61). Elections bring waves of uncertainty and have exacerbating 
effects due to institutional fragilities. Thus, democracy disappoints political leaders and their 
followers.  
 
The concurrent processes of liberalization, state-building, and transition to an unknown form of 
democracy culminated with the military coup and wars. In 1992, Shevardnadze legitimized the 
military council with the parliamentary election. While bullets were shot in the streets, the ballots 
were cast in the boxes, and undemocratic political forces came to power through reasonably 
democratic elections. The domestic scrutiny was high in elections under Gamsakhurdia, whereas 
the supporters of paramilitary groups and Shevardnadze benefited from the environment of the 
parliamentary elections in 1992. Both periods had low external scrutiny. Given these 
circumstances, none of the governments had any incentive to commit electoral fraud. They also 
had no experience to do so.  
 
The interim Constitutional provisions of 1995 determined the necessary conditions to hold 
parliamentary and presidential elections. Despite the negative predispositions, specifically the 
terrorist attack on Shevardnadze (Milanova 2004:129) amid a new constitution that favored a 
strong presidential system, the elections passed without violence. A total of 53 political parties 
participated, but only the Citizens’ Union of Georgia, the National Democratic Party, and the 
Union of Democratic Revival overcame the electoral threshold. The majoritarian seats were shared 
 96 
 
with other political parties and independent candidates.78 Eduard Shevardnadze won the 
presidential election, which was competitive with broad public debates. There were specific issues 
regarding the detention of opposition members during the pre-election campaign and complaints 
about the unequal distribution of media time in presidential campaigning. Despite technical 
difficulties in the polling stations, the registration procedures were consistent. The government 
failed to provide legally guaranteed state funding for political parties but was open to international 
and domestic observers.79 The external and domestic checks were high. The local 
nongovernmental organizations and the newly emerged private media outlet, Rustavi 2, received 
international support, although they were still beginners in detecting and documenting electoral 
violations. Democratizing and domestic pressures were beneficial in advancing the electoral 
procedures. Further, this scrutiny supported incumbents in acquiring the skills of authoritarian 
persistence. Even the low intensity of external political competition made rigging elections costly, 
as the political struggles and fractionalization were intense.  
5.5. Media–government relations    
 
Communication scholars agree that the form of transition determines that the media is a game 
changer or an instrument of the political regime (Voltmer 2013). Jakubowicz introduces the 
concept of ontogenesis, which captures the evolutionary logic of each component of the regime, 
including the media (Jakubowicz, Karol, Miklós 2008). The transition to democracy could produce 
different types of regimes in which the governments might have either weak or strong capacities. 
They are inclined to capture a state power (Fukuyama 1992). Some incumbents are more 
successful in mobilizing and legitimizing their power than others. Ostensibly, this mobilization 
and the degree of its legitimization affect the media actors and their chances of political resistance. 
Power matters in politics and the way power is constrained matter even more (Schedler 1999). The 
raison d’être of political power is to control a governing system, have access to political resources, 
                                                          
78 Note: Majoritarian elections mandated 18 seats for the Citizens' Union of Georgia, six seats - the Union of 
Democratic Revival, three seats -National-Democratic Party, 29 seats for independent candidates and 29 seats for 
other political parties. Source: The Central Elections Commission of Georgia: "Georgia - the History of Elections, 
1990-2010".   
79 See OSCE Election Report, 1 February 1996, p.1.  
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and exercise control over the state apparatus (Linz, Stepan 1996). A political regime is qualified 
as a democracy if the power of political elites is minimized and that of the non-elites is maximized 
(Bollen 1980:372).  
 
The media is a source of horizontal accountability and one of the nonincumbent elites to guard 
against the arbitrariness of government and the opacity of its power (Schedler 1999:20). Its 
constraining abilities derive from the structural premises of media to provide politicians with a 
broad audience; its psychological tenets to obtain the credibility and trust of its audience through 
daily communication; and normative principles of liberal policies (Blumler, Gurevitch 1995:12-
13). These powers can be used to anticipate conflicts between the media and the government.  
  
My study’s focus is on the private television media, although the print media had a longstanding 
tradition in Georgia. The rationale behind this choice is that television stations played a role in 
regime transformation multiple times and within a short time span. They also rapidly gained 
popularity among the population. The television media and government were in the process of 
self-formation. The state television station was less credible because of its Soviet past. The print 
media, such as 7 Day, Rezonansi, Iveria Express, and Mimomkhilveli/Reviewer, was a powerful 
actor compared to state television. These sources set a political agenda.  
 
This picture of the print media’s domination changed when the most famous private media outlet, 
Rustavi 2, emerged in 1994. The government was delegitimized and unaccountable for its actions. 
The media assumed the responsibility of informing and explaining to people the significant 
political developments and exposing the misconducts of politicians. The involvement of external 
democratizers began to increase from that point in time. Georgian television media and 
nongovernmental organizations received assistance from the outside and acquired knowledge of 
how to challenge the government.  
 
External democratizers supported the media’s freedom with public political statements and used 
private diplomacy. They also empowered the nongovernmental organizations—the Georgian 
Young Lawyers’ Association—to serve as the partner for media. These organizations educated 
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journalists about their civil and political rights.80
 
The Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association 
launched the project, Free Legal Assistance for Journalists, to assist private television stations and 
journalists and to promote democratic processes. This project was a local initiative backed by 
international assistance. 
 
The political will of Shevardnadze was essential to allow media freedom. His decision was 
rationally grounded because he mistrusted his political surrounding and bureaucracy. 
Shevardnadze needed reliable information from an alternative source to plan his further political 
moves. Media could do that job for him. As a communist leader, he underestimated the power of 
the media and nongovernmental organizations. Shevardnadze perceived them as decorations and 
thought he would make the vital political decisions. Rustavi 2 assumed a leading role to have say 
on domestic reforms, foreign policy issues, and civic values. The television station mobilized the 
people against the government and divided the political elites. The nongovernmental organizations 
and political parties used this television station as their forum to communicate with the electorate.  
 
The first media–government confrontation between Rustavi 2 and Kvemo-Kartli Governor Levan 
Mamaladze occurred in Rustavi. A dispute with local authorities resulted in changing the location 
of Rustavi 2 and widening its broadcasting area. The critical content of Rustavi 2 caused 
dissatisfaction among retrogrades in Shevardnadze’s political party. Shota Kviraia, the Georgian 
minister of internal affairs, took the lead in creating barriers for and shutting down Rustavi 2. A 
temporary punitive measure was removed, and the television station renewed broadcasting. On 
certain occasions, Rustavi 2’s owners had to take a non-confrontational stance toward Minister of 
Interior of Georgia Kakha Targamadze to avoid oppression. There were different instances of 
tactical conflicts. Giga Bokeria had a political talk show on Rustavi 2 for which he managed to 
have only two airings and had to leave because critical topics on Georgia’s Western choice and 
Georgia’s Orthodox Church caused discontent among the retrogrades of the Shevardnadze 
government. Giga Bokeria left Rustavi 2 and became the cofounder of the Liberty Institute, which 
                                                          
80 Author's interview with Davit Usupashvili, the Former Chair of the Parliament of Georgia; the Co-founder of the 
Georgian Young Lawyers' Association; December 2016, Tbilisi, Georgia.  
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further engaged in the legal education of journalists.81 The ownership structure of Rustavi 2 was 
another powerful ingredient. The media owners and journalists stood up against the government, 
which made them invulnerable against the oppression.82  
 
The owners of Rustavi 2 were also commercially motivated. Erosi Kitsmarishvili, Davit Dvali, 
and Jarji Akimidze aimed to strengthen their positions within the developing media market. 
Another television station, Kavkasia, was unable to diversify the media content or trigger the 
pluralization of the media market because it lacked financial, technical, and human resources. The 
search for commercial benefits sustained the cooperation of Rustavi 2 and the reformers group 
Zhvania-Saakashvili. Commercial necessities attracted a political investment in the media. The 
government realized the dangers of this cooperation and engaged in legal disputes with Rustavi 2. 
In 1994-1995, Rustavi 2 won its first legal dispute at the Supreme Court of Georgia. The external 
democratizers helped the media to build its foundation as a dominant actor in political processes. 
Intellectual, professional, and political support aided the media in benefitting from the conflict 
with the government and paved the way to the Rose Revolution. 
5.6. What explains the failure of a democratic transition? 
 
The external political competition was low, and there was no coordination among the groups. 
Russia was a leading external actor promoting autocracy with political and military tools. Also, it 
relied on old networks of bureaucratic and cultural elites that frequently set a pro-Russian tone. As 
the memories of the Soviet persecutions were fresh, including Russia’s direct engagement in the 
conflicts on the side of breakaway regions, a vast majority of the population disapproved of its 
politics in Georgia.  
 
 
                                                          
81 Author’s interview with Giga Bokeria, the former secretary of the National Security Council of Georgia, the former 
deputy foreign minister and the co-founder of Liberty Institute.     
82 Author's interview with Ia Antadze, Media Expert; Director of Civil Development Institute; Journalist of Radio 
Liberty; February 2016, Tbilisi, Georgia.  
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The social and political groups were fractionalized and polarized at different levels. Georgians 
were divided along the supporters of Gamsakhurdia and Shevardnadze. Within these polarized 
supporters, there were multiple factions that differently viewed the political future of Georgia but 
shared the baseline dislike of either Gamsakhurdia or Shevardnadze. The mainstream media and 
the rule of law actors sidelined with Shevardnadze. They also claimed to be in unison regarding 
the Abkhazian separatism. Georgia was fractionalized and polarized.  
     
The additional line of quasi-polarization ran between the ethnic Georgians and Abkhazians in the 
region of Abkhazia. Although the latter was in minority as a group, its capacities were equal to 
those of Georgia due to Russian support. Shevardnadze  joined the Commonwealth of Independent 
States to end hostilities in Abkhazia (Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Sullivan 1996:237). However, these 
attempts were inconsequential, as these authoritarian connections began to undermine his power 
covertly and violently, which gave him an impetus to frame a pro-Western foreign policy and 
rescue his presidency. He chose to give freedom to media because it served his political intensions. 
The law groups were instruments to counter other domestic competitors. Elections revealed the 
relations of political and societal groups and how the external political competitors engaged in 
changing the political course of Georgia. For instance, Shevardnadze survived a terrorist attack 
before the elections, and the identified attackers became Russian-affiliated insiders. After freezing 
the territorial conflicts, the polarizing effects were reduced, and the fractionalization of political 
groups was localized on the level of political parties. The political fractionalization under the 
strong presidentialism had destabilizing effects. External democratizers demanded that 
Shevardnadze improve this system if he was willing to receive some kind of protection. To sum 
up, this period chapter validates the assumption that the absence of coordination and external 
political competition leads to democratic failure. 
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CHAPTER 6 DEMOCRACY WITHOUT VISION 
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6.  The period of stabilization and the onset of democratization – 1995-2003   
 
In this period chapter, I analyze the second presidency of Eduard Shevardnadze and test the 
hypothesized mechanisms. During this period, the political regime exhibited the qualities of 
unstable competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky, Way 2010:220). It was a starting point of 
stabilization and the process of democratization. The external political competitors affected 
institutional formation and helped their proxies to survive domestic political competition. The 
society was frustrated by dysfunctional political elites as they rooted corrupt practices and used 
rent-seeking as a prevalent mode of relations with other segments of the polity and the society. As 
the conflicts were localized and froze, there was in-group fractionalization between the political 
elites in particular. The combination of these external and domestic factors affected democratizing 
processes.  
6.1. Attempting to coordinate differences   
 
Eduard Shevardnadze rebuilt the country after the civil war and separatists’ conflicts, and the 
political processes moved to the parliament. He initiated reforms to transform state institutions, 
and the police replaced paramilitary groupings in the streets. Unlike the period of Gamsakhurdia 
or Shevardnadze’s first presidency, the external democratizers actively engaged in the legal 
institutionalization of civil and political liberties. Chapter 2 of the Georgian Constitution on human 
rights met the highest standards from a normative perspective. Words replaced bullets in political 
disputes. The strong demand for political and civil freedoms underpinned the activities of 
nongovernmental organizations. The inceptive relations with external democratizers caused these 
nongovernmental activists to realize the powers of these liberties and that the state was obliged to 
defend them.83   
 
                                                          
83 Author’s interview with Tamar Chugoshvili - First Deputy Chair of the Parliament of Georgia, Former assistant to 
the Prime Minister of Georgia, former head of the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association and Rule of Law Program 
Coordinator for USAID; December 2016, Tbilisi, Georgia.    
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The state compromised because of low organizational power (Levitsky, Way 2010) and because 
the political groups thought that political liberalization allowed their representation. Georgia’s 
need for international integration conditioned the political elites to coordinate differences and base 
their decisions on political necessities. Shevardnadze opened the public space for the three main 
groups: banks, nongovernmental organizations, and media. These velvet reforms were a frontal 
attack on the post-totalitarian, Soviet mentality. His political will reshaped the legislative 
processes. The undisciplined parliament acquired the traditions of parliamentary practices. Since 
1997, Georgia did not have a death penalty because of its membership commitments to the CoE 
(1999).84 The international responsibilities helped to improve the rules regarding minority issues 
and overall legislation.  
 
External democratizers sustained85 politically proactive nongovernmental organizations such as 
the Georgian Young Lawyer’s Association and the Liberty Institute (Welt 2010:162). With the 
same assistance, Rustavi 2 launched the program called “60 Minutes.” This television program 
opposed the government. US government scholarships contributed to the professional 
empowerment of investigative journalists. The author of “60 Minutes” studied in the US and 
started a career in investigative broadcasting after completing his studies.86 This program was a 
breakthrough in Georgian investigative journalism, as it exposed corrupt government officials and 
their deals, bribery, and links with organized-crime groups. 87  
 
Foreign-funded nongovernmental organizations were the partners for Rustavi 2 until the triad of 
defectors established its opposition parties. These investigative journalists were threatened due to 
                                                          
84 Author’s interview with Lasha Natsvlishvili, Former Deputy Security Minister, Deputy Interior Minister, Deputy 
Chief Prosecutor of Georgia and a Member of Parliament of Georgia from the Republican Party, November 2016, 
Zurich, Switzerland.    
85 Author’s interview with Giga Bokeria, the former secretary of the National Security Council of Georgia, the former 
deputy foreign minister and the co-founder of Liberty Institute.      
86 Author’s interviews with Akaki Gogichaishvili, journalist, Rustavi2; TV anchor and team leader of “60 Minutes”; 
February 2016, Tbilisi, Georgia.    
87 Nino Zuriashvili recalls the following: “I had absolute freedom to select topics. I discussed with Akaki which topic 
would be more important. It was free and investigative journalism. 60 minutes created the strong reputation of Rustavi 
2.”  
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their criticism. The “60 Minutes” program had legal disputes with corrupt ministers and a former 
railway chief. The libel provisions endangered the financial conditions of Rustavi 2. The media 
actors needed “a political shelter.” A group of reformers—Mikheil Saakashvili, Zurab Zhvania, 
and Nino Burjanadze— in the government protected the critical media. This decision was mutually 
rewarding for these soft liners and media actors.  
 
On 31 October 1997, the parliament adopted the Law on Political Unions of Citizens, which 
enabled citizens to carry out political activities without infringing on state independence and 
territorial integrity or inciting national, religious, or social hatred.88 It prevented state authorities 
and state officials from interfering in party activities (Article 7). The political unions were entitled 
to receive funding through donations, membership fees, state subsidies, and loans from the 
commercial banks. According to this law, the state determined the funding scheme of political 
unions89
 
and ascertained an annual threshold for party spending.90
  
 
The state had to transfer additional sums to a fund that aimed to develop the capacities of political 
parties (50%) and nongovernmental organizations (50%) to facilitate a competitive political 
system. Each nongovernmental organization could receive around 10% of the total fund allocated 
for all nongovernmental organizations. The same provision gave voting rights to international 
organizations during the discussion of such projects.91  
 
The political elites and the group of reformers used these liberalized mechanisms to coordinate 
their political actions, establish new parties, and search for their funding opportunities. 
Competitive promotion of political, bureaucratic, media, and nongovernmental elites made the 
political differences visible. It also increased the fractionalization and division among such actors 
and facilitated a regime change. Among the critical domestic actors were the rule of law groups, 
as they provided the government with disruptive capacities, which demotivated actors to 
coordinate. Below, I discuss their role in political games and how they related to competing 
pressures. 
                                                          
88 https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/28324  
89 See Article 30, §4 available at: https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/28324 
90 Ibid. Article 11.   
91 Ibid. Article 301.  
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6.2. Affecting the rule of law actors    
 
The absence of economic prerequisites forced Shevardnadze to choose either dictatorship or 
corruption. Russia’s 1997–1998 financial crisis aggravated the situation, troubling the Georgian 
economy. Shevardnadze knew dictatorship would be costly for his regime, so he redistributed 
common goods and achieved minimal social justice by allowing countrywide corruption. The 
arrival of Chechen fighters in Pankisi Gorge under Ruslan Gelayev was the final stroke for 
Shevardnadze’s regime because Georgia risked becoming a failed state. The courts were corrupt, 
and impunity syndrome was universal, though the judiciary was less dependent on the executive 
branch. Prosecutors were not able to tell judges what to do. Two motives guided their decisions. 
The first and leading factor was the financial and social benefits. The second was the law and 
professional consciousness. Sometimes the courts issued just decisions, but corruption weakened 
state institutions and disabled the government to fund an oppressive machine. A resource-poor 
country cannot be corrupt and repressive at the same time. This weakness helped the political 
opposition to coordinate.  
 
Georgia adopted its criminal legislation according to the laws of continental Europe. Prosecution 
law banned so-called “common supervision,” a remnant of Soviet legislation.92
 
This amendment 
constrained arbitrary acts by legal authorities. Court law determined appointment rules for new 
judges and modernized the judicial system.93 However, Georgia was among the most corrupt 
countries in the world (Kupatadze 2016:110). Legal groups were selective of external 
democratizing pressures. For instance, the parliamentary committees on legal and human rights 
issues developed connections with European institutions, while law enforcement oriented itself to 
its US counterparts. The primary focus was on anti-corruption and border control projects, as well 
as on developing the forensic institute.94   
 
                                                          
92 Note: Under this provision, prosecutors could enter any public and private institution randomly to inspect whether 
any illegal acts, such as labor law violations, corruption or economic crimes, etc., had been or were being committed.   
93 Author’s interview with a former senior official of the Ministry of Justice, November 2016, Zurich, Switzerland. 
94 Dated as of 18 June 2001 and signed by the State Minister Giorgi Arsenishvili and Ambassador Kenneth Yalowitz.     
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On 18 May 2000, Shevardnadze reshuffled his government. The Georgian parliament approved 
eight ministers, including Kakha Targamadze, the minister of internal affairs; Vakhtang 
Kutateladze, the minister of security; and Davit Tevzadze, the minister of defense. Shevardnadze 
impaired the reformers’ group with this restructuring. Mikheil Saakashvili, then a member of 
parliament, openly supported Tevzadze’s candidacy and approved his program, which aimed at 
building the Georgian army according to NATO standards. Saakashvili criticized the programs of 
the ministers of internal affairs and security because both intended to expand their agencies’ 
capacities. Targamadze and Kutateladze complained about the deficits in state funding and foreign 
aid and stressed the need to tackle corrupt practices, but they remained vague in their methods. 
Saakashvili and his political allies demanded Targamadze introduce a court investigation and 
extend the rights of defense parties. This would reduce the concentration of power in a particular 
law enforcement agency and better protect human rights.95     
 
Saakashvili and other soft-liners from the Union of Citizens of Georgia were disappointed when 
hardliners pressured Revaz Shavishvili to leave his position as the head of the Chamber of Control. 
Zurab Zhvania, a parliamentary speaker, attempted to persuade Shavishvili to remain in his 
position, but the decision was final.96 Shevardnadze realized that the fragmentation of the ruling 
party had reached culmination, and its split was inevitable. Shevardnadze temporarily froze the 
possibility of political rebellion by distributing the spoils of political co-optation and policy 
concessions (Przeworski, Gandhi 2007:1282). He was not willing to question his regime’s survival 
or confront rival reformers, so he proposed to Saakashvili the position of justice minister. 
Saakashvili agreed and initiated judicial reforms. Through these trade-offs, they postponed the 
                                                          
95 Transcript of the plenary session of the parliament of Georgia, 18 May 2000, obtained from the parliament of 
Georgia, pp. 93-124.   
96 Transcript of the plenary session of the parliament of Georgia, 18 May 2000, obtained from the parliament of 
Georgia, pp. 5-8. Saakashvili addressed the parliament: “I respect his decision, but I do not think it is right. […]. It 
means that Shavishvili leaves a battlefield. The Chamber of Control was the only state authority that provided reliable 
information to the parliament of Georgia. He has professional integrity and is an honest person. This decision is 
unjustified because the fight which we started together resulted in the creation of the Anti-corruption Commission 
[…]. His resignation is the victory of corrupt officials as the parliament loses a source of authentic materials about 
their corrupt deals […]. I convinced him two years ago, and I hope I can do the same today. Otherwise, we are 
abandoned at this critical time for the parliament and our country.” 
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revolution. The justice minister became a leading reformer, the Council of Justice was established, 
and the Ministry of Justice was no longer responsible for administering the courts. Judges 
maintained their positions only on the condition of passing qualification exams. Davit Usupashvili, 
the former chairperson of the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association and a nongovernmental 
activist, recalls,  
 
“I remember a consultative meeting with Eduard Shevardnadze. The meeting was about 
the Independent Council of Justice and the qualification exams of judges. Around 15–20 
people attended this meeting with Shevardnadze, including prosecutors, university 
professors, the secretary of the Security Council, Saakashvili and myself. Saakashvili 
presented his plan and suggested adopting new laws. Everyone was against him. I was the 
only non-governmental representative. Saakashvili invited me to strengthen his position 
against the opponents. I was trying to contribute to these discussions, but Shevardnadze 
had the final say. He compared our plans to his 70s anti-corruption strategy when those 
who demanded reforms themselves became corrupt. Eventually, he allowed us to do these 
reforms. He concluded our meeting with the following words: ‘They are young. Let’s trust 
them; it might work.97 
 
Mikheil Saakashvili had political motivation to consume democratic assistance. First, Saakashvili 
was preparing for political elevation. By liberalizing these structures and the actors within them, 
he thought to secure himself and his political team in challenging Shevardnadze’s regime. Second, 
Saakashvili accumulated political capital and was respected by specific groups within the rule of 
law arena that eventually sided with Saakashvili, Zhvania, and Burjanadze during the Rose 
Revolution. Despite legislative guarantees, this standalone judicial reform was insufficient. Other 
segments of the government, such as prosecution and law enforcement authorities, required 
modernization to overcome their corrupt traditions. Justice Minister Saakashvili could only 
leverage institutionally subordinated agencies. His political influence stopped at the doors of the 
police, security, and prosecution authorities. He strongly disagreed with Kakha Targamadze, the 
minister of internal affairs. Saakashvili drafted a law on “Returning illegal and undocumented 
                                                          
97 Author’s interview with Davit Usupashvili, the former chairperson of the Parliament of Georgia and the co-founder 
of the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, December 2016, Tbilisi, Georgia.    
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property to the state.” This law aimed at exposing and punishing corrupt officials. The justice 
minister traveled across Georgia to raise awareness of the law and issued warnings that, if the 
parliament did not approve this legislation, he would run the referendum. Kakha Targamadze 
opposed Saakashvili’s anti-corruption policies and hindered Saakashvili’s nationwide information 
campaign.  
 
Mikheil Saakashvili also disapproved of the policies of Vakhtang Kutateladze, the minister of 
security, and Ivane Chkhartishvili, the minister of economy. Saakashvili understood that he could 
not win the anti-corruption campaign without Shevardnadze’s political support. He thought his 
stay in the government would undermine his credibility at home and abroad, so he resigned. In 
October 2001, Saakashvili established a political party, the United National Movement. Rustavi 2 
played a decisive role in his electoral campaign, which explains why security and tax authorities 
raided the television station. In November 2001, the United National Movement, the Republican 
Party, the Conservative Party, the nongovernmental organizations, and their supporters came to 
the streets of Tbilisi to defend media freedom. This was a rehearsal for the Rose Revolution.  
 
Eka Beridze, the former Rustavi 2 journalist, anchored the political talk show What Do People 
Think? on the state-controlled First Channel. The opposition and its supporters blamed the 
government for domestic failures. Eldar Shengelaia, the vice-speaker of the parliament and a 
member of Zhvania’s faction, accused state television of supporting the minister of internal affairs 
and the prosecutor general instead of Rustavi 2. Zaza Shengelia, the head of state television, joined 
the debates and demanded apologies from the opposition leaders. The media discord contained 
threats to polarize the electorate. Zurab Zhvania, the chairman of the parliament, promised 
resignation to Shevardnadze contingent on the removal of law enforcement ministers. Zurab 
Zhvania resigned, and Nino Burjanadze replaced him. The president was forced to dismiss the 
government, including Kakha Targamadze, the minister of internal affairs; Vakhtang Kutateladze, 
the minister of security; and Gia Mepharishvili, the prosecutor general. The former speaker of the 
parliament founded his political party, the United Democrats.  
       
The first wave of reforms focused on essentials and had no immediate consequences. The rule of 
law actors remained open to instrumental empowerment, which increased their capacity to conduct 
surveillance on opposition, media, and nongovernmental actors. Financial aid was insufficient to 
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meet these demands for two reasons. First, the external democratizers provided a calculated 
proportion of assistance, as they mistrusted corrupt ministers and questioned their foreign policy 
orientations. Second, budgetary resources were scarce. These factors precipitated a coordination 
problem among the law groups but increased the coordination of opposition forces. Thus, no 
specific group could curtail their efforts toward regime change. 
6.3. Authoritarian persistence against electoral uncertainties 
 
The election periods mirror the coordinative capacity of domestic actors and the level of 
involvement of external competitors. Democracy and autocracy promoters have baseline motives. 
Namely, if their political affiliates come to power, their political representations and agendas are 
advanced. Democracy promoters started to engage actively in Georgia during Shevardnadze’s 
second presidency. He realized that without opening Georgia to other international entities, he was 
at risk to deal with Russia alone. Shevardnadze chose the gradual weakening of his power over 
violent overthrow or authoritarian consolidation. His regime developed skills to resist democratic 
changes in different areas, including electoral uncertainties.  
      
Georgia had no codified electoral legislation until 2001. Separate laws regulated election 
procedures. International and domestic observers raised similar concerns about the Election Code. 
Notably, the electoral system, electoral dispute settlement, the abuse of administrative resources, 
vote-buying, and media regulations98 were signs of a competitive authoritarian regime (Levitsky, 
Way 2010:8). This political regime permitted competitive elections. Opposition leaders and parties 
participated in election races and were not merely a domesticated opposition, but authoritarian 
institutions created an uneven playing field to avert challenges that threatened the government 
(Levitsky, Way 2010:9; Przeworski, Gandhi 2007:1283).  
      
The critical media, a corrupt judiciary, bureaucratic apparatus, multi-party legislators, and public 
discontent undermined Shevardnadze’s regime. He used various institutional mechanisms to 
                                                          
98 See the following opinions of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission): 
CDL-AD (2002)9, CDL-AD (2004)005, CDL-AD (2005)042, CDL-AD (2006)037, CDL-AD (2009)001, CDL-AD 
(2010)013, CDL-AD (2011)043. 
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contain political rebellions. Davit Usupashvili, former chairperson of the Georgian parliament, 
recalls,  
“I sent the letter to Shevardnadze before the presidential elections of 2000 and called for 
risking and refusing to be the president of the system in which he operated and to some 
extent was created by him. I advised him to use this important chance and move the country 
towards the European track. The pre-election campaign was an opportunity to represent 
an anti-corruption strategy. He liked these suggestions and offered to establish an anti-
corruption group. But Shevardnadze hinted that he would do this after the elections. The 
main point was to base his election campaign on this platform and future policies out of 
it.”99  
Shevardnadze was cautious and made only partial concessions because strict anti-corruption 
policies would have cut privileges to a small group upon which he relied. The 1999 parliamentary 
election did not entirely meet international requirements, but it was marked by fierce competition 
among political parties. International observers regarded the electoral laws as providing an 
adequate legal framework for multiparty elections but having vague provisions about election 
procedures and a high electoral threshold (7%).100 International observers made similar claims 
about the presidential election and questioned counting and tabulation procedures. They 
encouraged amendments to the legal framework. Observers also raised concerns about state 
television, which allocated excessive time to the incumbent government, and about the 
composition of the election commission, which was predominantly represented by a parliamentary 
majority.101  
        
Following these critical assessments, the USAID and IFES assisted the Georgian Central Elections 
Commission (CEC) in developing a centralized computerized system on national, district, and 
precinct levels. The CEC and IFES recruited and trained the required staff. The total aid was no 
                                                          
99 Author’s interview with Davit Usupashvili, the former chairperson of the Parliament of Georgia and the co-founder 
of the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, December 2016, Tbilisi, Georgia. 
100 See Georgia-Parliamentary Elections, 31 October/14 November 1999, OSCE/ODIHR Final Report, pp. 5–6. 
101 See OSCE Election Observation Mission, Republic of Georgia, Presidential Elections, 9 April 2000, Statement of 
Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, pp. 1–2. 
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less than 150,000 USD.102 The US government was the largest financial contributor and was a 
main strategic partner, and Shevardnadze was considerate toward external signals. However, he 
could not prevent the massive electoral fraud that beset the 2003 parliamentary elections103 because 
the privileged political groups were beyond his control, and the reformers had left the Citizens’ 
Union of Georgia right before the local self-government election of 2 June 2002.  
       
Shevardnadze renamed his party, but this did not guarantee electoral victory, as the party lacked 
popular support. The local self-governance election in the capital city was the biggest rehearsal for 
the upcoming parliamentary election. The seven political parties won seats on the City Council of 
Tbilisi. The leading political parties were Shalva Natelashvili’s Labor Party of Georgia (fifteen 
seats), Mikheil Saakashvili’s National Movement-Democratic Front (fourteen seats), and Zurab 
Zhvania’s Georgia’s Christian-Conservative Party (four seats). Natelashvili and Saakashvili made 
a political agreement in which Natelashvili transferred the leadership of the Tbilisi City Council 
to Saakashvili. As a result, Saakashvili’s party rapidly gained popularity. Nino Burjanadze, then 
chairwoman of the Georgian parliament, was among the defectors. She formed the Block 
Burjanadze Democrats, and Zurab Zhvania and his supporters joined her party for the 2003 
parliamentary election.  
       
In a last attempt at authoritarian persistence, the CEC announced rigged results and claimed victory 
for the ruling party104 even though exit polls conducted by domestic and international observers 
demonstrated evidence of the ruling party’s defeat. The anti-regime demonstrations ended with the 
Rose Revolution. The happy end of the revolution was obfuscated because Georgia had 
experienced the violent escalation of political confrontations, but it ended with roses instead of 
                                                          
102 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of 
the Republic of Georgia, 2003, Tbilisi, Georgia; Source: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia.    
103 See OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Report, 2 November 2003, pp. 1-3, available at: 
https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/georgia/17822?download=true 
104 The 2003 Parliamentary Election results: 1. Block for New Georgia, 21.32% (38 seats); 2. The Union of Democratic 
Revival, 18.84% (33 seats); 3. Block Saakashvili–National Movement, 18.08% (32 seats); 4. The Labor Party of 
Georgia, 12.04% (20 seats); 5. Block Burjanadze–Democrats, 8.79% (15 seats); and 6. Block New Rights, 7.35% (12 
seats). Source: “Georgia: The History of Elections, 1990–2010”, obtained from the Central Elections Commission of 
Georgia. 
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bullets for several reasons. First, the political opposition had diverse ideological, domestic, and 
foreign policy viewpoints, but the leading political blocks maintained a common stance and 
perceived regime change to be necessary. Second, the nongovernmental organizations were backed 
by external actors and allied with the opposition forces. For instance, the Georgian Young 
Lawyers’ Association, the Liberty Institute, and Kmara (Enough) mobilized university students 
(Welt 2010:162). Third, the leading independent media outlet, Rustavi 2, favored reform and 
continuously informed voters about the political decisions of the revolutionary triad. Fourth, the 
democracy promoters were dissatisfied with the government, and their pressure helped the 
revolutionary groups in negotiations with the incumbents.  
       
After abolishing the election results, presidential and parliamentary elections were held on 4 
January 2004 and 28 March 2004, respectively (Levitsky, Way 2010:226).105 These elections 
could legitimately be called democratic and fair. Nino Burjanadze, former chairwoman of the 
parliament, revolutionary leader, and acting president of post-revolution Georgia, said,  
 
“The presidential and parliamentary elections of 2004 and the local self-government 
election of 2005 were the most democratic elections in the history of Georgia. They were 
ideal elections without vote-buying, political blackmails and electoral frauds.”106  
     
Using Zakaria’s language, rigging the election trumped everything and dissatisfied everyone; thus, 
neither Washington nor the world tolerated Shevardnadze (Zakaria 1997:40). Authoritarian 
pressures made electoral fraud more visible, as they intensified controversies among the 
opposition. Despite the government’s authoritarian persistence, electoral fraud proved costly, and 
competing foreign pressures did not permit the autocrats to legitimize it. External political 
competition increased the internal fractionalization of the political elites and the media and 
dissolved authoritarian capacities. Multiple factions were motivated to coordinate against the 
government and change the regime. 
                                                          
105 See http://infocenter.gov.ge/elections2017/history_en.pdf 
106 Author’s interview with Nino Burjanadze, former acting president of Georgia, 2003–2004; former speaker of the 
Parliament of Georgia, 2001–2008; December 2016, Tbilisi, Georgia.  
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6.4. The revolutionary media  
“You provide the prose poems, I’ll provide the war!”  
Citizen Kane, 1941 
 
Media, as the source and transmitter of information, possesses the ability to create a political mood 
by making and managing public opinions. Media exposure has different effects on the coordinative 
capacity of the elite and the population depending on what kind of content is disseminated and 
under what political conditions. Its role depends on the nature of the authoritarian government—
stable and unstable autocracies treat media differently (Levitsky, Way 2010)—and the support of 
foreign competitors. The preferences of external actors either constrain or loosen their 
communicative abilities and responsiveness, as well as determine how the government responds 
to the media challenge.  
     
In this revolutionary enterprise, the media was strategic and searched for political shelter. The 
regime soft-liners provided Rustavi 2 with tax benefits, preferential treatment, and protection from 
the abuses of hard-liners. When the reformers left Shevardnadze’s party, Erosi Kitsmarishvili, 
Davit Dvali, and Jarji Akimidze, Rustavi 2’s owners, openly aligned with Zhvania’s team, which 
later came under Saakashvili’s leadership. Rustavi 2 broadcast the investigative program 60 
Minutes and unveiled the corrupt practices and the impunity of regime. Rustavi 2 shaped public 
opinion and became more competitive than TV Imedi or the First State Channel.  
       
In 1999, Georgian oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili established Channel 9 and obtained a broadcasting 
license. He was believed to have close connections with Zhvania-Saakashvili, and Channel 9 (Info 
9) operated as an extra television station supporting the revolutionary groups. Shevardnadze’s 
government affiliated with Arkadi Patarkatsishvili, another Georgian oligarch and an influential 
figure in Georgian politics. Shevardnadze’s unstable regime permitted him to develop the 
necessary political connections to secure his wealth. The changing status quo and political 
instability promised him uncertainty. He realized that the media ownership might prevent him from 
unpredictable political developments. Moreover, Rustavi 2 had already established a precedent by 
legitimizing the rupture of the ruling party during the political crisis of 2001. Patarkatsishvili 
entered into a tacit mutually rewarding agreement with Shevardnadze’s government. On 4 March 
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2001, he founded the independent television broadcaster TV Imedi after several unsuccessful 
attempts to purchase Rustavi 2. The emergence of new private media outlets technically pluralized 
the media market. However, TV Imedi was meant to counterbalance Rustavi 2 during the 
parliamentary elections of 2 November 2003.  
       
Media owners and professional journalists were central to Rustavi 2’s potential, which served as a 
beacon of liberty and destroyed the myth of Shevardnadze by exposing his corrupt wonderland. 
Erosi Kitsmarishvili served as an ideational locomotive and formed ideological links with the 
reformers’ group. Davit Dvali ensured the financial independence of the television station. He 
established the Georgian Online internet service provider to make Rustavi 2 independent from 
donations. The television owners developed a horizontal management structure, which increased 
journalists’ autonomy. Journalistic professionalism played a role in creating a media product that 
brought credibility and earned the popular trust. Here, the definition of professionalism omitted 
journalistic impartiality because the media shared values with a particular segment of the 
opposition. This enormous popularity attracted foreign companies to advertise on Rustavi 2. The 
television station consumed most of the shares in the advertising market and undergirded its 
financial independence. These conditions were sufficient to challenge a dysfunctional state which 
was delegitimized and incapable of clamping down on regime-threatening media. 
      
The necessity of revolution emerged from the failure of the state to fulfill societal needs and 
provide a fair shot at realizing the basic demands of the Georgian population. This context was a 
solid foundation for the defectors of Shevardnadze’s regime to initiate nationwide demonstrations. 
The electoral fraud of the 2003 parliamentary election was the last straw for the opposition forces, 
media, and nongovernmental organizations. The parliamentary opposition orchestrated the 
November demonstrations. Saakashvili, Zhvania, and Burjanadze occupied leading positions 
within the Georgian parliament. The fact that Nino Burjanadze chaired the parliament fended off 
post-revolutionary escalation because, immediately after Shevardnadze’s removal from power, she 
became an acting president and was supposed to contain tensions of the parliamentary opposition, 
which distanced her from Zhvania-Saakashvili-Burjanadze.  
      
The parliamentary opposition polarized for multiple reasons. First, these political actors had a 
conceptual disagreement on domestic and foreign policy issues. Second, the government 
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engineered some opposition leaders, although it granted them the independence of political 
behavior. Third, Aslan Abashidze, the head of the Autonomous Republic of Adjara, led the largest 
non-revolutionary opposition party, the Union of Democratic Revival, and opposed the anti-regime 
mobilization. Abashidze feared that the removal of Shevardnadze would undermine his authority 
in the Georgian parliament and in the Autonomous Republic of Adjara. He pursued the strategy of 
parallel demonstrations in support of Shevardnadze. Here, Burjanadze’s role was relevant because 
she was acceptable to all political actors. The head of the parliament was constructive in political 
negotiations. Burjanadze understood the language of the Russian political elites, which was critical 
at that point. Additionally, Burjanadze’s spouse held a leading position at the Office of the 
Prosecutor General of Georgia and was capable of controlling processes from within. For their 
parts, Zhvania and Saakashvili had strong parliamentary factions and viable supporters in local 
self-governing bodies across Georgia who also backed them.  
       
Despite these promising conditions, the outcome remained uncertain. Political actors anticipated a 
certain equilibrium, but nothing was clearly defined. Erosi Kitsmarishvili, the owner of Rustavi 2, 
was especially worried about the November negotiations because Shevardnadze could have bribed 
the revolutionary leaders by sharing the spoils of electoral results and redistributing the political 
privileges. Without political leadership, nationwide mobilization and civil and media disobedience 
would be ephemeral. In the case of political pact-making, Rustavi 2, which was utilized to elevate 
the political tensions, would become a scapegoat. Kitsmarishvili did everything to eliminate such 
possibilities.  
      
On 23 November 2003, the situation culminated because Shevardnadze dismissed the resignation 
demands and decided to legitimize his electoral fraud. More than one hundred thousand protestors 
gathered in front of the parliament. Erosi Kitsmarishvili proposed the revolutionary leaders take 
roses into the parliament while Eduard Shevardnadze was making his speech. Mikheil Saakashvili 
led a group of demonstrators, who broke through the police barriers and entered the Georgian 
parliament. He interrupted Shevardnadze and demanded his resignation. The bodyguards removed 
the president from the tribune.  
       
The police and army were instructed to occupy the parliament and other governmental buildings. 
The police failed to execute this order because of the high transaction cost. They refused to be 
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loyal servants of the withering regime, which could not reward them. The military personnel 
abstained from interfering in political processes. The US Embassy maintained contact with the 
military leadership. Georgia commitments, undertaken before NATO, played an additional role. 
Davit Tevzadze, the defense minister, visited all army units and met the commanders of all 
battalions during the revolution. Military personnel acknowledged that their duty was to protect 
the population, not to disperse protestors. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov organized the 
meeting between Shevardnadze, Zhvania, and Saakashvili. After a long night of political bargains, 
Shevardnadze eventually resigned with these historic words: “I am going home now.” Nino 
Burjanadze became the acting president of Georgia.  
       
The media was a critical actor in the making of the revolution. A set of circumstances allowed the 
dominance of Rustavi 2. The political fragmentation, the diluted control over law enforcers, 
bureaucrats, an apolitical stance of militaries, and the rise of nongovernmental organizations were 
endogenous factors that minimized the possibility of state repression. Foreign involvement, from 
democratic and autocratic conditionality imposers, was instrumental to these domestic 
constellations. Democracy promoters supported the media actors in different ways. The US 
Embassy and the Soros Foundation proactively empowered journalists. They led advocates and 
defenders of media rights. Consequently, the government’s media meltdown was intolerable. 
     
At that point, Russia limited its role to aiding the confronted political elites in negotiations. This 
mediation was not altruistic. Foreign Minister Ivanov based his actions on well-calculated 
rationales. The first was to regain the trust and establish the image of a peace negotiator. Second, 
Russia intended to install pro-Russian political actors in the Georgian political hierarchy and 
beyond. Third, it was a declaratory act. Foreign Minister Ivanov signaled that Georgia remained 
in Russia’s focus and that significant political developments could not happen without Russia’s 
consent.  
 
To summarize, the media played a dominant role in the Rose Revolution. It held the revolutionary 
leaders accountable to deliver their promises and to be consistent in their actions. The media 
grasped the political realities and did not allow the government to blind the population. Competing 
pressures secured its dominance, and these activities steered mass mobilization. 
 117 
 
6.5. What made the regime change possible?  
 
In contrast with Shevardnadze’s first presidency, his second rule was marked by increasing 
external political competition. Policies were liberalized, electoral rules were renewed, and the 
media landscape was restructured. These processes ensured the participation of politically and 
socially fractionalized groups within Georgian controlled territories. Only Gamsakhurdia’s 
supporters were excluded from the political process. Polarization was localized within the party 
structures as Shevardnadze removed paramilitary groups and froze the conflicts in breakaway 
regions. The challenge was undemocratic institutions, which hindered the coordinative capacities 
of the fractionalized groups. Foreign competitors substituted these institutions, as they safeguarded 
their “reference groups” (Ambrosio 2010:384) and their interests. The presence of external threats 
in the form of foreign competition also facilitated cohesion within fractionalized groups and 
incentivized them to achieve an optimal solution. The combination of these factors made regime 
change possible and paved the way to a democratic transition. 
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CHAPTER 7 VENTURESOME DEMOCRATIZERS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 119 
 
 
7. Quest for opportunities and certain outcomes – 2003–2008   
 
This chapter investigates the post-revolutionary setting under the presidency of Mikheil 
Saakashvili. From the outset, the regime was provisional, and its exact qualities proved difficult to 
identify, as it was still unclear whether the successful disintegration of Shevardnadze’s regime 
would result in democratic change or create a new kind of authoritarianism. The political elites 
engaged themselves in the enterprise of democracy building through undemocratic methods. These 
aggressive and painful reforms generated cognitive dissonance among various actors and public 
discontent regarding such methods. The external political competition of Russia and the US, 
NATO, and the EU moved to a different level. Saakashvili’s first presidency provides contextual 
rigor for testing the proposed hypotheses.  
 
7.1. Homogenizing fractionalization  
 
After removing autocrats from power, there is always a threat of new authoritarianism (Acemoglu, 
Robinson 2006:83; Sharp 2010:73). This threat emerges from the objective conditions shaped by 
existing authoritarian institutions and from the unwillingness of political leaders to establish 
democratic institutions. Newcomers are not ready to practice establish rules and equally distribute 
their gains to the survivors of the old elite or the politically neutral. The political elites preserve 
their power through constitutional provisions. They liberalize civil and political liberties on paper 
but constrain them in practice because diversity scares them.  
       
The Rose Revolution was supposed to bring democratic change. Its success stemmed from elite 
co-optation (Beissinger 2007:269), institutional conflicts and personal rivalries (Sharp 2010:26), 
and the cooperation of diverse groups including media, nongovernmental organizations, and 
opposition forces. Revolutionary leaders learned the importance of these factors in defeating 
authoritarian leaders. As in Georgia, these methods of political resistance had proven useful 
previously in Serbia and, later, in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. The leaders had two main tasks. First, 
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they had to implement the necessary reforms to accommodate the public discontent that fueled the 
nationwide demonstrations. The second task, to which this triad subscribed, was power-sharing 
and preventing the potential replication of regime threating methods. Mikheil Saakashvili received 
the vast majority of votes in the presidential election of 4 January 2004.107 He amended the 
constitution. The three major consequences emerged from these counterproductive constitutional 
provisions, which eliminated the possibility of power parity. First, the post of prime minister was 
introduced. Second, the president strengthened his powers. Third, parliamentary capacities were 
attenuated to check the government.108
  
   
        
The president could dissolve the parliament and the law enforcement ministers unanimously, 
declare a legislative act unconstitutional, and monopolize the agenda of the parliament using 
constitutionally defined powers. He was entitled to propose legislative initiatives and hold ad hoc 
hearings to draft laws. Formally, Mikheil Saakashvili was not the head of state, but constitutionally 
vested power allowed him to determine when government meetings would be held in an ad hoc 
and predetermined manner.109 The justification was the necessity of fast reforms and prompt 
decisions. Constant parliamentary debates and hearings were thought to reduce the pace of 
reforms, so parliamentary powers were limited, and presidential powers were not only extended, 
but also supported by the prime minister, who assumed the burden of responsibility in case of 
failure.  
 
Nongovernmental organizations, experts, and the opposition criticized these amendments because 
the legal framework of the power separation resembled a super-presidential model, which would 
pave the way to authoritarian tendencies. Another criticism pertained to the legislative adoption 
procedures, which violated the constitutional requirement governing the time within which the 
drafts should have been issued for further plenary debates and voting. The draft amendments were 
not released a month before the voting. The government justified the observance of the time 
                                                          
107 http://infocenter.gov.ge/elections2017/history_en.pdf 
108 Author’s interview with Davit Usupashvili, the former chairperson of the Parliament of Georgia; and the co-founder 
of the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association; December 2016, Tbilisi, Georgia.    
109 Author’s interview with Avtandil Demetrashvili, president of the Constitutional Court 1996-2001; chairman of the 
State Constitutional Commission 2009; secretary of the State Constitutional Commission 1993–1995; Tbilisi, Georgia, 
December 2016.   
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requirement, saying that the constitutional draft was released in 2001 under Shevardnadze. Since 
the substance of the amendments differed from the previous edition of the constitution, the 
government ignored the amendment procedures. Opponents considered the adoption procedure 
illegal, while the government criticized them for favoring procedural democracy. 
Nongovernmental organizations were alone in the constitutional debates, as there was no viable 
opposition in the post-revolutionary political spectrum. 
      
Given that the presidential elections preceded the parliamentary elections, Shevardnadze’s 
parliament, which had neither the credibility nor the political legitimacy to defy a president elected 
by a vast majority, had to adopt these constitutional amendments. The coalition of the United 
National Movement faced internal opposition from the Republican Party, which was insufficient 
in the absence of external support. The political elites described this situation in a witty phrase: 
the Dictatorship of Democrats. The government of the United National Movement was the most 
effective among all previous governments. Saakashvili’s government transformed state institutions 
into functional, responsive agencies, and the bureaucracy became accountable to the government, 
instead of to corrupted interests and extra-constitutional groups. It was a fundamentally different 
period full of painful reforms. 
      
The political parties and activists affiliated with Shevardnadze and Abashidze became political 
outcasts, while the revolutionary parties merged their political capital and resources. The unipolar 
political landscape, with its extended presidential powers and disparity within the governing 
coalition in appointing party activists to critical ministerial positions, endangered democracy. 
UNM members occupied all leading cabinet positions. The revolutionary expectations had not 
been entirely met because the process was more about the state instead of democracy building. 
Nino Burjanadze, former acting president and speaker of the Parliament of Georgia explains:  
 
"I did not have enough resources to counterbalance both the prime minister and the 
president. The initial steps of Zurab Zhvania aimed at proving Saakashvili his loyalty. I 
have been excluded because Saakashvili perceived the tandem of Burjanadze-Zhvania as 
a threat. If Zhvania remained firm in his decision, we would be a perfect counterbalance 
for Saakashvili and prevent him from taking unreasonable steps. Then, Saakashvili would 
have been able to increase the productivity of reforms with his charisma, energy, and 
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opportunities. The prime minister transferred all powers officially to the president, 
including the leadership of his party, but attempted to obtain informal influences. When 
the prime minister died, I became weaker and had no leverage over the president’s 
decisions because the controlling tools of the prime minister were already in his 
possession. The tendencies of a personal rule were obvious. The disparity between the 
president, the prime minister and the parliament was a reason why the promises of the 
Rose Revolution were unfulfilled. If we avoided the power concentration in one man’s 
hands, Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic prospects would be real."110  
 
This ex-post justification indicates that neither Zhvania nor Burjanadze took necessary precautions 
against the unchecked powers. Prime Minister Zhvania thought that Saakashvili was inexperienced 
and would not be able to prevail against Zhvania’s political experience. However, Saakashvili 
interpreted this carte blanche as his political advantage over Zhvania and Burjanadze.  
       
Except for sharing political powers, there was a need to regulate the flow of information and 
liberalize the media landscape. In 2004–2005, three fundamental laws on the freedom of 
expression, broadcasting, and electronic communications were adopted to address these issues. 
The Law on the Freedom of Expression met high legal standards and eliminated the possibility of 
censorship, as the state recognized these rights as an absolute privilege (Article 3 and Article 4). 
Furthermore, the opinions expressed against public officials during political debates and at pre-
trial hearings or courts were no longer considered libel.111   
       
The Law on Broadcasting aimed at transforming the First State Channel and establishing a 
transparent, fair, and impartial public broadcaster. The Georgian National Commission of 
Communications and the Board of Trustees were reputed to achieve these objectives. These 
entities were equipped with institutional mechanisms to stimulate a competitive environment, 
ensure independence, and use broadcasting frequencies effectively. However, they remained at the 
disposal of the presidential powers, as the president considered candidates for the membership on 
                                                          
110 Author’s interview with Nino Burjanadze, former acting president of Georgia, 2003–2004; former speaker of the 
Parliament of Georgia, 2001–2008; December 2016, Tbilisi, Georgia.   
111 https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/33208 
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the Commission and nominated them before the parliament. The chairperson of the Commission 
was elected from these members. The government supported these members irrespective of that 
fact; the Commission risked conflict while performing its delegated responsibilities.  
      
To this end, the law established safeguards against governmental abuses and authorized only the 
parliament to warrant detention of its members. One of the strongest tenets of this law was the 
content-framing obligation. Specifically, the public broadcaster was obliged to reflect ethnic, 
cultural, linguistic, religious, and gender diversity and televise programs in minority languages. 
Regarding foreign policy, the public broadcaster had to popularize Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic 
integration.112 Saakashvili’s government was open to societal pluralism in terms of ethno-linguistic 
and cultural diversity, but he was intolerant of his political alternatives.  
      
The Law on Electronic Communications was designed to eliminate the monopoly on the digital 
market and liberalize services. The Georgian National Communications Commission regulated 
activities linked to electronic communications. However, the government defined critical policies, 
and the Prime Minister carried out those predetermined responsibilities.113 Article 83 of this law 
was the most controversial provision, in that it allowed security services to surveil, obtain, and 
maintain information through a massive intrusion into privacy. Security officials had unlimited 
access to any information from the land and connector lines of communication channels, mail 
servers, databases, station devices, and other networks in real time. Security and law enforcement 
officers were entitled to copy this information and preserve it on a long-term basis. 114 As a result, 
these agencies created rich data banks. 
     
There were the four counterarguments regarding its anti-constitutionality. First, Article 1433 of the 
Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia and Articles 12–14 of the Law on Counterintelligence 
authorized security agencies to process communications data independently from the beginning of 
its collection. Thus, they did not require prosecutor or court warrants. Second, the secret 
investigative actions per se lacked transparency and were beyond public scrutiny. Under these 
                                                          
112 https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/32866   
113 See Articles 4, 5 and 6 of the Law on Electronic Communications. 
114 https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/29620  
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circumstances, legal mechanisms could not protect citizens from illegitimate restrictions of their 
rights. Third, law enforcement and security authorities were professionally interested in gathering 
a formidable amount of information. Considering the institutional nature of these agencies, direct 
and permanent access to various kinds of communications permitted unreasonable intrusions into 
privacy. Fourth, the technological advancements enhanced surveillance capabilities. The law 
enforcement and security agencies were subordinate to the executive branch and had no 
institutional independence, which encouraged them to abuse their powers for political reasons. 
These factors blurred the boundaries between a democratic state and a police state and defeated 
the purpose of this law, which was to defend pluralism and democracy. This provision violated 
Article 16 and Article 20 of the Georgian Constitution.115 However, the nongovernmental sector 
was reluctant to defy this provision. Only after a decade of governmental power abuses did the 
nonincumbent actors convince the Constitutional Court of Georgia116 to declare it 
unconstitutional.117  
       
The reasons for this delayed action were several. First, nongovernmental organizations, political 
actors, and media actors lacked knowledge about data protection techniques. They underestimated 
potential dangers, as the law enforcement and security authorities had no expertise in carrying out 
criminal-intelligence tasks. Second, these agencies were undergoing reforms, and their outcomes 
were unpredictable. Eliminating corrupt practices and establishing a functional bureaucracy were 
time-consuming tasks, as they required mental and habitual changes. The government effectively 
used this provision to exposing corrupt officials and criminal networks and secure the public order. 
Third, after the regime change, core activists from nongovernmental organizations either moved 
                                                          
115 See Article 16 and Article 20 (1) of the Georgian constitution available at: 
http://www.parliament.ge/files/68_1944_951190_CONSTIT_27_12.06.pdf 
116 See the Constitutional Lawsuits of Tamar Kordzaia (Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, Decree N81/3 of the 
Constitutional Court of Georgia, dated as 18 April 2011, pp. 1-47) and of the Public Defender of Georgia (Decree 
N81/3 of the Constitutional Court of Georgia, dated as 18 April 2011, pp. 1-50) against the Parliament of Georgia 
concerning the Law of Georgia on Electronic Communications, the Law of Georgia on the Criminal Intelligence and 
Technical Agency of Georgia, the Law of Georgia on the Counterintelligence Activities, the Law of Georgia on the 
Personal Data Protection, the Law of Georgia on the Criminal Intelligence and Search Activities, and the Criminal 
Procedure Code of Georgia.  
117 See “Constitutional Court 20 Years Landmark-Decisions”, 2016, p. 62.  
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to the parliament or occupied top positions in the government. This outflow redistributed human 
resources unequally among nongovernmental actors. The opposition was derailed and extremely 
frail. The old allies with whom the media collaborated to oust Shevardnadze’s regime came to 
power, and media owners and journalists had trouble dismantling their partnership alliances with 
the political leadership. This made criticizing the government difficult.  
     
These liberalized laws established a framework for empowering societal and political actors, but 
in practice, such liberties were unattainable. Given that Saakashvili and his team won the 
revolution, it was difficult to criticize his policies. Furthermore, the actors within the key 
institutions were his loyal supporters. Political institutions were underdeveloped under 
Shevardnadze, and this condition allowed fractionalization of actors along different lines. 
Saakashvili reformed and strengthened these institutions, which helped him to homogenize 
political differences. The rule of law institutions were the prime enforcers of this task.  
    
7.2. The second wave of rule of law reforms  
 
The Rose Revolution government reformed the entire state apparatus. The first steps in this process 
involved reducing state functions and deregulating industries and institutions. Bureaucratic 
institutions were transformed into multiservice agencies, and the government reduced the number 
of jobs in public agencies and increased the salaries of civil servants. The recruitment methodology 
was merit-based at the lower and intermediate levels. Shevardnadze’s government had no incentive 
to fight corruption, as the officials benefited from the corrupt system. Unlike predecessors, 
however, Saakashvili’s government understood well the public demand that the government 
eliminate corrupt practices and free the political system from extra-constitutional actors.  
Without these preconditions, the government considered economic and political modernization to 
be impossible. It was the primary demand of the people during the Rose Revolution.118 To this 
end, the government created an effective criminal justice system and special units under the 
                                                          
118 Author’s interview with Tina Burjaliani, the former deputy justice minister of Georgia, November 2016, Zurich, 
Switzerland. 
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auspices of an anti-corruption response policy. These were extremely efficient at punishing corrupt 
officials and other criminals. Saakashvili’s government also made radical reforms to eradicate 
petty corruption and introduced a systematic professional recruitment methodology.  
       
The structural and institutional changes included the redefinition of the legislative framework and 
the functions of executive, judicial, and legislative institutions.119 The police patrol system was 
introduced, and around 15,000 police officers were dismissed. These small units gradually 
assumed their functions. As a result, service-based bureaucracies emerged. This new 
administrative system left no opportunities for corruption. The subject of criticism was the way 
the government obtained and processed information essential to restoring the state order. Here, the 
misperceptions of the government concerned the mechanisms law enforcement and security 
agencies used to handle this kind of information. The lack of such mechanisms led the law 
enforcement and security to abuse their powers.  
      
The political leaders understood that the corruption-free institutions were a prerequisite for all 
reforms, including economic ones, and that this would elevate their political legitimacy. However, 
their approaches and methodologies were not the innovation of the Georgian government but were 
built on the US experience. Except for methodological guidance, the US government aided the 
rule of law reforms financially. Considering the turbulence of the ethno-territorial conflicts in the 
region, first cooperation memorandums and agreements aimed at protecting state leadership and 
critical infrastructure, controlling international borders, and rendering antiterrorism assistance. 
Other priorities concentrated on supporting and developing a criminal procedure, judicial 
prosecution, and law enforcement reforms.  
 
Assistance was divided into three main categories: technical support, expertise, and education.120 
Technical support included forensic laboratory development; patrol police, police radio packages 
and tactical gear; patrol police vehicles and communication systems; computer equipment for 
                                                          
119
http://gov.ge/files/38298_38298_595238_georgia_in_transition-hammarberg1.pdf  
120 Agreement on Co-operation in the Field of Law Enforcement between the Government of Georgia and the 
Government of the United States of America (signed on 18 June 2001 and amended between 2004 and 2014). The 
Agreement and its amendments were requested from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia. 
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criminal records department; communications equipment for emergency command and control 
centers; police information management and communications development; emergency 
communications system, and emergency data recovery system projects. Expertise assistance 
projects focused on restructuring Georgia’s law enforcement agencies and providing advisory 
support to guide the reforms of the prosecution and the courts.121 They aimed at improving the 
criminal legislation, developing a trained group of criminal trial lawyers, and strengthening 
Georgian legal professional and legal institutions.  
       
Georgia’s criminal system and legislation acquired common law practices including jury trial, 
adversarial criminal procedures, and plea bargaining. Therefore, judges and prosecutors were 
assisted in practicing new aspects of the amended Criminal Procedure Code. Education assistance 
involved the creation of functional human resources within these agencies and equipping them 
with necessary skills.122 The total financial aid for the law enforcement reforms amounted to 
82,073,472 USD.  
                                                          
121 The American Bar Association and Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative Criminal Reform Program, the 
Resident Legal Advisor project, the anti-corruption support project, the American Bar Association Rule of Law 
Initiative and the Georgian Legal Socialization project were among such projects. 
122 Education assistance encompassed projects such as the Law Enforcement Academy, the American University 
Transitional Crime and Corruption Centre (AU/TRaCCC), the Specialized Training and Interagency Task Force 
Support project, the Federal Bureau Investigation Specialized Training and Task Force, the Law Enforcement 
Academy Curriculum and Facility, the Forensic Advisory Support project, the Police Specialized Training project, the 
Police Operations Manual, and the Specialized Police Training project 
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Figure 7: The US Government Aid for the Rule of Law and Justice Reform in Georgia 
 
On 22 July 2004, the EU designated its first Rule of Law Mission: EUJUST-THEMIS (EUR 2,050 
million). This project supported the Georgian government’s criminal justice reforms (Kurowski 
2009). Compared to the Office of the Public Defender and the Bar Association of Georgia, law 
enforcement authorities absorbed excessive foreign assistance. The political leadership’s priority 
was to amplify the effectiveness of law enforcement authorities. The reasons were straightforward. 
These authorities were thought to reinvigorate the cohesion of ruling elites and centralize their 
vertical power by neutralizing threats from the extra-constitutional actors and preventing the rise 
of alternative forces, including a viable opposition. A strong executive branch could serve these 
goals. Political agreements, pacts, and prolonged decision-making were unwelcome. This massive 
power concentration enabled the government to remove politically unwanted judges and to arrest, 
convict, and effectively enforce justice against former officials through corruption charges.  
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One issue that was critically neglected by democracy promoters and domestic political elites was 
agency professionalism within the judiciary. This pitfall contributed to the domination of the 
prosecution service and other law enforcement agencies. These actors possessed sufficient means 
to use and abuse political elites. Simultaneously, they carried out the government’s illegal orders 
and this provided these actors with leverage against politicians. The incumbents realized that 
judicial reform would be difficult, as the judiciary was not a subordinate system like the 
prosecution or the police. The top–down approach could not be employed there. Judges perceived 
these negative signals and initially began to exercise self-censorship, which was part of a survival 
strategy but was not necessarily acquiescing to governmental constraints.  
 
The incumbent government and rule of law actors made secret deals. The judiciary favored a 
horizontal system of accountability. Thus, the government formulated controlling mechanisms, 
such as disciplinary proceedings in case judges opposed the central message or used court 
chairmen as proxies to access the lower courts. The disciplinary board went blind to judges’ 
transgressions and kept this information as a skeleton in the closet to remind them later if 
required.123 Loyal judges were frequently rewarded with gifts of state property or promotions. 
Against these arguments, Saakashvili’s government claimed that the Supreme Council of Justice 
strengthened judicial independence. This self-governing body dismissed and appointed judges and 
dealt with disciplinary issues. The creation of this internal mechanism was regarded as giving the 
judiciary the freedom to make its own decisions.  
 
The judiciary remained the target of political elaborations. The contributing factors were several. 
First, the legislative base was strong enough to provide such independence, but the abuse of court 
appointments undermined any possibility of law-given autonomy. Second, the strong executive 
branch discouraged judges from fighting for their professional independence. This institutional 
setting created opportunities for low political culture and mercantilism. 
        
                                                          
123 Author's interview with Ana Natsvlishvili, the head of the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, December 2016, 
Tbilisi, Georgia.  
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Paradoxically, these seemingly restrictive conditions do not allow the government to dominate the 
judiciary. Something that is easily achieved in the vertically accountable prosecution or the police 
is not applicable to the judiciary. For this reason, authoritarian governments are cautious 
concerning the judiciary. Interestingly, a change in political power affects the judicial system in 
transitional democracies marginally. The robust formal and informal institutional mechanisms 
position judges as a reliable and influential group which cannot be easily dissolved. Although these 
actors are frequently portrayed as victims of the regime, they are capable of takeovers and might 
force political leaders to obey them. This symbiotic relationship favors both. On the one hand, 
these actors understand the threats posed by the political elites. In particular, incumbents could 
initiate reforms to demolish clans and nontransparent systems. On the other hand, governments 
realize that they might need judges during demonstrations, against political opponents, to justify 
oppression, or to legally disguise politically motivated prosecutions. The judiciary might 
informally constrain the government. For this reason, transitional regimes delay judicial reforms 
because establishing an independent judiciary means acting against their own interests. This causes 
institutional conflicts, especially under a presidential system. Independent judges are detached 
from the system, while those who develop close ties to the government become instrumental and 
unaccommodating.  
        
The power oscillations between incumbents and rule of law actors endangered the flow of 
democratization; more importantly, this happened when the legislature was restricted. Following 
the constitutional amendments of 2004, the second wave of justice reforms occurred under a robust 
presidential system in which the president relied on his strong parliamentary majority. This system 
was the primary concern of the Venice Commission, which was neglected by the government. 
(Babeck 2012:76). Saakashvili’s Georgia exemplified the power disparity between the incumbent 
government and the legislature, which was harmful to democratization (Fish 2012:53).  
      
To summarize, multiple factors played a role in homogenizing political diversity. For instance, the 
symbiotic relations between rule of law actors and political incumbents could not be disrupted 
without a strong legislature. Saakashvili’s presidential system established a durable vertical power 
of the executive, and the legislature was unable to upset its relations with the law groups. Political 
power was fused and concentrated in a single group at the expense of excluding others from 
political processes (Linz 1990a:54; Mainwaring 1993:199; Power, Gasiorowski 1997:125).  
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The ruling elites had justifications for not choosing the parliamentary system. The political parties 
were multiple and wayward. This condition would block fast reforms and promised instability 
because the government majorities risked dissolution and the continuous reshuffling of its 
ministers (Mainwaring, Shugart 1997:468). The rule of law actors benefited from this situation 
and extended their powers, which the weak legislature could not check. They had uninterrupted 
communication with the executives. The government determined promotion criteria and 
guaranteed structural, personnel, and administrative effectiveness (Russell 2001), which created 
mutual allegiance and encouraged their logrolling with the incumbent elites against others.  
       
The legal groups lost their usual role (Elster 1988; Slagstad 1988) as the instrument of horizontal 
accountability (Guarnieri 2003). In this setting, competing pressures dismantled homogenized 
political structures. In 2008, the War with Russia was the culmination of the external political 
competition. Contending narratives about the war’s causes spurred conflict between pro- and anti-
Russian factions. Eventually, the domestic actors and external democratizers reached a consensus 
to amend the constitution. 
 
7.3. Designing elections and explaining voters’ responses  
 
“If you like uncertainty, you will be a democrat.”  
Adam Przeworski, 1985  
 
The Rose Revolution taught all political actors a valuable lesson, particularly the government: 
leadership stays in power only with the mandate of a majority of the people. This attitude was 
framed by voter response to massive electoral fraud. Authoritarian regimes share state resources 
not only among their supporters, but also distribute them among their opponents to raise the cost 
of involvement in mass mobilizations. Shevardnadze’s regime had no state capacity to sanction 
the political resistance of the defectors and enforce his decisions (Tillly 2007:15). Electoral fraud 
was the final straw that broke his regime and resolved the collective action problem (Tucker 2007). 
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The post-revolutionary elections were mostly consistent with international standards.124 The media 
distributed time equally for political debates and election campaigning. Imbalances regarding party 
representation at the district and precinct election commissions were addressed. Some political 
parties benefited from this decision.125 
      
There were several issues during elections. First, Aslan Abashidze, head of the Autonomous 
Republic of Adjara, abused the local media which was biased toward his rule and promoted anti-
governmental content during the pre-election campaign. Second, there was suspiciously high 
electoral turnout in the areas populated by ethnic minorities because votes were cast multiple times. 
Third, the political parties used administrative resources unreasonably.126   
        
The presidential and parliamentary elections of 2004 and the local self-government election of 
2005 were mostly clean and peaceful. The main party to emerge from the revolutionary coalition 
had overwhelming support, which secured elections (Brancati, Snyder 2012). In the parliamentary 
election of 2003, the United National Movement built a coalition with the Republican and 
Conservative Parties. However, during the parliamentary election of 2004, Saakashvili declared 
that he would dissolve party coalitions and called for other parties to join the United National 
Movement. He offered a classic argument that cooperation with political parties and parliamentary 
debates would reduce the pace of reforms. Zhvania and Burjanadze merged their parties with 
Saakashvili’s UNM, while the Republican and Conservative Parties declined the proposal. Despite 
these contradictions, Saakashvili’s victory was impressive. Nearly an absolute majority of people 
supported the post-revolutionary president. Saakashvili rearranged the parliament in the 
Referendum of 2003. According to the Constitutional Amendment of 23 February 2005, “100 
members were elected by a proportional system, and a majoritarian system elected 50 
members.”127  
                                                          
124 Author’s interview with Nino Burjanadze, former acting president of Georgia, 2003–2004; former speaker of the 
Parliament of Georgia, 2001–2008; December 2016, Tbilisi, Georgia.   
125 Note:  The “Unity,” the Block of “National Democratic Party” and “Traditionalists,” and “the Socialist Party” were 
among these parties: available at https://old.civil.ge/geo/article.php?id=6390  
126 https://old.civil.ge/geo/article.php?id=6390 or https://civil.ge/archives/105585  
127 See Article 49 available at: http://www.parliament.ge/files/68_1944_951190_CONSTIT_27_12.06.pdf  
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The electoral triumph of 2004 was not comparable to the election results of 2008, in which the 
electoral outcomes were still unpredictable. Following the events of November, Saakashvili 
suffered from a rapid decline in credibility, although he won the presidential election. He managed 
to preserve power owing to the political context. Notably, he announced an ad hoc presidential 
election. This decision caused political tensions and fractionalized the political parties. The 
coalition of the United National Council nominated two separate presidential candidates, Levan 
Gachechiladze and Shalva Natelashvili. After the government clamped down on TV Imedi, Arkadi 
Patarkatsishvili, the owner of the television network, independently engaged in the presidential 
race.  
     
On 22 November 2007, Saakashvili amended Georgian Electoral Law. The amendment to Article 
10 §11 created opportunities for the abuse of administrative resources because the police and 
military personnel voted at the place of their deployment. For this reason, they enrolled in the 
special lists of voters. If they intended to vote at the location of their registration, they were obliged 
to inform the election commission within fourteen days, which made them insecure regarding the 
confidentiality of their votes. Article 281 of the Electoral Law permitted only the state-funded 
political parties to determine the seven members of the election commission. All other registered 
parties were deprived of representing their voters’ interests at the election commission. Moreover, 
this provision imposed barriers on state-funded political parties because if more than seven such 
parties were registered for the election, only those that performed well in the previous elections 
were authorized to nominate members. According to Article 731 §3, the qualified subjects were 
authorized to benefit from the media time with the public broadcaster. The definition of qualified 
referred to state-subsidized political parties that performed well in the previous presidential and 
parliamentary elections.128 Other parties were not allowed to use this media time. Given the fact 
that the taxpayers who funded the Georgian Public Broadcaster were also members and voters of 
these parties, this provision perpetuated endured disparity in political representation and skewed 
the electoral environment toward the ruling party.  
      
                                                          
128 See the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Report on Extraordinary Presidential Election in Georgia, 
January 2008, p. 5.  
 134 
 
Besides these electoral nuances, external democratizers were concerned with broader issues 
regarding the electoral laws. They placed great emphasis on the transformation of a mixed electoral 
system, which is believed to undermine the equality of suffrage and exclude the voices of political 
minorities (Norris 1997). The political elites explained why the favored the mixed electoral system, 
citing the necessity of a responsive and effective government. However, owing to domestic and 
external pressures, the Constitution of Georgia was amended in March 2008 to reduce the electoral 
threshold from 7% to 5% and introduce a balanced, mixed system. Seventy-five members were 
elected with a proportional system, and the other seventy-five members were elected with a 
majoritarian system. These amendments had positive political implications for the parliamentary 
election of May 2008. Specifically, four parties entered under a proportional system, and three 
parties entered under a majoritarian system.129  
        
The structural underpinnings of electoral laws can affect both parliamentary representation and the 
unity of voter responses. Procedural formalities determine electoral outcomes, but voters’ 
responses are equally important. The popular mood was decisive in attracting external attention 
and increasing domestic pressures. The major difference between the elections of 2004 and 2008 
was the predictability of outcomes. The post-revolutionary elections were more democratic, which 
built confidence in democratic norms but did not necessarily translate into a lasting amplification 
of democracy. The popular attitudes were highly ambivalent concerning the incumbent regime in 
the elections of 2008, which involved the danger of electoral manipulations. Competing pressures 
and domestic scrutiny reduced the possibility of electoral fraud. Nevertheless, the domestic 
political sphere was homogenized.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
129 http://infocenter.gov.ge/elections2017/history_en.pdf  
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7.4.  Silenced media  
“The Revolution devours its children"  
Jacques Mallet du Pan 
 
The government's behavior was inconsistent with its expressed values concerning media freedom. 
The Rose Revolution leaders called media freedom the foundation of democracy. This thinking 
was the leitmotif for the political team at the time of the revolution. Similarly, external 
democratizers regarded any restriction of media freedom as the line that no government should 
cross. In contrast, the government targeted the media, and the modalities of the transition reshaped 
their relationship (Voltmer 2013). Two critical aspects determine if the media is a change agent or 
merely an instrument for political ends. The first is the coercive capacity of ruling elites to control 
economic and political resources (O’Donnell, Schmitter 1986; Way 2015). The second is the 
external competing forces that reconfigure this power disparity in the government–media 
relationship.  
       
The Georgian media was a mood-making actor in the Rose Revolution for two reasons. First, voter 
behavior was predominantly expressive because policy domain was not pertinent to policy 
outcome. Ideological, moral, populist, or nationalist parameters determined voter support 
(Brennan, Hamlin 2004:145-146). Second, television stations were the fastest and most popular 
transmitters of information. Thus, media–government struggles for the redistribution of the media 
market to influence voters’ choices marked the pre-election period.130 The reluctance of external 
democratizers toward the reversal of the government’s declared values made it possible to silence 
the media.  
        
Saakashvili and his party lost their sense of accountability before the media and society because 
they thought there was no time for deliberation. This decision was a sharp indication of 
increasingly authoritarian tendencies, which were encouraged by the division of public opinion to 
a certain extent. There were three mainstreams: those who considered ruthless methods necessary 
when challenging the previous regime’s discredited political elites, those captivated by the political 
                                                          
130 Author’s interview with Tamar Kintsurashvili, the former director general of the Georgian Public Broadcasting, 
media expert, February 2016, Tbilisi, Georgia.     
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rhetoric of Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration, and those who feared expressing criticism because 
of severe punishments. This population’s tolerance negated all deterrents to government 
oppression and precluded political alternatives. As a result, the government initiated a series of 
political program shutdowns, and hardliners demanded media owners refrain from criticism. 
      
At first, the manipulation of media owners was soft, as the government offered privileges and 
favors. For instance, Rustavi 2 had the three owners, with whom government started negotiations. 
This situation became a game of prisoner’s dilemma because two owners refused to cooperate, 
while the third, Erosi Kitsmarishvili, defected and initiated the bankruptcy case.131 Kitsmarishvili 
considered the lost deal lucrative because it yielded political dividends. He was the motivating 
force behind Rustavi 2 and the reformers’ team during the Rose Revolution. Kitsmarishvili 
prevented dangerous negotiations with Shevardnadze’s government. This experience awakened 
his political ambitions and made him confident that temporary submission was necessary to 
emerge on the political scene. Kitsmarishvili also counted on his media background, which he 
eventually used to develop the media project TV Maestro. Kitsmarishvili invited Rustavi 2’s core 
journalists to his home. One of the participants of this gathering recalls, 
 
 “It was 2004. He gathered the leading journalists at his home and told us that he was 
forced to give up his media ownership. He demanded from the government to maintain 
Nikoloz Tabatadze in the management of Rustavi 2 because Kitsmarishvili mentored and 
trusted him. If anything happened, he promised us to pay salaries for a year. It was a 
confidential talk at that time and the first signal that something was happening. No one 
knew who had the bigger role in revolution-making, Kitsmarishvili or Saakashvili, but this 
revolution devoured him, although he received certain political benefits. Erosi thought to 
become the prime minister, but he could not succeed.” 132  
 
       
 
                                                          
131 Author’s interview with Nino Zuriashvili, journalist, “60 Minutes”, Rustavi 2; February 2016, Tbilisi, Georgia.  
132 Author’s interview, February 2016, Tbilisi, Georgia.  
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The political leadership disarmed Kitsmarishvili and transferred his ownership to Kibar Khalvashi, 
an affiliate of the prosecutor general and Minister of the Interior Irakli Okruashvili. Close 
relationships with top governmental officials were a predictor of which political group would gain 
media ownership. These relationships, however, were not constant and deteriorated over time amid 
the political controversies between these groups. Simultaneously, media funding was a painful 
issue due to the small market. The media outlets had to seek political or oligarchic shelters, which 
made them a subject of bargaining between the incumbents and owners. Ownership also 
determined editorial policy. For instance, Khalvashi shut down 60 Minutes, and the investigative 
journalists left Rustavi 2.  
        
Meanwhile, Georgian oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili closed Channel 9 (Info 9) and gifted advanced 
facilities, including flyaway satellites, to Rustavi 2 and state television. Furthermore, he funded all 
necessary state projects. The next target was the television station Iberia, which was financially 
supported by the Omega Group. Iberia attempted to obtain a nationwide broadcasting license, but 
the government raided the station and annulled its license.133 Zaza Okruashvili, Iberia’s owner, 
immigrated to the UK and returned the Omega Group’s assets through the political support of the 
British Embassy. Unlike Iberia, TV Kavkasia had neither governmental nor oligarchic affiliations 
because of its limited human and technical resources. Neither of its owners requested the expansion 
of its broadcasting license. These factors made Kavkasia the least dangerous media outlet and 
secured its presence on the media market. All remaining frequencies were sold to the associates of 
Davit Kezerashvili, the defense minister.  
       
International organizations were either hesitant or engaged in counterproductive initiatives. One 
EU-funded projects run through the German Development Foundation encouraged 
nongovernmental organizations to criticize the media. Top journalists advised them to be cautious 
because this would divide the nongovernmental organizations and the media and made government 
oppression easier.134  
                                                          
133 Author’s interviews with Luba Eliashvili, journalist, TV Iberia; the author and TV anchor of the political talk show 
“Dialogue” (2004), February 2016, Tbilisi, Georgia.   
134 Author’s interviews with Akaki Gogichaishvili, journalist, Rustavi2; TV anchor and team leader of “60 Minutes”; 
February 2016, Tbilisi, Georgia. 
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Georgian oligarch Arkadi Patarkatsishvili owned the second largest independent television station, 
TV Imedi, the only critical voice. This station required financial investments and critical products 
to compete with the well-positioned and pro-government Rustavi 2. TV Imedi’s independent 
editorial policy matched Patarkatsishvili’s political and commercial interests. According to 
television audience measurement results, TV Imedi was the highest rated television station, and its 
credibility increased when the analytic program Droeba broadcast the details of Sandro 
Girgvliani’s murder and exposed the government officials responsible for the murder.135   
        
Saakashvili’s government refused to appear on TV Imedi and marginalized its journalists. Inga 
Grigolia, the top political journalist, recalls,  
 
“Saakashvili’s government boycotted my political talk shows. The United National 
Movement rejected invitations for two years. They explained that there was nothing 
personal and the reason was the owner of this television. These political tensions 
negatively affected us. Journalists are the serious political weapon of the media owners 
against the government.”136  
 
Arkadi Patarkatsishvili, who had presidential ambitions, subsidized the opposition. He considered 
all strategies, including the possibility of a coup and physically liquidating the minister of the 
interior in case of such a necessity.137 Patarkatsishvili was a real threat to Saakashvili, with whom 
he developed a complicated relationship, but he maintained another influential oligarch, Bidzina 
Ivanishvili, in his camp. Before the outbreak of the November events, Patarkatsishvili concluded 
an agreement with News Corporation to purchase of Holding Imedi to protect the media 
ownership. As Giorgi Targamadze, political director of Imedi, recalls:  
                                                          
135 Author’s interviews with Giorgi Targamadze, political director of TV Imedi and author of the analytical programme 
Droeba, and with Natia Mikiashvili, journalist, the author of the investigative coverage on Sandro Girgvliani’s murder 
case, Tbilisi, Georgia, February 2016.    
136 Author’s interview with Inga Grigolia, the TV anchor of ‘Reakcia,’ a journalist at TV Pirveli, Imedi, Mze, Rustavi 
2, Tbilisi, Georgia, February 2016;   
137 https://civil.ge/archives/113830  
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“Luis Robertson, one of the top executives of TV Imedi and the US citizen was stationed 
with us. We discussed possible developments. I thought the government would declare a 
state of emergency, and send us the censor to regulate our content, as the Constitution 
envisaged it. Instead, the government raided us on air. I remember well the moment when 
Luis Robertson was waving his American passport and shouting that he is the US citizen, 
but in vain.”138  
      
The media–government confrontation ended with Saakashvili’s strategic resignation. Having 
revolutionary experience and knowing what the reaction of external actors would be, he preferred 
to announce an ad hoc presidential election rather than become a political pariah. Second, the crisis 
would continue until the constitutionally determined Election Day, and he would lose regional 
support until then.139 The involvement of the US and EU was critical and useful. Adam Michnik, 
a Polish dissident and journalist, arrived to establish the media monitoring group. This group left 
Georgia only after the renewal of TV Imedi broadcasting. 
 
7.5. Why did the political regime acquire authoritarian features? 
     
External political competition peaked. External democratizers aided institutions and actors 
differently. For instance, American professional journalists and rule of law actors helped improve 
electoral procedures, as did the EU. The Open Society Foundation mobilized nongovernmental 
organizations, opposition, and media actors and provided shelter for self-organization. In this way, 
the external democratizers attempted to reverse political homogenization, but this feedback 
mechanisms did not work because the rulers ignored its central message.  
                                                          
138 Author’s interviews with Giorgi Targamadze, political director of TV Imedi and author of the analytical 
programme Droeba, Tbilisi, Georgia, February 2016.   
139 Author’s interview with Nino Burjanadze, former acting president of Georgia, 2003–2004; former speaker of the 
Parliament of Georgia, 2001–2008; December 2016, Tbilisi, Georgia.  
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     Initially, Russia used soft tools, including professionally training opposition media,140 and 
revitalizing old networks, to influence Georgian politics. Saakashvili subverted these attempts by 
arresting Georgians working for Russia and Russian spies during the espionage scandal. 
Furthermore, Saakashvili made NATO membership a priority. Russia did not tolerate these 
developments. Saakashvili realized that the complete elimination of Russia from Georgia’s back 
yard was impossible. Still, he could not imagine that the situation would escalate to the point of 
war. This is why he was less attentive to the warnings of strategic partners. The free-riding of the 
political elite and its leadership pushed the political regime toward authoritarian trends. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
140 Author’s interview with Inga Grigolia, the TV anchor of ‘Reakcia,’ a journalist at TV Pirveli, Imedi, Mze, Rustavi 
2, Tbilisi, Georgia, February 2016; she recalls, “The Russian and Georgia media are very different. For instance, 
when I was working at TV IMEDI, a producer from Russian NTV was invited as a consultant. He was very famous 
and worked with Leonid Parfyonov. One day we were working on some program, and he said that I need to pack a 
product in this way. I could not understand him. We were discussing this for a half an hour. I told him that I was not 
living in Putin’s Russia. I could not understand why I should have packed the media product. Ironically, the Georgian 
government instructed the television owners to fire me. It was a funny situation, he was explaining, and I could not 
see his point. Eventually, I told him, it was not a Putin’s Russia. When the Georgian currency inflates, and the 
pensioners could not buy medicines, I could not pack it. This difference of perceptions between the journalists probably 
explains why the Georgian media is relatively free.”  
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8. Tasting pains of democracy – 2008-2012 
 
Following the electoral victory, Saakashvili was expected to learn from the November events and 
be moderate in exercising his powers. And, although the ruling party continued on the same track, 
unlike the previous period, external democratizers critically viewed each step of the government. 
This external skepticism deprived Georgia of its chance to embark on the Euro-Atlantic path, and 
the political rhetoric of the United National Movement weakened amidst the diminishing euphoria 
of their headway reforms. This period is notable for several reasons. First, state-building issues 
were settled, and responsive institutions were established. Second, competing external influences 
of democratic and autocratic conditionality culminated at this time. Third, the daunting political 
dynamics awakened the population and made them more vocal in their demands for democracy. 
8.1. Unfair rulemaking through liberalization 
 
During this period, liberalization policies evolved in three main directions: criminal procedure, 
media, and political rights. The Criminal Procedure Code was adopted in 2010, and portions of it 
were enacted later in 2010, 2011, and 2012. This code introduced two main innovations for the 
Georgian legal system: the jury trial and the adversarial system. Also, it modified the principle of 
plea bargaining. The main criticisms of these legal instruments concerned their purpose of use and 
operational environment, wherein equality among adversaries was questioned due to power 
imbalances within the legal system. 
        
In 2004, Saakashvili’s government pioneered a plea-bargaining mechanism for the administration 
of “fast and effective” justice, which mainly targeted Shevardnadze’s corrupt officials and aimed 
to fulfill an empty budget.141 Arrests were televised to shame the corrupt groups of former 
incumbents and to win public confidence. These corrupt officials paid millions to the state budget 
to avoid serving sentences thanks to this “bargained justice.” Saakashvili’s zero tolerance policy 
reduced the crime rate at the expense of human rights violations. Under this law, only a prosecutor 
was authorized to suggest a plea bargain, although this right was later extended to the accused and 
                                                          
141 Report on “The Plea Bargaining in Georgia,” Transparency International Georgia, 15 December 2010.    
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courts. This mechanism minimized legal safeguards for the protection of victims’ rights and 
interests. Subsequently, the administration of justice was contingent upon the goodwill of law 
enforcement authorities.142 According to the amendments of 1 October 2010, a prosecutor was 
obliged to consult with a victim and communicate the conclusion of the plea bargaining.143 
However, the victim could neither argue nor appeal this decision. The civil lawsuit was considered 
to provide legal protections, but it was time and resource-consuming for victims. A considerable 
discretion permitted a prosecutor to annul a plea bargain on obscure grounds, thus leaving the 
accused vulnerable.144 
        
The adversarial system completely redefined the process of evidence collection and evaluation and 
the standards of their admissibility. However, this seemingly fair procedure placed the accused, 
defense, and prosecution in unequal positions. Unlike the defense party, the accused was allowed 
some rights, although they rarely possessed the means for exercising them.145 Conversely, state 
machinery and resources were firmly behind the prosecution. These actors had no equal 
opportunities,146 which defeated the objectives of the adversarial system. In regard to jury trial, the 
political concern was its belated introduction147 might reduce claims concerning miscarriages of 
justice that would help build public trust of the court system. When trial by jury was enacted, it 
was limited to grave crimes and the jurisdiction of the capital city. These categorical and spatial 
restrictions inhibited politically motivated changes of going to trial and provided space for political 
manipulations within the judiciary. 
                                                          
142‘Victim’s rights in the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia (existing legislation, practices and international 
standards),’ Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, Tbilisi, 2016. 
143 Article 217 (1), available at https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/90034   
144 Report on “The Plea Bargaining in Georgia,” Transparency International Georgia, 15 December 2010.    
145 Chomakhashvili, K., Tomashvili, T., Dzebniauri, G., Osepashvili, S., Pataridze, M., “Evidence in the Criminal 
Procedure Code of Georgia,” Open Society Foundation, 2016, Tbilisi. Note: The accused was authorized to conduct 
own investigation, to carry out criminal intelligence activities, to obtain the data from computer systems, to demand 
the testimony of the witness, and to request any documents or material evidence from state agencies. 
146 OSCE/ODIHR and Council of Europe Joint Opinion on the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia, Opinion-Nr.: 
CRIM -GEO/257/2014 [RJU] Warsaw/Strasburg, 22 August 2014. 
147 Author’s interview with Giga Bokeria, the former secretary of the National Security Council of Georgia, the former 
deputy foreign minister and the co-founder of Liberty Institute; February 2017, Zurich, Switzerland.    
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The second component of liberalization policies concerned political rights. Many international 
organizations were concerned about the amendments to the Law on the Political Union of Citizens 
before the election of 2012.148 The Chamber of Control had broad discretion and acted as a de 
facto agency of the executive branch. The Chamber could obtain information on any individual or 
legal entity and scrutinize their financial resources.149 As there were no substantial legal safeguards 
to protect citizens from undue surveillance, the invasion of privacy through intercepting 
communications or installing surveillance devices at private properties was standard practice and 
mainly carried out by law enforcement authorities beyond the scope of their professional activities. 
Although the Law of Georgia on Personal Data Protection was adopted in 2011, its provisions 
were either ignored or required modifications.150 
       
The government was less capable of amending laws concerning free and independent media 
outlets, owing to the advocacy of nongovernmental organizations and journalists and the mediation 
of US and EU ambassadors. Nonetheless, these laws were critical tools for media manipulation. 
Political influence was easily exerted because private television stations could not sustain 
operations through commercial interests alone. Although diverse political interests pluralized 
Georgia’s media market, the murky nature of its funding and ownership, which in most cases was 
by proxy rather than real ownership, endangered the plurality of content. On 27 August 2009, 
Giorgi Arveladze, former Minister of Economy and Saakashvili’s affiliate, received 100% of TV 
Imedi shares and its Georgian Media Production Group Ltd. Thus, the government seized 
monopoly of the media. 
      
The oppositional profile deprived television outlets of financial opportunities. No business or 
commercial entity was willing to advertise through the critical media or donate openly because of 
potential government retaliation. Entrepreneurs used the television media to protect their business 
interests and frame editorial policies based on the outcomes of negotiations with the government. 
Saakashvili’s government possessed an additional tool for preventing the emergence of 
                                                          
148 https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2013/georgia 
149 See the report of the Georgian Public Defender, pp. 360-368, available at: 
http://www.parliament.ge/ge/ajax/downloadFile/18663  
150 https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/1561437  
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independent television stations and reducing their chances of survival: close ties to leadership at 
the Georgian National Communication Commission. In most cases, licensing procedures were 
arduous. For instance, in November 2007, TV channel Maestro requested a general license 
renewal, which had been delayed for five months.151 
         
Due to these circumstances, journalists, local nongovernmental organizations, and the 
parliamentary opposition lobbied a law on making transparent the offshore roots of media 
ownership. Following the seizure of TV Imedi, its former Political Director, Giorgi Targamadze, 
made a political comeback and, as the parliament minority leader, promoted this amendment.152 
The government opposed this initiative until the US ambassador openly supported the 
nonincumbent actors. Saakashvili’s government perceived domestic actors as incapable of 
electoral mobilization without external involvement. Strong outside support made the government 
cautious about its international reputation, and the ruling party acquiesced.153  
       
In this context, the most effective solution was the must-carry/must-offer policy, which allowed 
small-scale media outlets to reach wider audiences. The baseline argument was to pluralize media 
content during the preelection period and amend the Georgian Law on Broadcasting. As a result, 
Article 401 of the same law obligated cable TV providers to carry channels with satellite and 
general terrestrial broadcasting licenses whose audiences were no less than 20% of total viewers 
in Georgia. TV Maestro, Kavkasia, and Channel 9 (Info 9) became accessible to regional 
audiences, and external pressures were a decisive factor. 
        
Analysis of Saakashvili’s second presidency indicates that his government enforced biased 
operational rules. This uncompetitive environment excluded and dissatisfied actors at different 
societal and political levels, and external democratizers helped subvert the autocracy. Russia 
                                                          
151 http://www.maestro.ge/chven-shesakheb/istoria 
152 Author’s interview with Giorgi Targamadze, Giorgi Targamadze, political director of TV Imedi and author of the 
analytical programme Droeba, the leader of the Christian-Democratic Movement of Georgia and the parliamentary 
minority; December 2016, Tbilisi, Georgia.   
153 Author’s interview with Nino Danelia, one of the initiators of this amendment, media expert, professor of media 
studies at Ilia State University and elected member of the Board of Trustees of Georgian Public Broadcasting (GPB), 
December 2016, Tbilisi, Georgia.    
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pursued aggressive policy against Georgia and aimed to remove Saakashvili from power. Its 
invasion weakened Saakashvili’s authoritarian tendencies and made his rule more dependent on 
external democratizers. 
      
After the war, Russia began to cultivate new insiders and promote old networks. On 26 May 2011, 
Nino Burjanadze, a former acting President and parliamentary speaker, brought her party of 
activists and supporters to the streets. She criticized Saakashvili’s foreign policy with Russia and 
went as far as meeting with Putin.154 As Burjanadze explained, after suppressing this peaceful 
demonstration, Saakashvili ran out of resources.155 He still maintained a hold on the rule of law, 
but actors perceived this as a withering instrument of political opposition (Maravall 2003:263). 
 
8.2. The evils of rule by law 
 
 In transitional democracies, government branches are more involved in power struggles rather 
than dialogue. Legal scholarship has approached these institutional struggles within the context of 
constitutional review, which claims that such struggles prevent courts from engaging in 
“interpretative dialogue” and block the integration of majority will into constitutional 
interpretations (Friedman, 1993:585). Although legislature is regarded as an institutional remedy 
for unwarranted actions (Stephenson, 2013), the judiciary can constrain elected officials in policy-
making (Fox, Stephenson 2001:397). There are several grounds for criticism of judiciary privilege. 
First, judges cannot eliminate legislative pathologies or correct policy failures, as the conditions 
of their interpretative choice in capturing the intent of the median legislature is uncertain (Tushnet 
1999; Vermeule 2000; Waldron 2006). Second, this creates the counter-majoritarian difficulty of 
judicial superiority over legislative powers, which contradicts democratic theories (Bickel 1962). 
Third, there are concerns of judicial bias, judicial incompetence, and judicial overhang (Fox, 
Stephenson 2001:398; Tushnet 1999; Vermeule 2006:21). 
 
                                                          
154 https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22052  
155 Author’s interview with Nino Burjanadze, former acting president of Georgia, 2003–2004; former speaker of the 
Parliament of Georgia, 2001–2008; December 2016, Tbilisi, Georgia.    
 147 
 
All of these points were relevant in Georgia. There was skepticism over the competence and 
impartiality of the Georgian judiciary, which was a main source of selective justice and “judicial 
imperialism” (Nagel 2005:18). The super-majoritarian logic of constitutions was flawed (Brubaker 
2005) because the constitutions were crafted without public deliberations and at the convenience 
of the executive branch. The preferred system in Georgia was presidential, which affected the 
appointment procedure within the judiciary, prosecution, and police. The government provided the 
rules of law with institutional guarantees, yielding them extensive discretionary powers. Crafting 
laws that were structurally and administratively useful was a strategic decision: They fulfilled 
political orders in exchange for maintaining authority. 
       
The government established an active response system to reduce corruption, but Saakashvili’s anti-
corruption campaign revealed its side effects. Because judges, prosecutors, and police received 
more external support than defense lawyers or human rights defenders, corrupt officials were often 
exposed and punished without due process. This effective though undemocratic anti-corruption 
campaign became the instrument for the mobilization of government capacity and power, and law 
enforcement authorities were technically equipped to collect information against the criminal 
underworld. However, its application scope was widened for two reasons. First, there was a dearth 
of good practice in human rights protection. Inequality in legal proceedings was the major obstacle 
for human rights defenders. They had neither evidence-gathering tools nor media availability for 
the critical deliberation of human rights violations. In 2008-2010, however, the small-scale 
television stations Kavkasia, TV Maestro, Radio Liberty, and Obieqtivi allowed human rights 
defenders to be heard.156 Second, oppositional ideologists identified with the country’s existential 
challenge: Russia. According to the government, political opponents were the weapon of an 
enemy.157 As a result, 26,000 files were illegally created to blackmail anti-regime activists, 
politicians, and top government officials. Although the Georgian Dream government publicly 
                                                          
156 Author's interview with Ana Natsvlishvili, the head of the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, December 2016, 
Tbilisi, Georgia. 
157 Author’s interview with Lasha Natsvlishvili, Former Deputy Security Minister, Deputy Interior Minister, Deputy 
Chief Prosecutor of Georgia and Member of Parliament of Georgia from the Republican Party, November 2016, 
Zurich, Switzerland.     
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destroyed these tapes, some parts of these compromising materials were preserved and used to 
threaten politicians and journalists. 
         
The rulers of law obstructed democratization and were power-maximizers rather than arbiters. 
Legal groups were unusually cooperative with Saakashvili’s government during pre-election 
campaigns. This could be explained by the fear of uncertainty, which is concomitant with the 
change of political leadership. These fears are prevalent among those who occupy leading 
positions because they lose authority. In some instances, they are prosecuted. Those who take their 
place are less vulnerable, as new political teams profit from previous institutional experiences and 
memories. The pre-election period of 2012 was reflective of this dynamic. For instance, when 
small-scale television stations needed to reach the regional population, TV Maestro and Global 
TV donated tens of thousands of satellite antennas. Law enforcement seized them as alleged vote-
buying158 and fined Bidzina Ivanishvili 90.9 million USD.159 
        
The so-called prison tapes were leaked from penitentiary institutions before the election of 2012. 
These materials documented the inhumane and degrading treatment of inmates and depicted law 
enforcers abusing their authority. The state possessed extensive information through surveillance 
practices. Thus, it was hard to believe that the ministry of justice and the prosecution service could 
not detect these abuses. The political leadership tolerated their loyalists because they dissuaded 
internal splits and preserved centralized power. After the electoral victory of the Georgian Dream, 
many previously influential authorities fled the country. Justice Minister Zurab Adeishvili and the 
leadership of the Constitutional Security Department and the Special Operative Department were 
among the escapees. When the Georgian Dream came to power, approximately two-hundred 
public officials were punished for different violent crimes. 
       
Legal groups were the gatekeepers of democracy. To avoid power limitation, they invoked a 
strategy of “controlled opening.” They received expert technical and educational support to 
reinvigorate their capacities. They became efficient at collecting and analyzing information, which 
documented the misconducts of incumbents and other rival actors and protected them from 
                                                          
158http://www.transparency.ge/sites/default/files/post_attachments/Georgian%20Television%20Landscape%20Repo
rt%20English_0.pdf 
159https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/NIT13_Georgia_2ndProof.pdf 
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patronal abuses. Increasing resources and functional effectiveness permitted negotiations at the 
expense of democracy, and competing pressures made their information more valuable. For 
instance, a Russian-affiliated prison officer recorded and hand-delivered compromising materials 
to a pro-Russian journalist and to the political opponent of Saakashvili. When the television station 
of opposition leader Ivanishvili publicized these materials before the elections, it damaged the 
ruling elite. Political bartering between Saakashvili’s government and legal groups became 
impossible. As the most powerful constraints emerged from cleavages in moral issues (Lipset, 
Rokkan 1967:6), ordinary citizens voted against the ruling political party. 
8.3. Elections as the equalizer of odds 
 
Democracies, autocracies, and other regime types hold elections by reason. The common objective 
is political legitimization. As Przeworski put it, democracy periodically generates losers and 
winners through institutionally organized competition (1991:10); that is the nature of elections. 
Elections are critical for various reasons, especially for transitional democracies. First, elections 
are the equalizers of political inequalities through which people punish disobedient rulers. The 
entire process of elections modifies the strategies of actors and spreads democratic norms 
throughout other parts of the polity (Linberg 2006:159). Second, election cycles trigger media–
government tensions because access to media is equated with an electoral victory. 
       
These tensions mobilize citizens, nongovernmental organizations, opposition groups, and external 
forces. Domestic and foreign scrutiny increase at election times because their affiliated groups 
fight for influence. Decisions to rig elections are made under different circumstances. First, 
authoritarian institutions must encourage incumbents to reduce electoral fraud, and external 
pressure must be marginal for a decision to commit electoral fraud. Second, a decision to rig an 
election may also be made when the authoritarian regime is unstable and privileged groups are 
beyond the control of an authoritarian leader. 
       
Of these examples, the first explains Saakashvili’s decision to admit his electoral defeat. 
Institutions could not aid the government, as it lost legitimacy after the media release of offensive 
materials. This nationwide civic mobilization was something new for Georgian politics. The 
demonstrators were university students and civil activists who distanced themselves from political 
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forces. The lost legitimacy boosted voter turnout. The political parties united under the oligarchic 
leadership of Bidzina Ivanishvili. This coalitional approach was a winning card because it 
prevented voters from polarization. Further, it helped swing voters more easily decide which 
political force to vote for. The US and EU were univocal, which signaled that “the denial of popular 
will” would be devastating for Saakashvili. These factors arrested the repressive capacities and 
resources of the government. 
       
To provide further evidence, I will refer to the explanations of politicians who stand on different 
political platforms. As Nino Burjanadze, former acting President and Speaker of the Parliament of 
Georgia, claimed, “The government’s tolerance was not based on democratic premises. It was 
rather a rational decision because Saakashvili’s government had no resources to use force. The 
voter turnout was extremely high, and the election results were obvious. The straightforward 
position of the West aided the situation. Any other decision apart from the recognition of electoral 
defeat would be a political suicide.”160 
        
Giga Bokeria, the Secretary of the National Security Council of Georgia, explained, “The 
experience of the Rose Revolution made our conviction stronger that any political group should 
not be in power until it has popular support. Without such a mandate, one should leave. I do not 
know if some people were tempted to preserve power because power corrupts, but, eventually, it 
was the only right decision after knowing that the electorate supported another political team. I 
have not heard about the direct interactions with our external counterparts. Everything developed 
swiftly. There were no struggles between the old and new elites. When the president and his 
political team understood based on the exit polls and preliminary results that the ruling party lost, 
we immediately admitted it before the announcement of official results, right in the morning. We 
may say that the external democratizers helped us to seed such political culture. Their role was 
important to create this kind of political mind-set.”161 
 
                                                          
160 Author’s interview with Nino Burjanadze, former acting president of Georgia, 2003–2004; former speaker of the 
Parliament of Georgia, 2001–2008; December 2016, Tbilisi, Georgia.    
161 Author’s interview with Giga Bokeria, the former secretary of the National Security Council of Georgia, the 
former deputy foreign minister and the co-founder of Liberty Institute; February 2017, Zurich, Switzerland.    
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Although these political narratives are slightly different, the baseline argument is that the rigging 
elections was costly under increased domestic and external scrutiny. On one hand, external 
democratizers built local capacities to strengthen electoral processes (Norris 2015:87), 
nongovernmental organizations cooperated with foreign counterparts to document and report 
electoral frauds (Hyde, Marinov 2014:355), and international actors helped opposition parties 
assess electoral rules (Elkit, Svensson 1997:35-38) and collect evidence on electoral fraud. On the 
other hand, there was distrust regarding elections and democratic assistance. The core assumption 
was that autocracies cannot provide real political freedom and legitimize post-authoritarian 
governments (Carothers 2002). Thus, undemocratic elections are incapable of curtailing autocratic 
rulers, which makes them a malfunctioning mechanism of accountability (Schedler 2006:6). 
Moreover, competitive authoritarian regimes can be characterized by competitive elections in 
which opposition leaders and parties participate, but the incumbents create an uneven playing field 
(Levitsky, Way 2010:8-9).  
       
Despite authoritarian manipulations to shape electoral rules, uncertainty remained. Competing 
foreign pressures equalized political disparities and raised the costs of rigging elections, and 
external political competition decomposed the homogenized power of Saakashvili. In this setting, 
elections had backfiring effects, lacked effective distributive of rewards among privileged groups, 
and entailed the risk of costly mobilizations to the undermined regime (Brancati 2014:321; Geddes 
2006:6). 
8.4. Regained voice 
 
The government already possessed two controlling mechanisms. First, it had proxy ownership of 
two influential television stations: Rustavi 2 and TV Imedi. Second, this takeover monopolized 
the advertising market.162 Media control became hierarchical, and political-media bargaining 
shifted to the level of editors and producers. This uncompetitive environment caused small-scale 
outlets to suffer from financial instability, although it allowed them to remain under the radar of 
                                                          
162Since 1 January 2005, TVMRGE, with Nielsen Television Audience Measurement’s Official License has collected 
and generated results on television audience measurement using TVM2 and TVM5 people meters. 
http://www.tvmr.ge/en#!en/main  
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government control. Small media outlets were not perceived as regime-threatening and were even 
used to present an illusion of media freedom to external democratizers. 
       
The culmination of the government’s repressive media policies was the arrest of four 
photojournalists on the alleged crime of espionage. Among the detainees were the president’s 
photographer and his wife.163 Inga Grigolia, the political journalist, recalled, “My media products 
have been top-rated. The status of a highly demanded journalist has not prevented my talk show 
from closure. The media oppression was troublesome under Saakashvili. The methods included 
intimidation and blackmail. I have compromised many times to continue what I am doing. If I 
started my journalistic career under Saakashvili, I doubt I would be what I am now, while 
Shevardnadze’s regime allowed me to be a free journalist.”164 
       
At critical times, Kavkasia, TV Maestro,165 and Media House Obieqtivi166 served as alternative 
platforms, granting media access to opposition and nongovernment organizations.167 Shortly 
before the election of 2012, Bidzina Ivanishvili, a Georgian oligarch, established the Georgian 
Dream coalition, which consisted of six ideologically different parties. Oligarchic capital aided the 
rebirth of Channel 9 (Info 9), while the must-carry/must-offer policy made its media presence 
politically meaningful. Channel 9 (Info 9) journalists were trained according to Reuter’s manual. 
Teams composed of a journalist and a camera operator were assigned to various regions of 
Georgia. They showed the living conditions of the population and criticized the government.168   
       
The media and the political landscape were polarized between pro and anti-government groups. 
The government had a say in framing media content at two leading television stations, which 
altered watching behaviors of audiences in favor of opposition media. A decisive factor was the 
journalistic investigation of Media House Obieqtivi. From 2010 to 2011, Irma Inashvili, a 
                                                          
163 https://civil.ge/archives/185968   
164 Author’s interview with Inga Grigolia, the TV anchor of ‘Reakcia, ’a journalist at TV Pirveli, Imedi, Mze, 
Rustavi 2, Tbilisi, Georgia, February 2016.    
165 In 2008, Maestro TV obtained a general profile license to broadcast political and investigative programmes; 
166 The television channel was established in August 2010.   
167 Author’s interview with Ana Natsvlishvili, the Head of Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, December 2016, 
Tbilisi, Georgia. 
168 Author’s interview with Luba Eliashvili, General Director of Channel 9 (Info 9), February 2016, Tbilisi, Georgia.  
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journalist and the founder of Media House Obieqtivi, became aware of torture of prison inmates. 
Although there were media discussions about human rights violations at Georgian prisons, no one 
had yet produced irrefutable evidence. During her investigation, Inashvili obtained two types of 
tapes. The first tapes depicted acts of abuse by individual perpetrators. They were regarded as less 
convincing material to prove systematic abuse. The second tapes were later collected and showed 
abuses committed by groups of law enforcers. Inashvili secured these tapes abroad and handed 
them to Channel 9 (Info 9) and TV Maestro. 
        
On 18 September 2012, all television channels, including pro-government outlets, televised 
Inashvili’s investigative materials. She recalls, “I was under risk as a journalist before the release 
of [the] tapes. I travelled to Brussels as a part of safety measures. There was a big uncertainty 
about the public reactions or whether these materials were critical enough to defeat Saakashvili. 
When the prison tapes were released, everyone condemned the violence.”169 For the first time, 
rulers peacefully transferred the power in the October election of 2012. 
         
In addition to assisting in independence from oligarchic interests, external democratizers were 
critical in assisting media to regain its voice. First, they helped media outlets obtain institutional 
leverage and made meaningful the political challenge of the regime. Second, the “policy of 
condemnation” demoralized the government and prevented it from taking violent measures. Third, 
having had long-term communication and democratic exchange with Western democratizers, 
Georgian political elites understood that politically unjustified decisions would lead nowhere. 
Autocracy promoters did the “dirty job” of exposing the dark side of unwanted government. These 
competing pressures paradoxically developed Georgia into an electoral democracy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
169 Author’s interview with Irma Inashvili, journalist, Tbilisi, Georgia, February 2016.      
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8.5. What accounts for a peaceful power transfer? 
 
The second presidency of Saakashvili showed that external political competition and domestic 
coordination accounted for Georgia’s peaceful transition to an electoral democracy. The 
coordination underwent two cycles. During his first presidency, Saakashvili inherited 
fractionalized sociopolitical strata as well as frozen ethno-territorial conflicts, and he reintegrated 
pro-Gamsakhurdia forces. At the same time, he crowded out the core supporters of Shevardnadze 
and Abashidze. Slowly, he started homogenizing the political and media landscapes. Saakashvili 
unified political forces but excluded those who were unwilling to join him. Popular justification 
was that he had to finish the tasks of state and institution building. 
        
As external political competition increased after the Russian military aggression, a number of 
political fractions reemerged. External political competition contributed to the decomposition of 
Saakashvili’s power and eventually developed Georgia into an electoral democracy. External 
engagement brought together once-divided groups in the face of conflict (Przeworski 1986:53). 
While democracy promoters incentivized political elites to rebuild institutions and change their 
nondemocratic behaviors through rationalization or adaptation (Rustow 1970:345), autocracy 
promoters supported illiberal kinship groups to secure their proxy representation. These processes 
decentralized political bargaining and made outcomes uncertain (Przeworski 1991), from which 
democracy emerged in its minimalist sense. 
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CHAPTER 9 DEMOCRACY ARRIVES IN TOWN 
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9. The period of cohabitation – 2012-2016 
 
Temporary losers peacefully transferred a governing power to those who had won elections, and 
the period of cohabitation followed this power shift. President Mikheil Saakashvili headed the 
opposition party of the United National Movement, while Prime Minister Ivanishvili headed the 
ruling party of Georgian Dream. Possessed institutional mechanisms to influence political 
decisions. Following the prison tape scandal, external democratizers were more watchful and 
critical of the new government. The removal of the unwanted government appeased Russia. These 
factors permitted political pluralism and heightened competition between the government and 
opposition. The organizational structure of this chapter follows the logic of previous period 
chapters. 
9.1. The legacy of manipulated liberties 
 
Although the power-sharing mechanism was constitutionally redefined in 2009, constitutional 
amendments were not enacted until 2013. Giorgi Targamadze, an opposition leader, nominated 
Avtandil Demetrashvili, the first and former Chair of the Constitutional Court of Georgia, to head 
the newly established constitutional commission. Demetrashvili was elected to this position among 
three candidates. The chair of the commission had the two specific goals within the constitutional 
agenda: distancing a president from the executives and legislature.170 Political opponents perceived 
the rewriting of the constitution as Saakashvili’s strategic decision to become the prime minister 
after his presidency. Post-soviet leaders mastered this undemocratic practice of a constitutional 
power swap. Through this legal manipulation, government leadership remained unaffected. 
       
The case of Georgia was exceptional thanks to the electoral outcomes of 2012. As a result, the new 
constitution generated the process of cohabitation instead of the nominal power swap. Because of 
its hybridity, the new constitution introduced arrangements that could lead to political instability 
                                                          
170 Author’s interview with Avtandil Demetrashvili, the president of the Constitutional Court 1996–2001; chairman 
of the State Constitutional Commission 2009; secretary of the State Constitutional Commission 1993–1995; Tbilisi, 
Georgia, December 2016.     
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under circumstances of political polarization. There was no real balance of power among the prime 
minister, president, and parliament. Appointment procedures within the judiciary somewhat 
created space for political elaboration. The prime minister was empowered to define and pursue 
foreign and domestic policies, to select candidacies for the positions of defense and interior 
ministers, and to appoint regional governors. The political consequences of these institutionally 
granted authorities, however, were unequal power distribution, which allowed the prime minister 
to monopolize resources. Conversely, presidential powers were symbolic. The president had no 
discretion to initiate laws or referendums without the prime minister apart from legal acts issued 
at wartime. The president dismissed the parliament and appointed judges.171 
       
The chair of the Constitutional Commission and the justice minister found it difficult to reconcile 
their positions regarding the function of parliament, as the former supported strengthening the 
legislature. The justice minister prevailed, and the new constitution deprived the parliament of 
controlling mechanisms to balance a prime minister but granted sufficient institutional weight 
against the president to overrule his vetoes. A constructive vote of no confidence was another 
subject of debate because the mechanism that the constitution eventually proposed risked a 
prolonged political crisis if parliament announced no confidence to the government. If they could 
not reach consensus, the president would dismiss the parliament. Subsequently, their legitimacy 
was at stake because the parliament, which had the mandates of majority, distrusted the prime 
minister, although they were unable to select a new candidate.172 This model encompassed the 
properties of presidential and parliamentary systems. 
      
The chair of the commission and the justice minister also disagreed over the minimum-age 
threshold of judges at their appointment. President Saakashvili mediated this disagreement, and 
the limit was set at the age of thirty. Another questionable point was the probation period of judges, 
which gave impetus to judges to self-censor and show favoritism toward political elites in 
exchange for lifetime appointment. This institutional structure risked putting the president and the 
                                                          
171 https://civil.ge/archives/218332  
172 Author’s interview with Avtandil Demetrashvili, the president of the Constitutional Court 1996–2001; chairman 
of the State Constitutional Commission 2009; secretary of the State Constitutional Commission 1993–1995; Tbilisi, 
Georgia, December 2016.     
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parliament at odds. The first such controversy occurred over the Amnesty Law. The election results 
of 2012 brought new political realities. Saakashvili, as an opposition leader, was president. Bidzina 
Ivanishvili headed the winning political party, Georgian Dream, and was prime minister with a 
majority in parliament. Parliament initiated the Amnesty Law to mitigate miscarriages of justice 
and to release claimed political prisoners or those persecuted on political grounds. President 
Saakashvili vetoed this law, but parliament overruled his veto. Saakashvili did not sign the 
Amnesty Law because it politically denounced his policies and blamed him for creating a system 
that discriminated against people for their political views and permitted human rights violations. 
In its assessment, the Venice Commission was also critical of the law for not providing criteria for 
determining if a person was a political prisoner and for its arbitrary selection of cases.173 The head 
of parliament signed the Amnesty Law. 
      
A legacy of manipulated laws handicapped President Saakashvili in initiating legislation during 
the period of cohabitation. The veto power that the president held was of a declaratory nature rather 
than real institutional leverage because the parliament and its majority were in the camp of the 
prime minister. The Georgian Dream, nongovernment organizations, and the media initiated new 
provisions to the Law on Broadcasting. They regulated three major conditions. First, the president 
nominated candidacies for the Board of Trustees. Second, the must-carry/must-offer principle 
became legally binding not just during election periods but at all times. Third, Adjara television 
was remodeled as a public broadcaster and financially linked to the national public broadcaster. 
President Saakashvili vetoed the provision that allowed parliament to dismiss the board of trustees 
at the public broadcaster, and parliament overrode his veto. The cohabitation process ended with 
the most democratic presidential election of 2013, and power was peacefully transferred for the 
second time.174 Nevertheless, although de facto cohabitation was maintained under President 
                                                          
173 Opinion no. 710/2012, CDL-AD(2013) 009 on the Provisions Relating to Political Prisoners in the Amnesty Law 
of Georgia adopted by European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), 8-9 March 2013, 
p. 7, paragraph 48, available at:  http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-
AD(2013)009-e  
174 European Commission, Joint Staff Working Document, Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 
Georgia Progress in 2013 and recommendations for action Brussels, 27.3.2014, SWD (2014) 72 final, pp. 2-5., 
available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/enp/pdf/2014/country-reports/georgia_en.pdf 
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Margvelashvili, he gradually distanced himself from the Georgian Dream coalition and opposed 
certain decisions of the prime minister for which he used veto politics. 
       
The EU-Georgia Association Agreement opened new possibilities for the government to amend 
the Law on Broadcasting based on EU Directive 2010/13/EU.175 Regulation of the advertising 
market sparked a media-government confrontation because the accelerated implementation of the 
12-minutes rule risked limiting the financial independence of private media outlets. With the 
reduction of advertising time, prices increased. Neither private media outlets nor business entities 
were ready for radical changes in their commercial behaviors. The Georgian National 
Communications Commission drafted this amendment without the participation of 
nongovernmental and international organizations, and the first and second parliamentary hearings 
took place within one day. Hence, the preparation and adoption processes were procedurally 
controversial. 
       
The EU-Georgian Association Agreement conditioned Georgia to adopt an antidiscrimination law. 
The Orthodox Church demanded the law not specify types of discrimination. This Church mandate 
targeted sexual minorities and pressured influential members of the Georgian Dream. Clergy 
leaders attended the parliamentary hearings. The president, the parliament, and the prime minister 
shared a standard, humanitarian view, which made it possible to disregard Church demands. The 
Georgian Orthodox Church is believed to be the projector of the Russian influence, and the 
political sentiments of the Church help party representatives attract voters during elections. The 
Georgian Dream secured its power for the coming years and was not in need of its support. 
Compliance with international responsibilities were prioritized, as they promised establishing 
politically useful channels with external democratizers. 
 
The postelection period was marked by political pluralism. The former ruling party established 
itself as a strong political opposition. Its soft-liners assumed political responsibility for their 
failures, while its hardliners were prosecuted. Although the United National Movement stood 
multiple tests, including the reshuffling of party leaders and supporters, it maintained hold of 
                                                          
175
 See paragraph 87, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1490881931149&uri=CELEX:32010L0013 
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leading media outlets, which ensured its political survival. Rustavi 2 returned to its opposition 
roots. Its reconstructed image was politically and commercially beneficial. Unlike the media, law 
groups began political camping. 
9.2.  The third wave of rule of law reforms, the castle still unconquered  
 
Saakashvili's ruling party limited judicial independence by removing politically unwanted judges, 
empowering prosecution vis-à-vis judiciary, and using disciplinary sanctions against politically 
disobedient judges.176 Although the Georgian Dream coalition won the election by exposing grave 
human rights violations at penitentiary institutions, and rule of law reforms received priority in 
their political agenda, electoral promises were not a main factor in initiating these reforms. Legal 
reforms remained a top issue during discussions of visa liberalization between the European 
Commission and Georgian authorities, and the government announced the so-called policy of the 
“de-politicization” of the prosecution, police, and judiciary. 
      
The de-politicization policy modified structural arrangements at rule of law institutions. The 
Prosecutorial Council was established to appoint and dismiss the chief prosecutor. This special 
body was composed of the prosecutors elected by the Conference of Prosecutors. However, the 
Venice Commission raised specific issues regarding balance between political and nonpolitical 
actors. The Georgian Constitution defines the Prosecution Service as a subordinate agency of the 
Ministry of Justice. Correspondingly, the minister of justice holds strong powers to suggest 
candidates. The Venice Commission recommended reconsidering this constitutional provision by 
reducing the role of the justice minister and avoiding the structural subordination of the 
Prosecutorial Council to the Ministry of Justice. Otherwise, the Council could not be neutral in its 
decisions. Another concern was about the exclusion of defense counsel from the Council’s 
membership, which was explained by the adversarial principle.177 
     
                                                          
176 A brief overview on the third wave of judicial reform by Nino Gvenetadze, the Chief Justice of Georgia; provided 
by the Supreme Court of Georgia on 27 December 2016.  
177 Venice Commission opinion no 811/2015, ODIHR opinion no CRIM-GEO/272/2015, CDL-PI (2015)014; 
Strasbourg, Warsaw, 7 July 2015, pp.9–14. 
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The judicial reforms seemed on the right track when the High Council of Justice removed the 
politically appointed members and replaced them by civil society representatives and 
academics.178 For transparency, video recording was reintroduced into courtrooms. The 
disciplinary system was modified, and the adjudication of power was delegated to a disciplinary 
panel of common courts. The perspective of the EU Association Agreement was a significant 
impetus for this wave. Article 4 of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement179 necessitated 
domestic reforms, which reinforced external pressures on the government. The EU became the 
largest contributor to criminal justice reforms and provided legal expertise on institutional capacity 
building. 
        
One of the dilemmas the Georgian Dream government encountered was the demand from the 
Georgian electorate to dismiss and arrest the majority of judges on claims of miscarriage of justice. 
This demand indicated high domestic pressure. The incumbents were extremely careful with the 
judiciary, while immediate steps were taken about the prosecution and police. Nongovernmental 
representatives interpreted the reluctance of the judges as “a failure of the bird to fly once the door 
of its cage was thrown wide open.”180 The Georgian Dream government decided to maintain the 
entire body of judges whose integrity was questioned by the broader population. Tamar 
Chugoshvili, the first deputy speaker of parliament, explained, “Our government concluded that 
the political changes should not affect judiciary. We further provided them with institutional 
independence by reforming the High Council of Justice. That was a well-thought decision without 
any external involvement. I am convinced that this decision is right and will yield long-term 
results.”181 
        
The government abstained from opening Pandora’s Box for three reasons. First, 20,000 complaints 
against former law enforcers accused them of human rights violations. Reimbursement for these 
                                                          
178 A brief overview on the third wave of judicial reform by Nino Gvenetadze, the Chief Justice of Georgia; provided 
by the Supreme Court of Georgia on 27 December 2016.  
179
 https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/association_agreement.pdf See ‘Title III, Article 4 Domestic reform’, p.9. 
180
 “Judicial reform in Georgia and the Association Agreement, Old wine in a new barrel – what has changed?” Policy 
Brief on behalf of the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (GYLA) by Ana Natsvlishvili, the chair of the Georgian 
Young Lawyers’ Association, Tbilisi, July 2016, p. 3. 
181 Author’s interview, December 2016, Tbilisi, Georgia. 
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complaints approximated GEL 7 billion, and allegations in some cases were difficult to prove. The 
state returned property to victims worth GEL15 million. Nevertheless, the restoration of reclaimed 
justice became difficult, and it risked turning incumbents into political witch hunters. Second, if 
the government dismissed all criminal judges, they could not have been immediately replaced due 
to insufficient human resources. Third, financial resources were scarce for their payroll, and the 
government could endanger international support. 
        
Although this reasoning was plausible, there were other causes for the Georgian Dream and the 
law groups to miss their chances to transform this segment. The litmus test for mutual exploitation 
was the “Judge Murusidze”—a collective name for judges who loyally served the ruling elites, 
whether it was the United National Movement or the Georgian Dream, and which indicates that 
both actors easily and speedily adapted to each other—and the decisions of domestic courts on 
Rustavi 2. These two cases were reflective of political tampering and incited the reemergence of 
bureaucratic authoritarianism (O’Donnell 1973). The underlying structure of this co-optation was 
derived from political and institutional vulnerabilities. 
     
The Georgia Dream was the coalition, and its constitutional majority was at stake. The two 
influential politicians with clear Western links—Davit Usupashvili of the Republican Party and 
Irakli Alasania of the Free Democrats—were not strongly integrated into the coalition, even though 
Usupashvili was the speaker of the parliament, and Alasania was the defense minister. The political 
parties and leaders of the Georgian Dream were heterogeneous, and they had different views on 
domestic and foreign policy issues. These dissimilarities encompassed the substantive and 
procedural aspects of how the future of Georgia should develop. Prime Minister Bidzina 
Ivanishvili and his successor Irakli Gharibashvili needed internally stable structures or actors to 
push forward their policies. Simultaneously, rule of law groups were in search of a tolerant patron-
partner because the post-election situation made their position extremely fragile. These needs 
perfectly matched. 
        
Murusidze was the judge on the notorious homicide case of Sandro Girgvliani. This background 
did not hinder him from ascending the career ladder. He was nominated as a judge while serving 
as the Secretary of the High Council of Justice of Georgia, which supervises the judiciary. This 
presented a conflict of interest, not to mention his previous track record. The Chief Justice Nino 
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Gvenetadze voted against his candidacy.182 President Margvelashvili disapproved his appointment 
as well. Judge Murusidze became powerful and, together with his team, openly opposed Chief 
Justice Gvenetadze at the hearings of the High Council of Justice of Georgia. Judge Murusidze 
became a dividing line among the core insiders of the ruling coalition. 
       
Rule of law actors were successfully used to neutralize the Minister of Defense Irakli Alasania and 
his team, which ended with a political divorce of the Free Democrats and the Georgian Dream 
coalition. The “cable case” against former officials of the Ministry of Defense was the theme of 
fierce criticism by domestic and external observers. This case was alarming because of its political 
connotations that aimed to remove Irakli Alasania and his Free Democrats from the political 
scenery upon the order of Bidzina Ivanishvili. The prosecution service and courts were blamed for 
enforcing this order. 
      
The ownership issue of Rustavi 2 reappeared. Saakashvili and his affiliates stood behind Rustavi 
2 after the obscure takeover of its ownership. When he moved to the opposition, Rustavi 2 returned 
to its oppositional roots. After regaining a critical voice, this television channel recovered its 
ratings. The government anchored itself to cutting links between Saakashvili and Rustavi 2. To 
achieve this, it relied on rule of law actors. The prosecution service temporarily suspended a 
criminal case against a family member of the judge who examined the case of Rustavi 2 in the first 
court filing. Indeed, the judge ruled the decision in favor of the former Rustavi 2 owners and 
instructed them to appoint an interim manager. Nikoloz Gvaramia, the General Director of Rustavi 
2, claimed that the government attempted to blackmail him, that he was warned about a possible 
release of “compromising materials.”183 The Constitutional Court of Georgia played the role of 
arbiter, although their judges were subjected to similar pressures.184 
       
The Constitutional Court declared the norm unconstitutional, based on which the first instance 
court ruled an immediate execution of its decision without letting the case proceed through all 
court instances. The institutional structure of the Constitutional Court permitted it to be a legal 
adjudicator in this dispute. Notably, having several judges and higher standards during their 
                                                          
182 https://civil.ge/archives/112778  
183 https://old.civil.ge/geo/article.php?id=29901  
184 https://civil.ge/archives/125640  
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appointment could explain this decision. It is worth mentioning that these judges had different 
political tastes, although those who sympathized with the United National Movement prevailed in 
numbers. 
        
The rule of law arena remained unconquered by both governments. It was partly because of their 
political unwillingness to create an independent judiciary and genuinely de-politicize law 
enforcement authorities. The rationale was straightforward: Political elites perceived them as tools 
of governance. Law groups possess robust structural mechanisms to sanction other actors if they 
reduce their authority. There were two drawbacks from which the transitional regimes suffered. 
First, the powers of this group were unconstrained. Second, the rule of law was assumed to be a 
mere tool of punishment that neglects human rights, which in turn encourages the formation of 
unhealthy systems and practices that are hard to overcome. Law groups proved difficult to 
democratize. By revealing their faults, competing foreign pressures brought the population into 
the mechanism, and popular demands upset symbiotic relations between political forces and rule 
of law actors. 
 
9.3.  Toward democratic elections 
 
 Election is the best mechanism for democratic rule by the people. Similarly, they could ensure 
authoritarian survival (Schedler 2002). The ways electoral rules are structured define to what 
extent the political will of people is expressed. It is a demarcation point between the electoral and 
other kinds of authoritarian regimes. Electoral authoritarianism shifts its focus from exercising to 
accessing power (Schedler 2006:6). The involvement of diverse actors in electoral processes might 
prevent polity from authoritarian elections. For instance, the political context that framed from the 
2012 parliamentary election was useful for shaping the competitive electoral environment. 
      
The political and media landscapes were reconfigured. The United National Movement moved to 
the opposition but maintained influence over the leading television stations Rustavi 2, TV Imedi, 
and the Georgian Public Broadcasting. During the presidential election of 2013, the United 
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National Movement outperformed the Georgian Dream in media representation.185 Civil society 
organizations were actively engaged in political processes, and the revitalization of these areas 
alerted the population and external observers to the political behaviors of the ruling elites. This 
provided a productive environment for realizing political preferences. 
        
These reinforcing pressures developed sensible electoral laws. As a result, mayors and governors 
were elected by popular vote (Articles 23, 43, and 73 of the Law on Local Self-Government).186 
Before this amendment, the president appointed regional and municipal governors. This 
restructuring resulted in two primary conditions. First, presidential power was decentralized. 
Second, political parties underwent a problematic test because their electoral performance at local 
elections defined their access to state party funding and media time for the parliamentary election 
of 2016. 187 Thus, political resources were allocated based on the results of local elections. 
       
The mutually supportive interaction of domestic actors and external democratizers helped redraw 
single-member constituencies.188 The disputed provisions of the Election Code tailored the 
electoral geography so that votes carried unequal weight. Thus, elections were unable to guarantee 
accurate reflection of the popular will. The Constitutional Court declared this norm 
unconstitutional because it violated the principle of equality under Article 14 and paragraph 1 of 
                                                          
185 Note: According to the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Media Monitoring, pp.2-12, the Georgian 
Public Broadcaster allocated its media time to the leading presidential candidates as follows: Davit Bakradze (United 
National Movement) – 14.6%, Giorgi Margvelashvili (Georgian Dream Coalition) – 12.7 %, Nino Burjanadze 
(Democratic Movement – United Georgia) - 14.2%, and Giorgi Targamadze (Christian-Democratic Movement) -
11.8%. Rustavi 2 distributed its media time as follows:  Davit Bakradze (UNM) – 28.2 %, Giorgi Margvelashvili (GD) 
– 23.6%, Nino Burjanadze (DMUG) – 15.0% and Giorgi Targamadze (CDM) – 11.5%. TV Imedi - Davit Bakradze 
(UNM) – 32.3 %, Giorgi Margvelashvili (GD) – 16.8%, Nino Burjanadze (DMUG) – 15.0% and Giorgi Targamadze 
(CDM) – 10.9%. Maestro - Davit Bakradze (UNM) – 27.4 %, Giorgi Margvelashvili (GD) – 26.0%, Nino Burjanadze 
(DMUG) – 15.4% and Giorgi Targamadze (CDM) – 12.0%. Kavkasia - Davit Bakradze (UNM) – 20.4 %, Giorgi 
Margvelashvili (GD) – 29.3%, Nino Burjanadze (DMUG) – 15.4% and Giorgi Targamadze (CDM) – 10.6%. 
186 https://www.matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/2244429 
187 Elections in Georgia, 2014 Local Self-Government Elections, Frequently Asked Questions, Europe and Asia, 
International Foundation for Electoral Systems June 9, 2014, p. 1. Available at 
http://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/2014_ifes_local_elections_georgia_faqs.pdf 
188 http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-REF(2016)001-e 
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Article 28 of the Georgian Constitution.189 External observers positively evaluated the decision of 
protecting equal suffrage.190 These gradual moves determined the democratic quality of the 
parliamentary election in 2016 as a competitive and inclusive political process.191 
        
During this period, political and societal conditions allowed greater pluralism compared to the 
previous regimes. The EU Association Agreement of 2014 and its responsibilities pushed 
democratic behavior forward. The moderate stand toward Russia was also a factor. These diverse 
voices and pressures limited the undemocratic maneuver of incumbents. 
9.4. Circumventing regime-threatening challenges through media 
pluralism 
 
The abundance of political actors pluralized “the media market,” which helped private media 
outlets to survive and ruling elites to circumvent regime-threatening challenges. The 
permissiveness of incumbents was contingent on several factors. First and foremost, a strong 
opposition emerged with which a leading television station, Rustavi 2, established partisan ties. 
Second, the diversity of the political realm and the uncertainties regarding a bureaucratic 
acceptance of the ruling elites made the Georgian Dream civilize its methods of media control. 
Third, the rapid digitalization of media made it more challenging to control public opinion.192 The 
ruthless strategies that worked under Saakashvili were no longer applicable against the media. The 
reasonable decision was to counterbalance opposition narratives. The need for alternative channels 
to disseminate pro-governmental discourse motivated the Georgian Dream to return TV Imedi’s 
ownership to Patarkatsishvili’s family. As a result of such media-government reconciliations, 
certain television stations obtained television frequencies and private broadcasting licenses to 
diversify their media profiling. Before the presidential election campaign, TV Tabula started 
                                                          
189 https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/2867512# 
190 https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/georgia/227496?download=true 
191 https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/georgia/297551?download=true 
192 Note: the number of private television stations increased from 2013 to 2016 on the Georgian media market (See 
Appendix III). 
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broadcasting with a private broadcasting license.193 It established a niche as a small-scale 
television station to avoid existential vulnerability and financial dependency. 194 On 13 August 
2013, Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili shut down Channel 9 (Info 9). He based his decision on 
the fact that the television station had no self-sustainable capacity and that it had lost its function 
as a challenger of the regime.195 
        
The prime minister did not need direct media affiliation because the ownership manipulations with 
TV Imedi resulted in pro-governmental framing of editorial policies. The shutdown of Reakcia 
confirmed the political influences on the channel, as it aired the highest rated political talk show 
and outmatched the prime-time programming of Rustavi 2.196 The government was also involved 
in the dismissals of Davit Paitchadze and Eka Kvesitatdze from the public broadcaster197 and in 
the ownership disputes over TV Maestro. The managing director of pro-government TV Imedi 
intended to rehabilitate a rival television station, TV Maestro. His financial assistance was aimed 
at installing partner-owners and building a reliable advertising network, as these two television 
stations shared advertising time. 
       
The director general of TV Maestro opposed the owners’ engagement in this deal, but the Board 
of Directors dismissed her.198 Several journalists critical of Bidzina Ivanishvili and the Georgian 
Dream government had left the channel beforehand. Tendencies to share the media landscape were 
also manifested in the diversification of audience measurement companies. Tri-Media Intelligence 
launched a television audience measurement service with a license from Kantar Media. Georgian 
Public Broadcaster, TV Imedi, TV Maestro, and GDS TV switched to Tri-Media Intelligence 
Kantar Media, while Rustavi 2 and Kavkasia remained with TVMRGE AGB Nielsen. 
       
                                                          
193 Note: the board members of TV Tabula included Kakha Bendukidze, the former minister of economy, as well as 
journalists and scientists with a libertarian ideology. 
194 Author’s interview with Tamar Chergoleishvili, general director of TV Tabula, February 2016, Tbilisi, Georgia. 
195 Author’s interview with Luba Eliashvili, general director of 9 Channel, Tbilisi, Georgia, February 2016.  
196 Author’s interview with Inga Grigolia, the TV anchor of Reakcia, journalist at TV Pirveli, Imedi, Mze, Rustavi 2, 
Tbilisi, Georgia, February 2016;    
197 Author’s interview with Davit Paitchadze, Professor of Communications at Ilia State University, Radio-TV anchor 
at Georgian Public Broadcasting, Tbilisi, Georgia, February 2016;     
198 https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28964  
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At a later stage, the government meddled through intermediaries with Rustavi 2. In August 2015, 
the former owners of Rustavi 2 filed a lawsuit claiming the return of an ownership right. Even 
though the previous and current owners were parties to the proceedings, the way in which the 
procedural formalities had been conducted raised doubts about the government’s interests. First, 
the prime minister criticized Rustavi 2 for spreading fake news before litigation, and incumbents 
attempted to influence a judge of the First Instance Court, which Rustavi 2 exposed. Second, the 
same court ignored the principle of separate corporate personality and did not distinguish the 
television station as a legal entity separate from its shareholders. The court arrested the company’s 
tangible and intangible properties instead of its shares. Rustavi 2’s director was deprived of 
undertaking any financial obligations, which decreased the company’s cash flow. Third, the first-
instance court ruled in favor of appointing interim managers. Rustavi 2 appealed the ruling at the 
Appellate Court and the Constitutional Court. The latter declared the norm unconstitutional. The 
Appellate Court abolished the measure on the grounds of inexpediency.199 
      
The government’s tensions with the Appellate Court and the Constitutional Court200 demonstrated 
the limits of the government’s controlling mechanisms over the judiciary. After the political power 
shift, some of the judges who were appointed and promoted under the United National Movement 
government had no allegiance with the Georgian Dream. This political camping of the judiciary 
became useful for the media. The consolidation of domestic and international forces made the 
incumbents rethink their strategies.201 The EU and US diplomatic missions released a joint 
statement on the appointment of interim management.202 The government had political goods at 
stake, including obligations arising from the Association Agreement and visa liberalization 
prospects. 
      
The government experienced political disagreements from inside, particularly with the Republican 
Party, which left the collation before the election. All of these required resources to handle internal 
splits and win the elections. These constraints on the government made it impossible to 
                                                          
199 Author’s interview with Dimitri Sadzaglishvili, a defense lawyer of Rustavi 2, Tbilisi, Georgia, February 2016.    
200 http://constcourt.ge/ge/news/saqartvelos-sakonstitucio-sasamartlos-saoqmo-chanaweri-saqmeze-shps-
samauwyeblo-kompania-rustavi-2-is-da-shps-telekompania-saqartvelo-saqartvelos-parlamentis-winaagmdeg.page  
201 Author’s interview with Nikoloz Gvaramia, director of Rustavi 2, Tbilisi, Georgia, February 2016.   
202 https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28754  
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misappropriate Rustavi 2. The Georgian Dream’s decision of controlled media pluralism can be 
interpreted as the limits on its power and capacities as well as being derived from conflicting 
political interests. 
      
Media freedom could be guaranteed under the following set of circumstances: impartial courts, 
pluralized domestic actors, supportive external democratizers, and cooperative nongovernmental 
organizations and the media itself. In the given situation, the Constitutional Court played a decisive 
role. Later on, the Supreme Court of Georgia ruled against Rustavi 2 and granted its return to the 
former owners, although the European Courts of Human Rights suspended this decision.203 The 
mobilization of citizens was neither extensive nor comparable to previous instances of Rustavi 2 
and TV Imedi. Alliances between media and nongovernmental organizations were strongly 
supported by external democratizers, which guaranteed the effectiveness of pressuring 
mechanisms. For the resolution of the media-government confrontation, the internal tools were 
inconsistent and unreliable when linked to the government. The mobilization of the citizens was 
not high because the “civilized methods” of media repression did not spur citizens to protest. 
 
9.5.  Making democracy work 
 
Despite frozen conflicts, Georgia built its state and political institutions. By 2016, Georgia had a 
real opposition with the former ruling party and other political forces, and this political diversity 
gave additional freedom to nongovernment organizations. The ruling Georgian Dream showed 
ideological difference compared to its predecessors when it chose its leftist orientation. For the 
first time, Georgia had an openly partisan media. The competing external actors had vested 
interests in Georgia. Relations with the US and NATO were strengthened, and political ties with 
the EU reached new heights. Nevertheless, Russia continued misappropriating Georgian territories 
and strengthened its political presence through “support groups.” Sputnik and other Russian media 
sources started to counter the pro-democracy media, and for the first time, Georgia witnessed the 
emergence of far-right group. The actors coordinated these differences and handled the external 
political competition, which made democracy work in its electoral sense. 
                                                          
203 https://civil.ge/archives/126209  
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10. The external political competition and domestic coordination in 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Ukraine 
 
I developed the theory of coordinated competition by studying the case of Georgia. I found that 
homogenized and fractionalized societies can cope with external political competition. The 
combination of these factors made regime change possible under Shevardnadze’s second rule. The 
same factors generated an electoral democracy at the end of Saakashvili’s second term. By 
contrast, Georgian citizens and political actors were polarized along ethnic and political lines, and 
external political competition was skewed in favor of Russia during Shevardnadze’s early 
presidency. Georgia was a failed state with the features of unstable authoritarianism. I extrapolate 
these findings and theoretical conjectures in the cases of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and 
Ukraine by cross-case comparison. 
10.1. Regional outlook 
 
Great regional powers competed for political influence in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia (De Waal 
2002:51), Moldova, and Ukraine. The interests of external powers were different among these 
countries, as their ideological proximity aligned with their political elites. These factors define the 
willingness of external actors to promote their favored regimes (Weyland 2017:1236). Domestic 
conditions are at the grassroots of externally driven processes, and recent developments in 
Hungary and Turkey indicated that when political elites polarize and erode democratic values, they 
develop certain affinities toward their external role models and replicate their policies (Buzogány 
2017:1308-1309). 
       
The structure of society and the interrelations of its members are among the defining domestic 
conditions that shape the manipulative abilities of political elites at home and abroad. If political 
elites are threated to be crowded out and the masses fear exclusion, these are necessary conditions, 
but insufficient to destabilize peace without a foreign facilitator (Kaufman 1996:115). The 
intertwined effects of these domestic and external factors account for the trajectories of Post-soviet 
regimes. 
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For instance, Moldova was culturally and linguistically split between those who associated with 
Romania and Russia. At the beginning of democratization, political elites politicized these 
differences (Williams 1999:74-78). The Russian ethnic minority disapproved of the language law, 
which supposedly put them in an inferior position. They used the local media to politicize these 
difference and rally their supporters to defend against the central government of Moldova 
(Kaufman 1996:126-127). Russia backed these claims of ethnic kin, which resulted in the armed 
conflict between Moldova and its breakaway region of Transdniestria (Kaufman 1996:119). The 
conflict was localized, and the region depended on Russian support. Moldova embarked on its 
European path, which was less threatening to Russia, as its support groups were well-established 
at the societal and political levels. Russia has two ideologically affine political parties, the 
Socialists and Patria, and it exploited its ethnic and ideological kin (Besemeres 2016:410-412). 
Russia’s concerns were minimized given that Moldova has never strived toward NATO 
membership. 
       
Similar events developed in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Mass-level conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh 
spilled over to political elites. The two political parties of the Armenian National Movement and 
the Azerbaijani Popular Front were formed to structure and lead conflict resolution (Cornell 
1998:55; Kaufman 1996:116). Armenia was more homogenous compared to Azerbaijan, which 
shared cultural kinship with Turkey and Iran. Therefore, Armenia developed closer ties with 
Russia, while Azerbaijan leaned toward Turkey and Iran. Elchibey withdrew Azerbaijan from its 
CIS membership. Russia took countermeasures by openly supporting Armenia, removing Elchibey 
through a quasi-coup, and providing Aliyev with opportunities for seizing power (Kamrava 
2001:221). The Karabakh is the case of ethnic nationalism that broke out amidst nonexistent 
political institutions (Snyder 2000:38). It is difficult to measure external political competition in 
the cases of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Apart from Turkey, external democratizers and autocratizers 
isolated Azerbaijan (Cornell 1998:51). This conflict tied Armenia with Russia and made uncertain 
its journey toward the West. 
        
Unlike Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova, the conflict in Ukraine erupted at a later stage 
of democratization. These developments make Ukraine the outlier case for the theory that argues 
that states rage wars during their nascent democratization (Mansfield, Snyder 1995; Snyder 2000). 
Ukraine decided to independently plan its foreign policy and secure its energy politics, and external 
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democratizers positively responded to these domestic signals. Ukraine’s free riding threatened 
Russia’s dominance, and Western actors realized that the political leadership of Ukraine was weak, 
and the threat of Russia was real. These were defining factors in tacitly consenting to Russian 
inclusion through Yanukovych who forced political opponents to abandon the European path. 
Russia used its “ethnic card” (Besemeres 2016:412) between Ukrainian and Russian groups in 
Crimea (Armstrong 2004:32; Mankoff 2014:62), and rising external political competition pitted 
these major groups against each other and polarized them. I review these cases below and 
summarize the effects of domestic coordination and the external political competition on the 
formation of a democratic regime. 
10.2. Armenia: reintegrating with Russia, choice or coercion? 
 
The Soviet collapse triggered almost-similar events in Armenia. The national excitement for a 
democratic project brought the leader of the Pan-Armenian National Movement, Levon Ter-
Petrosyan, into power. Following the democratic election, Armenia engaged in the Nagorno-
Karabakh War with Azerbaijan. Although, Russia initially sided with Azerbaijan, the superpower 
positioning changed shortly after because Azerbaijan decided to pursue an autonomous foreign 
policy. Armenian political elites seized the momentum and requested Russia to maintain military 
presence and patronage in their conflict with Azerbaijan. Since then, Armenia remains the only 
South Caucasus country to keep a Russian military base (Gyumri Military Base). As a result, 
Armenia had to follow complementarity politics by attesting cordial relations with the West but 
preserving strategic partnership with Russia. 
      
This power configuration prohibited NATO from involvement in Armenia. Another difficulty with 
the alliance was Turkish membership. Turkey was a longstanding enemy of Armenia. The 
historical memory of genocide and Turkey’s support of Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh War 
(Freitag-Wirminghaus 2008:76) incited the lack of Armenian NATO membership ambition. The 
US used the same programs of democracy promotion, and the focus areas were similar to those in 
Georgia. Through these projects, it targeted civil society organizations, media entities, government 
officials and the rule of law, and parliamentary and electoral institutions. Democracy crafting 
turned into a project of building a more stable and predictable Armenian government, which 
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acquired the features of semi-authoritarianism, including government-controlled media, fraudulent 
elections, corrupt judiciary and law enforcement authorities, and motivated but muted human 
rights organizations. 
    
Since 2005, the EU promoted democracy softly and consistently. It attempted to convince the 
Armenian government to take on the path of Europeanization and did not treat external 
democratizers as political tourists. Furthermore, Armenia witnessed external democratizers 
succeeding in Georgia, which awakened the mechanism of neighbor emulation, but the country 
stumbled because of three problems. First, EU neutrality and true mediation in the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict discredited the perception of an ally. Second, Yeltsin’s Russia had no 
clearheaded interests in Armenia. Armenian political elites searched for Russian protection by 
promising an advantageous position in the territorial conflict with Azerbaijan. Under Putin, this 
cooperation took the form of coercion, and Armenia was forced to quit the Association Agreement 
with the EU.204 This averted path led Armenia to the Eurasian Economic Union (Börzel 2015:525). 
Third, attitudes of the population were crucial. There was disillusionment about democracy 
because of misperceptions. Many people understood democracy as a political space in which 
everyone has a voice, citizens are treated with dignity, and elections are free from corruption, but 
without Euro-Atlantic socialization.  
10.3.  Azerbaijan: practicing preventive foreign policy 
 
Azerbaijan regained its independence in the same context. Unsettled borders and the Soviet 
removal from the geopolitical scenery as a controlling gendarme triggered an irredentist conflict 
in the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave. Except for Russian interference, Azerbaijan risked Lezgic 
separatism and the Iranian involvement in the Talysh region, where the people had ethnic kinship 
                                                          
204 See the CRS Report on “Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. 
Interests” by Jim Nichol , 2014 Congressional Research Service, 7-5700, www.crs.gov RL33453, p. 17, available at: 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33453.pdf  
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with Iran. In 1991, Ayaz Mutallibov was democratically elected, although the Azerbaijani Popular 
Front made him resign after the Khojaly Massacre in the Nagorno-Karabakh War, and Soviet 
dissident Abulfaz Elchibey took over presidential power. He openly declared Azerbaijan’s 
willingness to integrate into Western institutions. For this purpose, Elchibey made the Russian 
army withdraw from Azerbaijan. He initiated a political opening through economic and political 
liberalization and established the Azerbaijani army. Elchibey transformed Azerbaijani state 
consortium with the presidential decree of 13 September 1992 (Bagirov 1996:5) and opened the 
Caspian Energy market for foreign companies (Bagirov 2001:181; Ibrahimov 2013:127; 
Karagiannis 2002:115). Because of these independent political movements, Elchibey offended 
Russia, and the South Caucasus region fell into the grey zone of Russian near Abroad. President 
Bush also sympathized with Russian political leadership. In 1992, the US Congress adopted the 
so-called 907 Freedom Act and banned Azerbaijan from being the recipient of democratizing 
assistance.205 The Armenian diaspora supposedly lobbied this act (Ibrahimov 2013:133; King 
Pomper 2004).  
     
The coup d’état of 1993 removed Abulfaz Elchibey from power. Heydar Aliyev seized the 
presidency and consolidated authoritarian power. Aliyev skillfully navigated opposing energy 
politics (Bagirov 2001:191-192). The prospects of energy and transport projects made the US 
rethink its strategies toward Azerbaijan. Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, 
Azerbaijan gained a geopolitical necessity. Specifically, Azerbaijan could serve as the logistics 
partner to provide a stable and alternative supply for the US and NATO missions in Afghanistan. 
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visited Azerbaijan to negotiate the Freedom Support Act 907 
(Ibrahimov 2013:134-135).  
       
Formerly, the EU was transforming itself as a global power and had limited opportunities to 
support democracy in Azerbaijan. Despite its multifaceted efforts and partnership tools, the EU 
could not correct the US embargo on democracy promotion. The EU had intrinsic motivation to 
secure its energy market, as Azerbaijan satisfied 5 % of its oil demand and supplied Caspian gas 
resources to the EU market through the Southern Gas Corridor.206 Azerbaijan participated in 
                                                          
205 https://www.congress.gov/bill/102nd-congress/senate-bill/2532/text   
206 https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/4013/EU-Azerbaijan%20relations  
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NATO programs of NACC, PfP, and IPAP, and military training but remained unwilling to join 
its membership (Matlary 2011:77). Azerbaijan left the CSTO and maintained its ties with the CIS 
(Hedenskog, Larsson 2007:23). Political kinship and energy politics with Turkey prevented 
Azerbaijan from joining the Eurasian Economic Union. 
      
Azerbaijan was the rejecter of democracy and exhibited characteristics of stable authoritarianism. 
Its nongovernmental organizations and media could not provide alternative views, and all powerful 
nonincumbent entities were funded by the government. This domestic status quo weakened 
domestic rhetoric about the necessity of democracy promotion. Azerbaijani political elites ordered 
choices and measures in the process of integration. First was political reasonability. Here, the big 
question was how the delegation of political sovereignty affected their current authority. Second 
was the economic rationale, which meant sharing and distributing resources. Third was the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. For Azerbaijani political elites, the integration process should 
guarantee conflict resolution. The omission of this issue in any integration process is viewed as 
the crisis of credibility. These three factors shaped its predictable and preventive foreign policy. 
      
Azerbaijan practiced a policy of balance by attracting great powers and keeping them on equal 
ground. Specifically, being too close to any external actors meant spoiling relations with others. 
Azerbaijan perceived that major foreign policy tasks were to diminish Russian dependence, 
prevent strong influence of Iran, and develop relations with the West based on geo-economic 
interests. This foreign policy prioritized authoritarian stability over democracy. 
10.4.  Moldova: the case of (dis)engagement with the West  
 
Moldova experienced similar upheavals, but unlike the Southern Caucasian countries, it had 
underdeveloped national awareness and a pro-Russian political identity. This was reinforced by 
Soviet memories when Moldova performed better economically than other socialist states 
(Tolstrup 2014). Another critical point was the Russian “compatriot policy” in separatist 
Transnistria. When the national mobilizations for independence started across the Soviet republics, 
the Moldovan Popular Front supported the unification with Romania, while the pro-Russian forces 
backed Gorbachev’s removal from power without the Soviet dissolution (Bugajski 2004:95). This 
indicated the cognitive dissonance in national and political identity.  
 177 
 
Yeltsin disagreed with Vice President Alexander Rutskoy regarding the issues of Transnistria. In 
1992, Rutskoy visited Bendery, a city in Transnistria, and explicitly encouraged the separatist 
government. Yeltsin was more considerate because he feared creating precedent; however, the 
nationalization of Russian politics and domestic pressures from radical groups incited Yeltsin to 
change his position (Bugajski 2004:95). The economic and energy dependency on Russia led 
Moldova to CIS membership without joining its military structures and political institutions 
(Brzezinski, Sullivan 1996:250).  
      
Putin attempted to negotiate with Communist President Vladimir Voronin on the so-called 
federalization proposal of Moldova and Transnistria in 2003. This federalization plan enabled the 
autonomous government to block the decisions of the central government. Voronin rejected the 
proposal right before Putin’s planned visit in November 2003. He realized that Moldova would be 
at a low ebb and heavily dependent on Russia.207 This did not affect the high approval of Putin’s 
political persona among the Moldavians, possibly because of their identity cleavages, which were 
reinvigorated by high penetration of Russian television propaganda.  
      
Against this background and after the independence of Moldova, the US invested around 1.4 
billion USD to guide the country toward a market economy.208 The US was the proactive Western 
power until 2005. After that point, it disengaged from Moldova, allowed the EU to play a vital 
role, and supported every European initiative. The EU conditioned its instruments and future 
benefits on the democratic performance of Moldova. Political neutrality prevailed in the discourse 
of the Moldovan political elites. For this reason, there was no open declaration of its NATO 
membership. This wavering stance of Moldovan political elites manifested itself in the election 
results of 2001 when the Communist Party resurged. Since the Soviet Putsch, the communists had 
been outlawed, but Moldova was the only post-soviet country where the Communist Party fully 
returned. At that point, the EU was eager to conclude the Association Agreement and conditioned 
it on the removal of the communists from power.  
      
 
                                                          
207 Author’s interview with Vladimir Socor, a country expert for Moldova, June 2017, Zurich, Switzerland. 
208 https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5357.htm 
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The Alliance for European Integration (AEI) included the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Vlad 
Filat, the Democratic Party (PD) of Vlad Plahotniuc and Marian Lupu, and the Liberal Party (PL) 
of Mihai Ghimpu (Cojocariu 2014:118). These three parties of the coalition government agreed on 
dividing the spheres of influence among governmental institutions. Consequently, all ministries, 
regulatory agencies, media, and the judiciary were politicized. Party leaders appointed their cadres 
to run these agencies and pursue their politics. Moldovan party leaders, who embraced 
personalized leadership in their parties, started to export these tendencies to different governmental 
branches. They regularly redistributed the political capital and engaged in savage competition.  
      
However, among them, Vlad Plahotniuc from the PDM rapidly built the party’s power because he 
controlled the core law enforcement institutions during these reshuffles and power sharing. These 
agencies helped him to marginalize competitors and political rivals from other coalition parties 
through the policies of “kompromat.” Plahotniuc built up his media empire through the 
composition of six leading media outlets. He also monopolized the advertising market, which was 
the media’s source of financial independence. “Jurnal TV” and “Publika TV” were the alternatives 
to these pro-governmental channels. Nongovernmental organizations mainly worked on European 
integration and electoral issues.209  
      
In 2016, the rebranded Communist Party leader, Igor Dodon, assumed the presidency through the 
Party of Socialists. His tandem with Plahotniuc created opportunities for the rise of Russian 
influence in Moldova. Nevertheless, Moldova had less strategic importance compared to Ukraine 
and Georgia. Russia had no reason to stay alert because of the US disengagement and reluctance 
of the political elites in the transatlantic integration. The population lacked intense national and 
political consciousness. Overall, these factors and the power discontinuity of political elites made 
strategic planning for a better democracy difficult.  
 
 
 
                                                          
209 https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/NIT-2011-Moldova.pdf  
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10.5.  Ukraine: the case of democratic turmoil   
 
Ukraine was the most strategically important state for Russia among the post-soviet countries. 
Ukraine possessed economic power, nuclear capabilities, and a geographically attractive position, 
directly bordering Europe and Russia. Ukraine, with the city of Sevastopol, played an essential 
role in the Black Sea regional security, although it immediately became a disputed area between 
the Russian and Ukrainian naval forces. The national identity of Ukraine was partitioned between 
the Western and Eastern Ukrainians. Poland and Lithuania mainly influenced Western Ukraine. 
Eastern Ukraine fell under Russian domination (Beissinger 2004:191). Russia perceived Ukraine 
as its offspring in political and ethnic terms. The concept of “Bradsky Narodi” (“Brotherly 
People”) emerged from this attitude.  
      
This bifurcation of Ukrainian political leaders and its people was observable during the nationalist 
mobilizations for Soviet dissolution (Beissinger 2004). The Russian political elites were 
particularly cautious about Ukrainian independence, to such an extent that Gorbachev’s worries 
were reflected in “the Chicken Kiev Speech” made by US President George H.W. Bush.210  
      
After the referendum and the declaration of Ukrainian independence, Russian political leadership 
gradually started to demarcate their spheres of influence. Yeltsin pressured the first two Ukrainian 
presidents, Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma. Ukraine became an associate state (1993) in 
the CIS and never joined the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Russia extended its claims 
on the Russian-populated Eastern regions and the Crimean Peninsula (Bugajski 2004). During the 
first post-soviet decade, Russia abstained from ruthless moves to realize its second claim. The 
reasons were straightforward. First, Ukraine was still a nuclear power, and the fear of mutual 
destruction deterred the possibility of war. Ukraine denuclearized on the promise that its borders 
would persist.211 Second, Yeltsin was not a robust authoritarian leader and preferred to use soft-
power tools. Kuchma’s second presidency revived the corrupt Soviet practices. Ukraine sank into 
clan-based rule, in which the power struggles among different political forces, interests, and 
                                                          
210 http://www.nytimes.com/1991/08/29/opinion/essay-after-the-fall.html  
211 https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_1994_1399.pdf 
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economic groups were prevalent. This political dynamic distanced Ukraine from the West and 
caused it to engage with Russia (Bugajski 2004; Tolstrup 2014). Kuchma benefited from this 
situation because excessive resources allowed him to get rid of political opponents, commit 
electoral fraud, control the media, and build networks with the oligarchs (Bunce, Wolchik 2011).  
     
Kuchma suffered the consequences of modernization and economic liberalization because it 
promoted fierce competition and incited some oligarchs to challenge his rule (Bunce, Wolchik 
2011:117; Way 2008). Kuchma attempted to nominate Viktor Yanukovych as his successor, who 
tried to play on the national sentiments of Eastern Ukrainians and reiterate Kuchma’s strategy from 
the 1994 elections (Way 2008:259), but the nationwide mobilization and economically stable 
conditions (Bunce, Wolchik 2011:118) caused this to fail. Defector oligarchs funded the Orange 
Revolution forces and opened up media access to the opposition and nongovernmental 
organizations, which additionally received financial assistance from the “Soros Foundation,” 
NED, and the USAID. This funding amounted to 160 million USD (Bunce, Wolchik 2011:123-
142). The US promoted Ukrainian democracy through the USAID and Millennium Challenge 
Account (MCA). The reported assistance of the USAID amounted to 144,908,471 USD (2001-
2017).212 
     
 In 2006, Ukraine joined the MCC through the anti-corruption package (45 million USD for two 
years) and also received 2.1 billion USD conditioned on the progress of democracy.213 Instead of 
seizing the momentum, the pro-Western orange coalition failed the test due to the political 
immaturity, internal fights, and the corrupt system. President Yushchenko dismissed 
Tymoshenko’s cabinet. The Ukrainian leadership was politically disoriented. Although Ukraine 
actively participated in NATO programs and declared its membership aspiration, its population 
and political elites contested this initiative (Bukkvoll 2011:83). The slightly different NATO 
mechanisms of rapprochement were indicative of the hesitation of the Ukrainian leadership to 
make steady moves toward NATO.  
      
                                                          
212 https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/UKR?implementing_agency_id=1  
213 https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32866.pdf 
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Tymoshenko made her comeback as the second-time prime minister. At that time, the so-called 
“gas crisis” emerged between Ukraine and Russia. Tymoshenko made “the gas deal” with Putin, 
but after her electoral defeat against Viktor Yanukovych, this deal became the reason for her 
imprisonment. Multiple factors enabled the pro-Russian Yanukovych to win the presidency. The 
confusion of political and ethnic identity was a necessary precondition, but not sufficient. The lack 
of determinacy of Ukrainian political elites, weakly institutionalized political parties,214 and 
complicated agency structure of the state made Ukraine an easy target for Russian influence.  
      
The EU used the instruments of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (1994), European 
Neighborhood Policy (2005), and Eastern Partnership (2009) to promote democracy in Ukraine. 
President Yanukovych rejected the EU Association Agreement that inflamed demonstrations 
among pro-European forces. The “Euromaidan” was not as peaceful as the Orange Revolution, 
although it removed Viktor Yanukovych from power. These events spurred alternative 
demonstrations in the ethnically populated Crimea, Donetsk, and Lugansk, where the pro-Russian 
stance was strong. In response to Yanukovych’s dismissal, Russia invaded Ukraine and annexed 
these territories.  
      
Petro Poroshenko, the new and wartime president of Ukraine, signed the EU Association 
Agreement. The EU allocated 12.8 billion euros to support Ukrainian democracy and help in 
dealing with the war consequences.215 The political turmoil of Ukraine can be explained by the 
quadruple transition to the state, nation-building, democratization, and liberalization (Kuzio 2000). 
In post-soviet countries, these processes are frequently concurrent, which accounts for the 
outcomes of democracy promotion (Munck 1997). Due to the heterogeneity of post-soviet polities, 
this overlap involves dangers and ensuing uncertainties. 
 
                                                          
214 Author’s interview with Dr. Taras Kuzio, an expert in Ukrainian political, economic, and security affairs, 2017 
June, Zurich, Switzerland. As Kuzio explained to the author, “The political parties in Ukraine are created only as 
election project, kind of one of those plastic cups used in picnics. They are funded by oligarchs and not by membership 
dues. Another challenge is the deep ideological niche prevalent in the Eastern Europe – the Communist Party, which 
either collapsed completely, like in Georgia or never converted to social democratic party and became a pro-Russian 
extremist party, like in Ukraine.”  
215 https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine_en/1937/Ukraine%20and%20the%20EU  
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10.6.  Does the theory of a coordinated competition work? 
 
Comparative analysis of Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Ukraine demonstrates that 
Russia sees these countries as the integrals of its geopolitical realm and excludes other external 
competitors. The success of its foreign policy depends on multiple factors. First are the political 
and societal structures within these countries. Second is the persistence of rival external actors. 
Third is the political leadership of Russia. The cases of Georgia and Ukraine indicate that Yeltsin 
was more moderate compared to his headstrong successor. The theories on nationalism and early 
democratization provide compelling arguments about the post-soviet conflicts in Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova. According to these explanations, multiple factors account for 
these conflicts, namely, the breakdown of a patron state; the initiation of political liberalization 
without democratic institutions in place, which spurred nationalist speech instead of free speech; 
and liberal opinions (Mansfield, Snyder 1995; Snyder, Ballentine 1996; Snyder 2000). However, 
these factors cannot explain why Putin’s Russia raged wars in Georgia and Ukraine when these 
countries were supposedly advancing their democracies.  
      
The theory of a coordinated competition can explain the inter-state wars between Russia and 
Georgia in 2008, and Russia and Ukraine in 2014. Georgia and Ukraine rebelled against the 
geopolitical hegemon. The political elites of the color revolutions declared their pro-Western 
orientation and openly sought NATO and EU membership. Russia had more at stake in Ukraine 
than in Georgia. The military aggression in Georgia was a warning to the Georgian political elites, 
Ukraine, and the West. Ukraine was strategically more important than Georgia because Russia had 
risked energy politics and economic resources concentrated in the hands of pro-Kremlin oligarchs 
in East Ukraine. Yanukovych’s pro-Russian efforts to dismiss Ukraine’s deal with the EU gave 
visibility to the deep-seated disagreements between the pro-Russian and pro-Western forces in 
Ukraine.  
      
Georgia underwent this process smoothly because its political and societal structures coordinated. 
They were fractionalized under Shevardnadze and the Georgian Dream and homogenized under 
Saakashvili. Georgia coped with the external political competition. By contrast, the political and 
societal structure of Ukraine was polarized between almost equally strong opposing groups of 
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ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians. Georgia localized its ethnic differences and isolated these 
diversities in geographic and political terms, but the same was not the case in Ukraine.  
      
Moldova shares some similarities with Georgia, mainly with regard to its ethnic and political 
divisions at the domestic level. Moldovans are divided among Moldavians and groups that identify 
themselves as Russian and Romanian affine groups. An additional line of division is the region of 
Gagauz, with its minority having Turkic origin. These divisions ran among the political parties 
and defined their stance regarding foreign policy issues. For instance, the Popular Front had the 
double face of being pro-Romanian and also embracing the formation of Moldavian identity. The 
Agrarian Party was more homogeneous, with minor exceptions, pushing forward Moldavian 
nationalism. The pro-Russian groups were mainly in the Transnistria breakaway region and were 
sympathetic toward building institutionalized ties with Russia through CIS membership. The 
fractions of the pro-Romanian and pro-Moldavian forces vetoed its ratification but eventually lost 
against the legislature and the pro-Russian Snegur, who preferred CIS membership because it 
promised economic and energy benefits (King 1994:346-354). However, what makes Moldova 
different is its selectiveness toward external democratizers.  
      
Armenia and Azerbaijan have homogeneous political and societal structures, but there is a low 
intensity of external political competition between autocracy and democracy promoters. Armenia 
clumsily moves along its European path because its political elites have ideological proximity with 
Russia due to its complicated relationships with other geopolitical actors. What provides hope in 
Armenia is that it has close ties with the external democratizers at the diaspora levels, but these 
connections seem insufficient without leverage (Levitsky, Way 2007). Azerbaijan is the hardest 
case of either democratic leverage or linkage. Given that multiple autocracy promoters operate, 
and Russia, Iran, and Turkey have their interests (Matveeva 2008:205), the prospects of democracy 
are beyond reach.  
     
In sum, Georgia stands as the democratic forerunner among these countries because its domestic 
actors coordinated foreign competition. The cycle of coordination ran between the 
fractionalization and homogenization of political and societal forces, which allowed it to moderate 
and transform the pluralizing effects of the external political competition into an electoral 
democracy. Moldova is fractionalized, but it does not have the required level of political 
 184 
 
competition. Armenia and Azerbaijan are homogeneous. The former resembles Moldova in terms 
of foreign political competition. The latter lacks the engagement of democracy promoters. Ukraine 
is an example of a polarized society that could not coordinate the fierce political competition of 
external competitors, which, instead of pluralization, increased the level of polarization and risks 
of escalation of war. These findings and the theory of a coordinated competition shed light on the 
cases that cannot be explained by the theories of geographic proximity, linkage, and leverage.  
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CHAPTER 11 CONCLUSION 
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11. Explaining the divergent regime outcomes of competitive promotion 
 
By and large, the causal supremacy was given to the structural and institutional factors such as 
prior regime dependency (Mahoney 2001), democratic diffusion (Brinks, Coppedge 2006; Starr 
1991), reverse snowballing (Huntington 1991), and international organizations (Pevehouse 2005; 
Schimmelfennig, 2003; Vachudova, 2005). The critics of structural theories outlined the neglect 
of uncertain processes that caused the actors and their perceptions to waver (O’Donnell, 
Schmitter1986; Rustow 1970), although they recognized the importance of international structures 
(Levitsky, Way 2006; Whitehead, Schmitter 2001) and actors (Tolstrup 2009, 2013, 2014).  
      
These are compelling theories; however, there are puzzling questions. As a citizen of 
democratizing Georgia, I asked myself why democracy promotion leads to unintended 
consequences. Despite the shared political history, the Baltic States consolidated democracy while 
Georgia and its South Caucasian counterparts lagged behind this cohort. The political regimes 
differ in countries of the South Caucasus. Georgia is a forerunner. The diffusion of color 
revolutions was not possible in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Moreover, Moldova and Ukraine could 
not emulate the policies of their direct neighbors in Europe. After the Rose Revolution, Saakashvili 
reformed political institutions with undemocratic means. He formed a dominant party regime, 
which completed the major tasks of institution and state building. The prime motive was to 
preserve his power. He met people’s immediate needs and satisfied the Western partners to 
temporarily contain Russia and avoid the political destiny of Gamsakhurdia or Shevardnadze.  
      
By contrast, Ukraine did not succeed in fighting corruption or building functional political 
institutions and bureaucracy. One possible explanation is the openness of the political elites. For 
instance, Prime Minister Vlad Filat of Moldova was willing to replicate Saakashvili’s policies. He 
had European and NATO agendas but made a trade-off between them due to internal struggles. 
Prime Minister Filat backtracked against the parliamentary leader Plahotniuc because he could not 
risk alliance with a communist party during the negotiations on the EU Association Agreement.  
      
The geographic proximity or external democratizing efforts could not render rigorous accounts 
about a viable pathway toward democracy without incorporating authoritarian competitors into the 
analysis. In this research, I studied the competitive regime promotion of external democratizers 
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and autocratizers that used specific instruments to influence the domestic actors during the 
democratization (Teorell 2010). Studying them in a comparative perspective conveyed nuanced 
analysis (Burnell 2011:283). The in-depth case study of Georgia and its cross-case comparisons 
with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Ukraine provided extensive empirical evidence to 
develop the theory of coordinated competition.  
 
11.1. Answering the guiding research question: how and under what 
circumstances does external political competition lead to democracy?  
 
The first and foremost finding of this dissertation is that the competition between the Black and 
White Knights should not be understood as ex-ante, leading to negative consequences. There are 
two widely accepted views. Based on these claims, the extensive exposure of domestic actors to 
democratizing pressures yields democratic outcomes, while their close connections to external 
autocracies endanger the prospects of their democratic transformation. These theories have their 
merits. However, political behaviors are not always contingent on space or unilateral relations. 
The preferences of actors in democratization evolve and are rarely realized in isolation. 
Additionally, their effects intercept. Previous research suffered from the lack of specificity 
regarding why the outcomes of competitive regime promotion deviate from the intentions of either 
autocracy or democracy promoters. These theories are also silent on the conditions that might lead 
competition to conflict instead of democratization.  
      
I find that external political competition is desirable because it builds opposing political forces 
inside the polity. The similar or different others pluralize the political landscape, and its actors 
engage in domestic competition. The multiple pressure groups limit the governmental powers and 
make the rulers responsive (Dahl 1971:3; Karl, Schmitter 1991:78). The inclusion of competing 
groups creates what scholars call “a stalemate situation” (McFaul 2010:7; O’Donnell, Guillermo, 
Schmitter 1986:72), in which all the actors seek a solution, and losing is not an option. This 
condition enables the contending forces to pursue their objectives without being attacked or 
relegated to an inferior state. The consequences are that the power is shared, and the constructive 
struggles provide a peaceful environment for building democracy.  
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For instance, the US and EU complemented the geopolitical emptiness of post-communist space 
in which Russia was weakly present compared to its totalitarian past; however, it still maintained 
its ideological, ethnic, and interest-based kin. Shevardnadze followed the same intuition because 
Russia was unreliable and perhaps incapable of responding to the signals of its former vassals. 
These factors reshaped the old space, coupled with the domestic demands for democracy. Without 
this bottom–up support, political leaders can hardly achieve their goals or develop any links with 
the external forces of democratization. The next finding regarding favorable domestic conditions 
refers to this point.  
 
11.2. What are the domestic conditions needed to coordinate external 
political competition? 
 
The polity should be prepared to handle external political competition. The buttress is domestic 
coordination. This involves a national ambition primarily forged from below and by the 
population. This ambition is inherent to homogenous societies and developed in fractionalized 
societies out of the fear of external threat. The domestic coordination motivates and constrains the 
political leadership not to deviate from the declared track and permits external political 
competition to produce democracy.  
      
Post-soviet countries provide solid empirical evidence for this theory. For instance, Georgia 
exemplifies varying attendance to these transformation factors. The US-Georgian relations were 
humanitarian because Georgia was undergoing simultaneous and painful processes of nation- and 
state-building. Russian involvement was high, and the political and societal actors were 
fractionalized and polarized. This situation of the post-independence period created an 
uncompetitive and uncoordinated political space. The state was failed, and the regime had the 
properties of unstable authoritarianism.  
      
In 1995-2003, the competition reached a considerable point. The society was politically 
fractionalized among the supporters of Shevardnadze, Gamsakhurdia, and the Reformers Group. 
The supporters of Shevardnadze and Gamsakhurdia had ideological differences, but the latter 
group had no resources to polarize the citizens. The reformers emerged within the ruling party. 
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The majority of Georgian voters, nongovernmental organizations, opposition media, and external 
democratizers supported them. The defectors group was divided on the inside, and the hardliners 
of the ruling party were also fragmented. This period constituted a loosely coordinated competition 
with the elements of a weak state and unstable authoritarianism.  
       
The Rose Revolution government initiated “the politics of national reconciliation” among the 
divided groups and intensified relations with the external democratizers. As a result of these 
reconciliation efforts and modernizing reforms, effective state institutions were established. The 
War of 2008 in Georgia steered the Russian antagonism and solidified relations with the West. 
Between 2008 and 2016, this coordinated competition caused the breakdown of competitive 
authoritarian trends and pushed the regime toward electoral democracy. Georgia’s case is different 
from those of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Moldova, and Ukraine, although it shares some structural 
similarities. Let me review each case separately and provide the common outlook of regime 
dynamics.  
      
Azerbaijan is a stark example of tolerating authoritarian subjugation of incumbent elites. This 
leniency of the Western actors partially stemmed from the energy and security concerns (Börzel 
2015:523). Another dimension of this managed democratizing pressure derived from manipulating 
the ethnic divisions and territorial conflicts. The Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict over the Nagorno-
Karabakh region waved superpower projections. Initially, Russia backed Azerbaijan, but as soon 
as President Mutallibov ostracized Russian interests in the energy politics, Russia rendered 
enduring assistance to Armenia (Ibrahimov 2013:127). Additionally, Armenian US diaspora 
played a crucial role in lobbying Section 907 of the US Freedom Support Act, which prohibited 
assisting Azerbaijan until 2001 (Ibrahimov 2013:133). The US interest only changed when 
Azerbaijan attracted Western energy companies and signed the “Huge-Scale Caspian Oil Deal” in 
1994 (Bagirov 2001:181).  
      
Democratizing assistance emerged under the mantra of “pipeline politics.” First, the Clinton 
administration supported the “Baku-Supsa Pipeline Project” and then the “Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
Project,” which initially was announced at the OSCE summit in Istanbul. The interests of major 
external players intersected over security concerns following the September terrorist attack. The 
US needed logistic support from Azerbaijan to provide stable and alternative supply to the NATO 
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forces in Afghanistan. The US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visited Azerbaijan and 
negotiated the Freedom Support Act 907, which would be renewed annually. Azerbaijan became 
a leading ally in supplying the NATO forces mainly with non-lethal freight in Afghanistan.  
      
Geopolitics changed the interest of superpowers. US-Azerbaijani relations improved while Russia 
strengthened its military, political, and economic presence in Armenia. Azerbaijan also cooperated 
through a Turkish liaison with NATO, which was another reason that Armenia was unreceptive 
toward a possible NATO membership. Azerbaijan lacked a desirable threshold of competition. 
The incipient coups and authoritarian takeovers troubled its national ambition; however, 
Azerbaijan, similar to Armenia, had no problems with domestic coordination. External political 
competition was missing in Armenia. The political elites sided with Russia due to the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict and developed an amorphic relation with the West. Armenia is an unstable 
autocracy, while Azerbaijan is among consolidated autocracies.  
      
Moldova and Georgia under Shevardnadze were somewhat alike. Moldova was fractionalized 
along political and ethnical lines. Unlike Georgia, it failed to raise the external political 
competition. A fraction of political and social groups shares an affinity with Russia that makes 
Moldova a borderline case for the variable of domestic coordination. These factors do not allow it 
to be an electoral democracy. Ukraine is a case of discoordination because its actors are politically 
and ethnically polarized among two groups of equal size. These polarized groups are also 
fractionalized within themselves. The polity cannot coordinate. The external political competition 
is remarkably high, which increases the polarizing effects. Ukraine is a dangerous case of 
democratization with elements of a war-prone hybrid regime.  
      
Overall, these findings show that three political outcomes emerge when external actors 
simultaneously promote democracy and autocracy abroad. First is the polity, in which the domestic 
societal forces are polarized and struggle for power over the state; the external political competition 
leads to a war-prone hybrid regime. Second, the lack of foreign political competition, with or 
without coordination, produces authoritarianism. Third, the coordinated external competition 
generates a democratic outcome.  
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11.3. How do these domestic and external factors affect the political 
liberalization, the rule of law, elections, and the gatekeeping of actors? 
 
In 1992-1995, Georgia was still on the path of Soviet-initiated liberalization triggered by a regime 
decay (Linz, Stepan 1996). Shevardnadze redefined the framework of political rights and liberties 
without consulting much with either external or domestic actors. He used liberalizing policies to 
fractionalize the domestic political sphere and protect his political power from local thugs and 
external rivals. Through these liberalizing policies, Shevardnadze prevented polarization and 
increased competition among multiple groups. He paved the way for the Western democratizer to 
level the uneven external political competition. Saakashvili improved liberal policies on paper and 
ruled in a competitive authoritarian manner. When the external political competition increased, the 
domestic actors recovered from the shock of his rule. The engineered political parties had 
alternatives, although they were linked to the oligarch Ivanishvili. The media started to gain its 
voice and align with nongovernmental organizations to mobilize voters.  
      
In uncertain times, the rule of law actors served those who guaranteed rewards and stability. The 
actors of the rule of law were the Achilles’ heel of the political regime. Instead of truthful 
arbitration, they were engaged in political corruption and pushed the regime toward bureaucratic 
authoritarianism (O’Donnell 1988). The early phases of democratic assistance aided Georgia in 
securing its stability. Thus, the emphasis was on the structural efficiency of police, intelligence, 
and prosecution services. The democratic penetration in judicial institutions was peripheral. 
Political elites were not eager to upset them because the instrumentalization of judges advanced 
their political objectives. On their part, the rule of law groups feared reform. They abused the 
accumulated resources and information to control the swiftness of reform and engaged in 
patrimonial bargaining with the political elites. Democracy promoters should redistribute aid 
equally within the structures of law groups and particularly empower human rights defenders to 
avoid the rule by law. This is a complex task due to internal oppositions, which paradoxically are 
broken by the proxies of autocracy promoters. This internal discord weakens their coercive 
capacities and puts their actions under public scrutiny. The authoritarian promotion of its 
supporters within the law groups is intended to reduce the links to external democratizers; 
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however, it unintentionally exposes the abuses of democratic assistance and the wrongdoings of 
these actors.  
      
During elections, the external political competition resurrected political strategies, actors, and 
processes (Linberg 2006; O’Donnell, Schmitter 1986) in Georgia. During the founding elections, 
there was national euphoria. Nationalist parties and leaders outnumbered communists and opposed 
any candidate with a communist affiliation, including Shevardnadze. External scrutiny was low 
because the Russian coup redirected the attention of external democratizers from the peripheries 
to Moscow. This unsuccessful coup had a reverse snowball effect (Huntington, 1991) on Georgia. 
Gamsakhurdia could not defuse militaries, and the army was polarized. His nationalist politics 
were internally disputed. Russia was a leading external actor, if not the only one. In 1995-2016, 
the role of external democratizers increased. The assistance aimed at designing and defining 
electoral legislation and geographies. The media and nongovernmental organizations were 
empowered to engage in meaningful electoral participation and competition. Democratic partners 
could tolerate some electoral manipulations, but falsifying results was the red line, which no 
government was supposed to cross. The complex relationship of Georgia with Russia reinforced 
the effectiveness of this demand. Thus, the breeding pressures of domestic scrutiny and foreign 
political competition bore high political costs to rig election results.  
      
With regard to political elites, the competing foreign pressures impose mutual constraints and limit 
their gatekeeping potential (Teorell 2010). This reduces the transaction cost for other actors, 
including media, to challenge the regime. Democracy promoters train journalists and empower 
nongovernmental organizations that reinforce media freedom. They are unyielding toward the 
political pressures against the media. The role of external democratizers is more distinct under 
electoral democracy. The media-government confrontation is not simple because the political and 
media market is pluralized, and popular support is fractionalized, from which the collective action 
problem emerges regarding how to defend the media. Paradoxically, media freedom might be 
useful for autocracy promoters to damage the reputation of unwanted governments. They could be 
the suppliers of critical content that is commercially and politically beneficial for the media. On 
their part, autocracy promoters disseminate their narratives and give voice to their insider allies.  
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In sum, external political competition affects political liberalization and democratization so that 
electoral democracy is possible. Competing foreign pressures make liberalizing policies 
operational. They intensify anti-regime mobilization; however, there is a risk of conflict without 
domestic coordination. They attenuate the obstructive capacities of the rule of law actors by 
dividing and subjecting them to public scrutiny. Competing pressures strengthen pre-election 
confrontation and raises the costs of rigging electoral results. As a result, the media weakens the 
oppressive mechanisms of the government.  
 
11.4.   Limitations and extensions  
 
This case study provided a fine-grained explanation of the phenomenon by focusing on the 
processes, actors, and periods. I traced (1) how the democracy promoters democratized the 
institutions and actors, (2) what countermeasures were undertaken by autocracy promoters, and 
(3) under which circumstances domestic coordination was possible. The assumptions derived from 
these reconstructed processes, were tested using qualitative evidence. They were obtained from 
interviews with direct participants, who detailed the rationale behind their decisions.  
      
This study has limitations that call for further extensions. First is the issue of generalizability of its 
major finding that external political competition might be useful for democracy. Although I took 
some preliminary steps, including suggesting codding rules and a possible formula for estimating 
the bargaining power of actors involved in democratization, this dissertation does not build on 
quantitative data. To address this limitation, I need to develop a code book, create an original 
dataset on democratizing regimes, and test this theory in a large number of cases. Second, this 
ambitious extension will provide knowledge on the following questions: What is the intensity of 
external political competition that produces or subverts democracy? What happens when the 
number of competing foreign actors increases in degree and kind? Which levers are the most useful 
for regime promotion?  
      
These questions call for comparative research and for adjusting existing regime promotion models 
to the current realities, which put at stake “liberal universalism” when China, Russia, Iran, and 
Saudi Arabia rise as authoritarian promoters worldwide (Diamond, Plattner, Walker 2016:4; 
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Whitehead, 2009:2016). The surgical democratization of Iraq made clear that uncontested 
decisions in international politics lead to failed democratization (Cederman, Hug, Wenger 
2008:510). The downfall of Saddam Hussein reshaped external and internal power structures and 
gave rise to confrontation among the “regional hawks” - Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. 
Additionally, it had implications for Kuwait and Lebanon (Whitehead 2009:219). The case of Iraq 
demonstrates that knowledge on the degree and kind of external actors and the relational structures 
among them will tell us a lot about the process of democratization.  
     
 Identifying the most effective levers in developing social, economic, and political ties  (Levitsky, 
Way 2005, 2006, 2007) is another pertinent point. Autocracy and democracy promoters use the 
same tools in competitive regime promotion. Let us take the human-based, economic, and energy 
levers as examples. Russia’s RT and Sputnik, China’s CCTV, and Iran’s Press TV are human-
based levers in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and post-soviet states (Cooley 2015:60; 
Diamond, Plattner, Walker 2016:4). They compete with the liberal media, such as Radio Free 
Europe/Liberty and other Western media outlets, depending on the region. Similarly, the 
competing foreign actors diffuse economic ties and engage in “pipeline politics” abroad. For 
instance, China economically supports neighboring regimes (Nathan 2016:33). Energy policies 
impact the Arab region (Diamond, Plattner 2014).  
      
The point I make is that there is no comparative analysis telling us which lever is the most effective 
and whether its effectiveness is time- and region-dependent. This gap motivates me to extend my 
research and collect quantitative data on democratic and autocratic external actors and their 
instruments across time and regions.  
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Appendix I 
Indicators and Coding Rules 
Section 1: Defining and contextualizing indicators  
1. Political levers (superpowers and international organizations):  
The standard form of political pressure is a critical statement of disapproval of the government and 
a country leader or his policies. The connotation of these messages is negative and contains threats. 
Political support usually encourages country leaders. The connotation of messages is positive and 
embraces the performance of the government. Additionally, it signals rewards for the leaders and 
their governments.  
Forms of political levers:  
a. Statements (press releases, interviews)  
b. Memoranda  
c. Communiques 
d. Declarations  
Comparing political levers in Georgia and Belarus216  
For example, the statement of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev:  
 
“Georgia’s acts have caused loss of life, including among Russian peacekeepers…. In 
accordance with the Constitution and the federal laws, as President of the Russian 
Federation, it is my duty to protect the lives and dignity of Russian citizens, wherever they 
may be. It is these circumstances that dictate the steps we will take now. We will not allow 
the deaths of our fellow citizens to go unpunished. The perpetrators will receive the 
punishment they deserve.” (Medvedev 2008) 217 
 
                                                          
216 Note: Belarus was selected to sharpen the contrast between countries that experience the intensity of high (Georgia) 
and low (Belarus) competition.  
217 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/1042 
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For example, the statement of Russian President Vladimir Putin:  
“During the talks, we had a detailed discussion of our prospects for developing economic 
ties. I want to let you know that we made a decision to offer the third credit tranche 
from the EurAsEC anti-crisis fund and we will begin detailed talks about a fourth 
tranche. We were pleased to note that this is possible, in a time-efficient and expedient 
manner, taking into account the positive dynamics of the Belarusian economy.” (Putin 
2012) 218  
Comment: In Belarus, this positive statement aimed at the preservation of Lukashenka’s 
authoritarian regime. In Georgia, the negative statement aimed at destabilization, calling for 
violence and subverting the prospects of democratization. Any such external actors should be 
coded as strategic rivals because their deliberation is negative.  
2. Human-based levers (superpowers and international organizations): 
 
This type of lever includes different kinds of actors. These actors are distinguished along two 
dimensions: (1) entities/organizations and (2) individuals. They serve as proxy agents of influence. 
Entities/organizations are NGOs, media outlets (including print, television, and social media), and 
political parties. Individual actors are journalists, politicians, public figures, and 
intellectuals/academics. 
They assume two leading roles toward external actors:  
a. Proponents  
b. Opponents  
Their connections are developed through education and diaspora ties. However, the guiding 
criterion for coding them as proponents or opponents should be their position toward the external 
actor.  
                                                          
218 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/15519  
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Comparing human-based levers in Georgia and Belarus  
Human-based levers should not be understood only as the “compatriot policy” (Bugajski 2004; 
Hedenskog, Larsson 2007) with which external actors use “ethnic cards” (Snyder, Ballentine 
1996:27). The dominant component of this lever is that external democratizers and autocratizers 
empower and promote those who align with them. These domestic actors have legitimacy and 
mandate to carry out policies that are compatible with the objectives of foreign actors.  
Example 1: The Case of Georgia (1992-2003) 
Under Shevardnadze’s governments, the leading ministerial positions were held by those who 
openly represented Russian interests (Ministers of the Interior: Tengiz Kitovani and Shota Kviraia, 
Minister of Defense: Vardiko Nadibaidze, Ministers of Security: Igor Giorgadze and Valeri 
Khaburdzania). When the pro-Western forces emerged, they started to compete for such positions. 
Two of the leading figures were Mikheil Saakashvili (Justice Minister) and Zurab Zhvania (the 
chair of Parliament). The Georgian Young Lawyers Association and Liberty Institute were leading 
pro-Western nongovernmental organizations. Later, the Russian-Georgian Civil Center, the 
Georgian Eurasian Institute, Multinational Georgia’s Anti-Fascist Coalition, and the Society of 
Erekle the Second were established as alternatives to the Western-dominated organizations. The 
television media were generally pro-Western, especially Rustavi 2, while the Russian narrative 
circulated through the print media.  
 
Example 2: The Case of Belarus (1992-1994) 
 
The controversy over the neutrality of Belarus between Prime Minister Kebich and Head of the 
Parliament Shushkevich ended with the success of pro-Russian forces because their representatives 
prevailed in the Parliament of Belarus (Brzezinski, Sullivan 1996:294).  
 
(See, in the same source, “Shushkevich, Kebich Differ on Confederation” by Igor Sinyakevich, 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 19 September 1992) (Brzezinski, Sullivan 1996:297)  
 
Debates on joining the Collective Security Treaty Organization:  
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Security Commission Chairman on Treaty Hryb stated: “At the Tashkent meeting of the CIS heads 
of state and heads of government, Stanislav Shushkevich, the head of our delegation, did not sign 
the treaty whereby the republic would have joined the collective security system. …. Many 
deputies and representatives of the executive branch think that had we being among the states 
that signed the Collective Security Treaty, we would be finding it easier now to resolve the 
questions of securing arms and material for our armed forces.” (Brzezinski, Sullivan 1996:297) 
(Source: Interview by Igor Sinyakevich, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 17 March 1992) 
  
Comment: Georgia is representative of these competitive proxies; Belarus is not. 
 
3. Economic and trade levers (superpowers and international organizations): 
Economic levers refer to the trade flows and their turnover between the influencer and target 
country (e.g., Russia and Georgia, the EU and Georgia, or the US and Georgia). Economic leverage 
can take positive and negative forms, including: 
a. Embargos  
b. Boycotts 
c. Tariff reduction  
d. Tariff elimination  
e. Market access  
 
Comparing economic and trade levers in Georgia and Belarus 
Belarus and Georgia were top debtors to Russia (Hedenskog, Larsson 2007:66). The Russian 
economic leverage was high in Belarus. In 1992, Russia and Belarus established a common 
economic space and formalized their economic interdependence. Prime Minister Kebich promoted 
economic and monetary integration with Russia (Brzezinski, Sullivan 1996:300-301). 
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For instance,  
 
Security Commission Chairman on Treaty Hryb stated: “As I see it, we should orient ourselves 
toward cooperation with Russia over a long period. There are also economic factors promoting 
us to cooperate: Russia has raw materials while we have a concentration of manufacturing 
sectors. It is not so easy to break into Western markets filled with goods, whereas Russia is a fine 
market for our products. I believe that we should be interested in a very close, well-disposed, and 
intimate cooperation with Russia. I see this as giving us advantages and adding appeal to our 
plan.” (Brzezinski, Sullivan 1996:297) (Source: Interview by Igor Sinyakevich, Nezavisimaya 
Gazeta, 17 March 1992)  
Georgia did not build structural economic ties with Russia. It exploited the Russian market and 
received loans. Georgia institutionalized such relations with the external democratizers in the form 
of budget support, investment, social welfare human development capital, and economic growth 
projects (Source: External Aid in Georgia, Report 2015).  
 
Comment: Unlike Belarus, Georgia was exposed to competing economic forces. 
 
4. Energy levers - gas, oil (superpowers and international organizations): 
This type of lever includes relationships related to oil and gas business. Similar to other levers, 
its leverage can be exercised with the purpose of making either a negative or positive impact. 
The types of relationships are:  
a. Transit corridors  
b. Supply  
c. Extraction  
d. Exploitation 
e. Development  
f. Refinery  
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Negative leverage includes:  
a. Cuts and incidents  
b. Increased prices 
     Positive leverage includes: 
a. Reduced prices  
 
Comparing energy levers in Georgia and Belarus 
Russia was strongly present in the Georgian energy sector. The Unified Energy System of Russia 
generated (100%) power and distributed it (75%) and exported electricity (50%) in Georgia. Russia 
and Belarus also created a common energy space in 1999 (Fredholm 2005:5). Unlike in Georgia, 
in Belarus, Gazprom penetrated the banking sector, in which it accumulated shares worth 34.99% 
(Hedenskog, Larsson 2007:76). Shevardnadze decided to diversify energy connections and 
included Georgia in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum projects. Shevardnadze 
opened doors to American energy influences in Georgia. The US was willing and capable to 
compete with Russian energy companies.  
Comment: The external competition with energy levers is visible in Georgia but not in Belarus. 
5. Military levers (superpowers and international organizations): 
There are soft and hard military levers.  
1) The soft application rests on the mutual consent of parties. The relationship proceeds in the 
following forms:  
a. Advising 
b. Recommendations 
c. Providing expertise  
d. Military exercises and training 
e. Military supplies 
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2) The hard application of military levers involves military action, such as: 
  
a. Military threat  
b. Use of force  
c. Acts of aggression  
d. Invasion   
e. Occupation 
f. Deploying military troops, including peacekeepers    
 
Comparing military levers in Georgia and Belarus  
For example,  
Interview with Deputy Head of NATO Liaison Office, Georgia219: 
“…. NATO does not impose or insist anything. The level of cooperation between NATO 
and the country depends on the ambition of the partner. It is up to the partner to define the 
intensity of relationships. NATO does not tell countries how far these relations go. For 
instance, Georgia is an aspirant while Armenia and Azerbaijan are not, and they make these 
decisions….” 
Georgia NATO Cooperation Mechanisms, Programs, and Initiatives220 
North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC 1992)  
Partnership for Peace (PfP 1994)  
Planning and Review Process (PARP 1999—renewed biennially)  
Georgian soldiers in Kosovo Peacekeeping Operation (KFOR 1999-2008)   
Georgian soldiers in International Security Assistance Force (ISAF 2004)   
NATO Support and Procurement Agency Memorandum (NSPA 2002 –demilitarization purpose) 
Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP 2004) 
                                                          
219 Author’s interview, 2016, Tbilisi, Georgia  
220 Source: Ministry of Defense of Georgia; the materials were requested and provided under the status of public 
information.  
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Annual National Programme (ANP 2008)  
NATO Professional Development Programme (PDP 2009) 
Defense Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP 2009)  
NATO/PfP Training and Education Center in Sachkhere, Georgia (2010) 
Military Committee + GEO Work Plan (2010)  
NATO Smart Defense Initiative (2012)  
Building Integrity Initiative (BI 2012)  
Connected Forces Initiative (CFI 2013) 
Substantial Georgia NATO Package (the most interoperable partners and an invited member of 
the Enhanced Opportunity Partners’ Group) (2014) 
Joint Training Education Center (JTEC 2016) 
Defense Institution Building School (2016)  
 
For example,  
Interview with Shevardnadze by Leon Onikova, Izvestiya, 22 June 1992:  
“…I have already made a statement on the Russian Air Force’s helicopter attack on guard’s 
positions and Georgian villages in the Tskhinvali area on 18 June. It was an act of 
aggression…Rather less groundless was the threat made to Georgia by the Russian vice 
president in a phone call to me ‘I will send planes up.’…...I was in Tskhinvali 13 May and 
reached agreement on a cease-fire. A few hours later there was a rocket attack on the region 
where my colleagues and I were. I described it as an attack on our policy of finding a peaceful 
settlement to the conflict. A more destructive attack followed on 20 May. A group of Ossetian 
refugees was shot near Kekhvi village….The Tskhinvali region is witnessing an escalation of 
hostilities in which Russian army subunits are participating directly.” (Zbigniew, Sullivan 
1996:234)        
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Interview with Shevardnadze by Daniel Lecomte, ARTE Television Network, Strasbourg, 8 
October 1993:  
“I should differentiate between two sides in Russia. On the one hand is the side headed by Yeltsin, 
and on the other – I would even use rather crude words – there are the bastards, who did everything 
they could to raise Abkhaz separatism to the level of fascism. They were the ones who provided 
the financing; they were the ones who supplied all the modern armament. All the 
ammunition as supplied by them. Training was carried out with their help, and they even 
took a direct part in the fighting. That is what I would call the policy of reactionary Russia…. 
The decision to join the CIS was not the decision of the parliament – I made this decision. …I 
must say that it will not be without reason, but I was in this decision the last chance to rescue my 
people and my country…” (Brzezinski, Sullivan 1996a:237).  
 
Georgia-Russia Relations (Military Component) 
 
Until 2005, there were 23 Russian military bases and units. There was one air force base and five 
peacekeeping units (Hedenskog, Larsson 2007: 81-92). In August 2008, there was a Russian-
Georgian war.  
Comment: In its early independence years, Russia had strong military leverage, which motivated 
Georgia to search for strong ties far outside and learn the democratic command of its militaries.  
Belarus-NATO Relations221  
North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC 1992)  
Partnership for Peace (PfP 1994)  
A permanent mission at NATO headquarters (1998) 
NATO-Belarus relations deteriorated over Kosovo (1999) 
Planning and Review Process (PfP PARP 2004) 
                                                          
221 https://www.nato.int/cps/ie/natohq/topics_49119.htm  
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NATO projects (2007-2011) 
 
Belarus-Russia and Russian-Dominated Organizations 
“Russia supplied S-300s of 13 million USD to Belarus (2006). Russia and Belarus established a 
Single Air Defense System (2009) and the Single Regional System of Air Defense (2012). There 
were military trainings, including, Shchyt Sayuza military exercises in 2006 and 2001 (with 1, 800 
and 7, 000 Russian troops), ‘Zapad-2009’ exercise (with 6000 Russian troops) and ‘Zapad-2013’ 
exercise (with 12, 000 Russian troops)” (Bohdan 2014:15-30).  
There are two Russian units based in Belarus. One of them has a strategic function (Hedenskog, 
Larsson, 2007).  
Comment: Compared to the West, Russia effectively uses its military levers and integrates 
successfully with Belarusian militaries. 
Section 2: Determining the intensity of partnerships and rivalries, incentivization, and 
imposition   
Coding: The scale of measurement runs from 0 (low) to 1 (high).  
(0) 0 = absent   
(1) 0 > and < 0.2 = low/weak presence  
(2) 0.2 > and < 0.5 = medium presence  
(3) 0.5 > and = 1 high/strong presence  
Comment: The intensity varies across the levers. For example, political statements might be more 
numerous than military exercises. For this, I set clear rules to distinguish the levels of intensity.  
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1. Rule 1 on Political Levers: 
a. If there are annually 5-10 political statements/memorandums/communiques/declarations, 
the support or opposition is weak. If there are annually 10-15 political 
statements/memorandums/communiques/declarations, the support or opposition is 
medium. If there are annually 15-12 political 
statements/memorandums/communiques/declarations, the support or opposition is strong. 
Code separately for EXAUT (External Autocratizers: Superpower, Organization) and 
EXDEM (External Democratizers: Superpower, Organization).  
2. Rule 2 on Human Based-Levers:  
b. If there are 1-2 entity actor proponents (ENAPROS), the external actor is weakly present. 
If there are 3-6 entity actor proponents (ENAPROS), the external actor is moderately 
present. If there are more than 6 entity actor proponents (ENAPROS), the external actor is 
strongly present. There is no need to count opponents because the proponents of both actors 
(autocracy and democracy) are taken into consideration. If an actor holds a higher position 
(e.g., a minister, or the head of Parliament), the actor should be regarded as the entity actor 
due to broad discretion. Code separately for EXAUT (External Autocratizers: Superpower, 
Organization) and EXDEM (External Democratizers: Superpower, Organization).  
c. I assume that the entity actors are more powerful than individuals because of their 
organizational resources. The degree to which an individual is famous in a country can 
compensate for the unavailability of the mentioned resources. Thus, the quantifying 
numbers are increased in the case of individuals. If there are 1-10 individual actor 
proponents (INAPROS), the external actor is weakly present. If there are 11-25 individual 
actor proponents (INAPROS), the external actor is moderately present. If there are greater 
than 25 individual actor proponents (INAPROS), the external actors are strongly present. 
Code separately for EXAUT (External Autocratizers: Superpower, Organization) and 
EXDEM (External Democratizers: Superpower, Organization).  
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3. Rule 3 on Economic and Trade Levers:   
d. If the trade turnover (export and import) is < 10,000 USD annually, the economic leverage 
is weak. If the trade turnover is 10,000-15,000 USD annually, the economic leverage is 
medium. If the trade turnover is > 15,000 USD annually, the economic leverage is strong. 
If the external country imposes embargos or boycotts as negative leverage, it increases its 
political leverage but decreases its economic leverage because embargos and boycotts 
reduce trade flows. Thus, embargos and boycotts should not be separately coded. The same 
rule applies to the preferential tariffs. Code separately for EXAUT (External Autocratizers: 
Superpower, Organization) and EXDEM (External Democratizers: Superpower, 
Organization).  
4. Rule 4 on Energy Levers:  
e. To identify the strength of the entities that represent external actors in energy politics, I 
need to determine their involvement in the activities specified in Section 2, Paragraph 4 (a-
f). For this reason, we should know the ownership of affiliated companies in the domestic 
energy market. For example, if Gazprom holds < 15% in the domestic market, then it is 
weakly present. If it has 15-20%, then it should be coded as having medium strength. If its 
domination exceeds 20% in the domestic market, then it is strongly present. Code 
separately for EXAUT (External Autocratizers: Superpower, Organization) and EXDEM 
(External Democratizers: Superpower, Organization).  
f. The intensity could also be determined by the arbitrary regulation of prices or cuts and 
incidents. If the price goes arbitrarily below or above the standard market price, the external 
actors exercise their leverage. If both negative and positive incentives (including cuts, 
incidents, and pricing) are used once a year in a target country, the external actors are 
weakly present. If these incentives are invoked twice a year, the external actors are 
moderately present. If these incentives are used more than twice a year, the external actors 
are strongly present. The numbers for detecting intensity are reduced because the 
negotiation of prices is time-consuming. Similarly, cuts or incidents happen occasionally 
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because even the punishers care about their commercial image and are interdependent or 
compete with other actors in the market. Code separately for EXAUT (External 
Autocratizers: Superpower, Organization) and EXDEM (External Democratizers: 
Superpower, Organization).  
5. Rule 5 on Military Levers:  
g. There are the three types of military presence. (1) When the external actor forcefully 
deploys its military troops, with the consent of the international community (usually UN 
Security Council authorization is required), carries out a humanitarian intervention, or 
places its soldiers under a peacekeeping mandate, then this should be counted as medium 
presence. (2) When the external actor invades, occupies, and uses force without the 
authorization of the international community, it is coded as strong presence in a target 
country. (3) When the external actor conducts military training and exercises or provides 
military supplies, this should be coded as weak presence. Code separately for EXAUT 
(External Autocratizers: Superpower, Organization) and EXDEM (External 
Democratizers: Superpower, Organization).  
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Appendix II  
Interview Samples  
Researcher’s question: What steps did you take to free the judiciary from political elaboration?  
Interviewee: the Former Senior Official of the Ministry of Justice.  
 
[We strengthened the role of the self-governing body in the judiciary. Specifically, the Supreme 
Council of Justice performed this function. The courts were responsible themselves for appointing 
judges, dismissing them and imposing disciplinary sanctions. These were important steps, and 
eventually, this is the way that the judicial independence is formed or was formed in other 
countries. These instruments and guarantees exist in the European countries as well, and we 
introduced the same provisions in the Georgian legislation. However, legal safeguards alone 
could not alter the system. You need two things to change a system: first, to establish new rules 
and, second, to create new traditions. It is easy to change legislation, but it is difficult to instill 
new traditions. It takes time.] 
Follow-up question: So the difficulty is in how the agents adapt to these new rules?  
Interviewee: Former senior official from the Ministry of Justice.  
 
[Democracy passes several tests….the best examples are the East European countries and how 
the judicial system was formed there. The legislative guarantees were first, and then the elected 
officials abstained from the revision of the judicial system after the governmental 
changes…..Unfortunately, a new government failed to pass this test.]  
 
Researcher’s question: Why did Saakashvili admit the results of the 2012 elections?  
 
Interviewee: the Former Secretary of National Security Council of Georgia and the Former 
Deputy Foreign Minister.  
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[We, the authors of the Rose Revolution, knew very well that our legitimacy rested only on the 
popular support… Since we understood that we had no such support and that the population voted 
for the alternative political force, we decided to admit.]  
 
Follow-up question: Was this decision the result of external pressures?  
 
[…..that was a logical consequence of the democratizing policies our partners carried out in 
Georgia and invested so much in.]  
 
Researcher’s question: Did the EU conditionality (the prospects of visa liberalization and the 
association agreement) play a role in forcing Saakashvili to recognize the election results?  
 
Interviewee: Former chairperson of the Parliament of Georgia (under the Georgian Dream). 
  
[On the one hand, we reside in a problematic region with complex geopolitical constellations. This 
difficulty is unusual, on the other hand, because we are the subject of interest for different key 
players… Georgia follows the stream; we cannot make initiatives, nor do we have a dynamic 
foreign policy. In a nutshell, our geopolitical location is both the source of a threat and the source 
of perspective… Saakashvili’s government was regarded as pro-Western, and the decision should 
have been relevant to his Western image…] 
The elite interviewing is the account type of evidence. I collected secondary data to control the 
respondents’ biases by obtaining sequence and trace evidence as well as checking the congruence 
between their narratives and actual outcomes.  
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Appendix III 
Ongoing Aid (USD) -2015 
Source: eAIMS database, the Donor Coordination Unit under the Prime Minister of Georgia 
 
 
Donor/ Thematic Area Economic Growth Sustainable Use of 
National Resources 
Good Governance Social Welfare Human Capital 
Development 
Rule of Law and 
Justice 
Other Aid Flows Grand Total 
European Union (EU) 120 376 685.62  18 315 470.55  85 062 024.57  30 497 165.83  58 469 613.81  74 498 965.17  72 750 546.90   459 970 472.45  
European Bank for 
Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) 
87 234 924.00  204 700 188.00  
    
5 668 000.00   297 603 112.00  
Germany 27 055 633.47  221 262 810.46  14 359 342.88  1 147 091.86  2 740 450.00  3 010 968.93  13 704 216.50   283 280 514.10  
Sweden 
 
61 682 722.84  77 279 539.64  6 008 812.93  10 382 059.80  36 973 411.69  1 925 000.00   194 251 546.90  
Netherlands 20 691 500.00  2 814 111.20  616 785.60  879 315.91   1 761 962.04  130 215.49   26 893 890.24  
Austria 3 888 785.00  6 921 533.97  1 754 865.00    
 
381 817.80   12 947 001.77  
Council of Europe (CoE) 
  
4 377 735.70    6 447 977.10    10 825 712.80  
Czech Republic 674 009.00  276 857.40  196 968.20  1 001 369.80  322 311.60     2 471 516.00  
European Investment Bank 
(EIB) 
432 637.00  297 595.70        730 232.70  
Estonia 35 812.40  59 228.20  104 682.40   431 042.70     630 765.70  
EU countries and structures totally contributed 12 89 604 764.66  
US Government 29 448 609.00  13 898 024.00  66 108 315.00  5 660 220.00  153 374 006.00  29 998 976.00  300 000.00  298 788 150.00  
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Appendix IV 
List of Interviews  
 
1. Akaki Gogichaishvili—Anchor/producer of the investigative television program 60 
Minutes, Rustavi 2  
2. Ana Natsvlishvili—Head of the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association 
3. Avtandil Demetrashvili—First president of the Constitutional Court, 1996-2001; secretary 
of the State Constitutional Commission, 1993-1995; chairman of the State Constitutional 
Commission, 2009 
4. Baleisyte Kristina– Deputy head of the NATO Liaison Office in Georgia  
5. Batu Kutelia—Former Georgian ambassador to the United States of America, former 
deputy minister of defense of Georgia and former deputy secretary of Georgia’s National 
Security Council 
6. Davit Paitchadze—TV and radio journalist, Georgian Public Broadcasting; professor of 
media studies at Ilia State University  
7. Davit Sikharulidze—Former defense minister of Georgia, former Georgian ambassador to 
the United States of America 
8. Davit Tevzadze—Former defense minister of Georgia 
9. Davit Usupashvili—Former chairperson of the Parliament of Georgia, former chairperson 
of the Republican Party, cofounder of the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association  
10. Dimitri Sadzaglishvili—Rustavi 2 lawyer  
11. Dwight Nystrom—Political/economic chief, Embassy of the United States to Georgia 
12. Elene Khoshtaria— Former first deputy state minister of Georgia on European and Euro–
Atlantic integration, cofounder of the nongovernmental organization GRASS 
13. Carlo Natale—Minister, deputy head of the EU Delegation to Georgia  
14. Giga Bokeria—Secretary of the National Security Council of Georgia, cofounder of 
Liberty Institute, deputy foreign minister of Georgia  
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15. Giorgi Targmadze—Political director of the TV company IMEDI, author and anchor of the 
analytic program Droeba, former leader of the Christian–Democratic Movement of 
Georgia 
16. Giorgi Tugushi—Former public defender of Georgia and former minister of corrections 
and legal assistance of Georgia 
17. Gocha Tskitishvili—Director of the Institute for Polling and Marketing 
18. Ia Antadze—Head of the Civil Development Institute Board, media expert and journalist 
for Radio Liberty and GDS 
19. Inga Grigolia—Anchor of various political talk shows and news program, including TV 
Imedi, TV Mze, Rustavi 2, First State Channel (currently Georgian Public Broadcasting), 
and TV Pirveli 
20. Inna Melnykovska – A country expert for Ukraine  
21. Irakli Menagarishvili—Former foreign minister of Georgia 
22. Irma Inashvili—Journalist who released the notorious prison tapes before the elections of 
2012 
23. Jenny Paturyan – A country expert for Armenia  
24. Lasha Natsvlishvili—Former deputy security minister, deputy interior minister, deputy 
chief prosecutor of Georgia and member of the Parliament of Georgia from the Republican 
Party  
25. Levan Dolidze—Former ambassador of Georgia to NATO, former first deputy defense 
minister of Georgia, and current director of the Georgian Centre for Security and 
Development 
26. Lilia Shevtsova—A country expert for Russia 
27. Luba Eliashvili—Former director general of Channel 9 and TV company Iberia, journalist 
for First State Channel (currently Georgian Public Broadcasting) 
28. Natia Koberidze—Former journalist at Rustavi 2, Georgian Public Broadcasting, and TV 
Imedi 
29. Natia Mikiashvili—Investigative journalist, TV Imedi, TV Maestro, and Channel 9 
30. Natalia Timus—A country expert for Moldova  
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31. Nika Gvaramia—General director of Rustavi 2, former minister of justice of Georgia, 
former deputy general prosecutor of Georgia, and former minister of education and science 
of Georgia 
32. Nino Burjanadze—Former acting president of Georgia, 2003-2004 and 2007-2008; former 
chairperson of the Parliament of Georgia; leader of Democratic Movement-United Georgia  
33. Nino Danelia—Media expert, professor of media studies at Ilia State University, and 
elected member of the board of trustees of Georgian Public Broadcasting  
34. Nino Shubladze—Former deputy director general of Rustavi 2  
35. Nino Zuriashvili—Investigative journalist of 60 Minutes at Rustavi 2, studio monitor 
36. Roshan Ibrahimov—A country expert for Azerbaijan 
37. Salome Zurabishvili—Former foreign minister of Georgia 
38. Sergi Kapanadze—Former deputy foreign minister 
39. Shota Utiashvili—Former head of information, Analytical Department, Ministry of 
Internal Affairs of Georgia 
40. Stephen Stork—Deputy head of Operations Section, Delegation of the European Union to 
Georgia  
41. Tamar Chergoleishvili—Director general of TV Tabula 
42. Tamar Chugoshvili—First deputy chairperson of the Parliament of Georgia, former 
assistant to the prime minister of Georgia, former head of Georgian Young Lawyers’ 
Association, and Rule of Law Program coordinator for USAID 
43. Tamar Kinsturashvili—Former director general of Georgian Public Broadcasting and 
chairperson of the board of the nongovernmental organization Media Development Fund  
44. Taras Kuzio – A country expert for Ukraine  
45. Tengiz Gogotishvili—Journalist of P.S. Studio and Rustavi 2 and former head of NATO 
Information Centre 
46. Tina Burjaliani—Former deputy minister of Justice  
47. Former representative of the Ministry of Justice of Georgia (anonymous)   
48. Vakhtang Abashidze—Chairman of the Georgian National Communications Commission  
49. Viktor Dolidze—Chair of the European Integration Committee of the Parliament of 
Georgia  
50. Vladimir Socor – A country expert for Moldova  
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Appendix V 
Media Market in 2013-2016 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Georgian National Communication Commission data of 2013 on the revenues of 54 private 
media outlets 
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Figure 9: Georgian National Communication Commission data of 2014 on the revenues of 66 private 
media outlets 
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Figure 10: Georgian National Communication Commission data of 2015 on the revenues of 64 private 
media outlets 
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Figure 11: Georgian National Communication Commission data of 2016 on the revenues of 79 private 
media outlets 
 
